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Chapter 1: Collective action in networks 
Usually one takes for granted that a company is the unit of interest for production of 
customer benefits. Another way of producing such benefits is, however, through a 
network of self-governing companies that serve customers collectively. As an 
example, a tourist destination can operate as an integrated unit, such as Disney 
World, where the corporation serves most of the activities for their customers. On the 
other hand, a tourist destination can consist of several actors that, in a network, 
collectively form a tourist experience. For example, Oslo is a tourist destination. The 
latter is the subject of this research, i.e. situations where two or more companies 
together form customer benefits. Another example of this would be a shopping mall 
where different stores satisfy complementary needs, and where the combination of 
stores forms the total product, i.e. the mall. The arena for this project is illustrated by 
these examples, and consists of actors1 who, in a value chain, offer complementary 
products2 for the same group of customers. 
As can be seen intuitively, organizing Oslo as an integrated tourist destination 
would be difficult. In economic terms this is because the transaction costs of 
bureaucracy exceed the gain from monitoring control (Williamson 1985). On the 
other hand, contractual arrangements can capture some of the coordination effort, as 
can be seen in shopping mall contracts, but unforeseen conditions and environmental 
changes make it impossible to capture every condition in a contract (Heide 1994), 
and formal contracts can be free ride (Nygaard 1992; Nygaard and Silkoset 2003; 
Rokkan 1997). Based on this, the purpose of this project is to investigate the 
coordination effort between two or more actors that operate in co-producing 
                                                     
1 When referring to actors in this research, I mean the businesses and not the customers 
2 With products I also mean services and ideas. 
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networks, which serve the same group of customers (Ramírez 1999). In particular, the 
focus is on the coordination of self-governing actors in co-producing networks who 
perform a co-market orientation, and whether this coordination affects the actors’ 
ability to adapt their products toward each other, and toward their collective 
customers.  
Co-producing networks are characterized by specialized businesses offering 
complementary fragments of a customer’s total product (Ramírez 1999). Thus, the 
sum of the fragments, documented by the different customer segments, is identified 
as the total product. A total product is created by two or more businesses and 
identified by the customer. Such fragmented markets are characterized by specialized 
businesses and occupied by divided or narrowed tasks (Dollinger 1990). In co-
producing networks the customers have to transact with several suppliers to satisfy 
their demand (Stigler 1951). For example, a holidaymaker interacts with a travel 
agency, a transportation company, hotel, restaurants, and other activities, such as 
salmon fishing, beaver safari, museums and concerts. The customer’s centre of 
attention is the trip in its entirety, i.e. the total product. Because the customer 
evaluates the total product, the network actors are affected by each other’s behavior. 
This notion is well known in the collective action theory, which discusses volunteer 
participation for collective long-term goals (Olson 1965; Sandler and Hartley 2001), 
and in the free-riding literature, which discusses control mechanisms for participation 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
An individual actor can adapt its products to its customers, and/or the 
adaptation can be done collectively with the other actors in the co-producing network. 
Choice of behavior is important because the behavior affects the other actors that 
operate in the same network (Olson 1965; Ramírez 1999). Product adaptation 
requires information about the customer and the market (Day 1994b; Day 1991). 
Several studies (see Deshpandé 1999; Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster 1993; Kohli 
and Jaworski 1990; Narver and Slater 1990) have demonstrated that market 
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orientation is an effective tool regarding a company’s ability to develop products 
adapted to customers' preferences. This is because market orientation in principle 
works as an information system to support managerial decisions (Day 1994a; Day 
1994b; Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster 1993; Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Narver and 
Slater 1990). Further, in co-producing networks, where several actors serve the same 
customers through co-production, collective understanding about the customers is 
essential (Ramírez 1999). For instance, the presence of externalities demonstrates that 
there is a lack of coordination between the activities (Coase 1960). In such situations, 
one party might exploit the other parties for their own gain, but at the cost of the 
collective benefit (Olson 1965). However, the risk of sub-optimization and 
exploitation decreases with the level of system knowledge (Senge 1990). Therefore, 
the use of co-market orientation in this research builds on the assumption that the 
degree of co-market orientation covary with the degree of collective market 
knowledge. Day (1994b) demonstrates that the market learning processes of market 
oriented firms are distinguished by: open-minded inquiry based on the belief that all 
decisions are made from the market back; widespread information distribution that 
assures that relevant facts are available when needed; mutually informed mental 
models that guide interpretation and ensure that everyone pays attention to the 
essence and potential of the information; and an accessible memory of what has been 
learned. For instance, the agency theory demonstrate how divergence in actor goals 
hampers synchronized action (Eisenhardt 1989), whereas shared goals among 
members encourages collective actions (Ouchi 1979).  
Information is a critical factor in the ability and motivation to cooperate 
(Akerlof 1970; Stiglitz 2000), whereas information impactedness  and information 
asymmetry hampers coordination and adaptation (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Therefore, extensive information processing, as assumed in market orientation, 
becomes especially interesting in co-producing networks and, as a result, is the main 
subject in this research.  
10 
 
An example of adaptation derived from customer knowledge is Tromsø 
Museum. They cooperated with Destination Tromsø and opened their museum at 
night- time to adapt toward customers in a direct flight from England. The primary 
goal for these tourists was to watch polar light. If product offerings are 
desynchronised a tourist is likely to evaluate the destination negatively. The problem 
exists in other settings as well. For example, a shopping mall will get a negative 
reputation if one of the retailers free rides on customer service. Also, a customer will 
negatively evaluate a car brand if one of the manufacturers free rides on the quality 
on their components. Similarly, a computer brand will be evaluated negatively if the 
software, delivered by another company, does not work properly in conjunction with 
the hardware.  
1.1 Business specialization 
Coase (1937, p. 394) discusses the economic rationality behind specialization by 
asking the question ‘why is not all production carried out by one big firm?’ There are 
several explanations. First, as a firm gets larger, there may be decreasing returns on 
the entrepreneur function, that is the costs of organizing additional transactions 
within the firm may rise. Second, it may be that as the organized transactions 
increase, the entrepreneur fails to prioritize the factors of production where their 
value is greatest. Finally, Coase (1937) argues that the supply price of one or more of 
the factors of production may rise because the “other advantages” of a small firm are 
greater than those of a large firm. The firm tends to expand until the costs of 
organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying 
out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of 
organizing in another firm (Coase 1937). When firms specialize they concentrate and 
develop operations that supports their strengths (Stigler 1951). There are other 
reasons why firms do not want to integrate or extend their domain (for instance, serve 
several fragments of the customer’s demand, e.g. that the Maihaugen museum in 
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Lillehammer does not want to offer accommodation), which include the following. 
The businesses have focused niche strategies (Porter 1980) or they have outsourced 
all activities outside the strategic core because of the transaction costs (Anderson, 
Day, and Rangan 1997). It can also be because of lack of knowledge and competence 
(Leonard-Barton 1992), lack of other resources such as machinery, equipment, 
natural resources, or the finance to invest in such resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978), or lack of knowledge to run a big company (Arrow 1974). In addition, it can 
be because of the history of the company (Boeker 1989), for example, a family firm 
which has been run for several generations (for instance, Friele, a family business in 
Norway, which through 200 years of history has focused on the quality of coffee 
beans), or the risk of damaging a corporate brand (Jap 1993). Thus, there exist several 
economic and strategic reasons why a company occupies a certain domain.   
Utilization of resources can be connected to organizational efficiency, which is 
an internal standard of performance based on the measurement of how well the 
organization is performing its activities (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Organizational 
efficiency measures the ratio of resources utilized to output. It answers the question 
"how to do?" Focus is on how the internal organizational activities are being 
performed3. Efficiency therefore affects an actor’s degree of specialization 
(Williamson 1985). 
1.2 Product complementarity in co-production 
Business specialization implies that different actors offer complementary fragments 
of a customer’s need in co-producing networks. A usage complementary product 
                                                     
3 The efficiency perspective has been criticized for treating organizations as a 'black box' or bundle of 
functions. The effectiveness perspective on the other hand, is criticized for its isolation from antecedent 
conditions and outcome. Organizational effectiveness is defined as a measure on the organizations ability to 
create acceptable outcomes and actions (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). It is an external standard of how well an 
organization is meeting the demand of the various groups and organizations that are concerned with its 
activities. By this organizational effectiveness can be seen as a socio-political question to give answer to 
"what to do", a decision of which activities to perform. 
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implies that the product attributes fulfill each other in such a way that the total 
customer value is bigger than if the products had been offered to the market 
separately (Ramírez 1999). This understanding of value is not simply 'added' but is 
mutually 'created' and 're-created' among actors with different values. For co-
production, Ramírez (1999) focuses on value co-produced by two or more actors, 
which is mutually beneficial, with and/or for other actors. Thus, the value creation in 
co-production is between seller and buyers, and between sellers for the purpose of 
buyers. When, for example, actors coordinate their market information through a 
collective brochure, the customer is provided with easy access to information about 
their activities.  This enables the customer to make informed decisions about what 
activities would best suit their needs.  
1.3 Collective action 
Value creation between actors in co-producing networks requires coordinated action 
between the actors. Collective action comes into being when the efforts of two or 
more individuals are needed to accomplish an outcome (Olson 1965). Activities that 
involve the furtherance of the interests or well being of a group are often examples of 
collective action. Problems with collective action are typically characterized by 
interdependency among the participants, so that the contributions or efforts of one 
individual influence the contributions or efforts of others (Sandler 1992). Three 
problems with collective action exist.  One is with coordination, which can be 
hampered because of free riding, and there are two adaptation problems, which are 
caused by sub-optimization and unsolved tasks (Olson 1965). These problems cause 
the network to be inefficient, and the utilization of the business resources declines.  
The problems with coordination and adaptation between specialized businesses 
are rooted in the ability and motivation to cooperate (Coase 1937; Olson 1965). 
Ability and motivation to cooperate are dependent on information (Akerlof 1970; 
Stiglitz 2000), whereof information impactedness and information asymmetry 
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hamper coordination and adaptation (Jensen and Meckling 1976). For instance, where 
integration needs to take place, actors can hold back information in the selection 
process, which leads to misrepresentation (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992). During 
hierarchical governance information can be held back with the purpose to shirk 
(Williamson 1985). When partners are operating in alliances, information can be held 
back with the intention of free riding on the other actors (Rokkan 1997), at their 
expense (Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999). Similarly, information can be withheld to 
prevent the other actors misusing the information opportunistically (John 1984). 
Therefore, the ability and motivation to coordinate and adapt is fundamental to 
collective action among specialized businesses operating in co-producing networks.  
1.4 Synchronizing and coordinating network actors  
Market orientation has been shown to be an effective tool regarding businesses’ 
adaptation toward the customer (see Atuahene-Gima 1995; Atuahene-Gima 1996; 
Cooper 1994; Day 1994a; Grewal and Tansuhaj 2001; Han, Kim, and Srivastava 
1998; Hurley and Hult 1998; Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Li and Calantone 1998; 
Lukas and Ferrell 2000; Narver and Slater 1990). However, challenges come into 
being when a customer’s evaluation of a business is affected by the other businesses 
in the same market, and where there is limited ability to control the other actors. 
Therefore, this project seeks to uncover the mechanism which is used to synchronize 
and coordinate self-governing actors in co-producing networks when they work 
together to perform a co-market orientation.  
 
The problem in question in this project is: 
 
What is the impact of a co-market orientation in networks? 
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As briefly mentioned earlier, the literature identifies information to be a key problem 
in achieving effective adaptation and coordination between specialized businesses 
(Stigler 1961). Information is needed to determine the best use of resources and 
appropriate adaptation. However, information is not freely available to everyone 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992), and, based on this, information needed to coordinate 
actors has to be exchanged and participants have to give and receive information.   
The project will focus on two factors regarding co-market-orientation among 
specialized actors in co-producing networks. Based on the problem of information 
asymmetry (Akerlof 1970; Stiglitz 2000), ex-ante factors will be investigated that 
affect the coordination of self-governing actors who perform a co-market orientation. 
For coordination, the factors investigated will be the use of formal contracts and the 
presence of social control, the latter being identified as a type of social capital, as 
well as the effect of structural position in the network. These factors form the 
independent, exogenous variables in the research model. Second, the outcome from 
co-market orientation in co-producing networks is examined. Here the focus turns to 
ex-post adaptation of co-producing actors who have a common purpose. Two factors 
regarding adaptation are investigated: the presence of investments which are to be 
used specifically to adapt the actor’s offerings, and the effect that has on the 
collective customers. These variables, and the variable of co-market orientation, form 
the mediating and endogenous variables in the research model. The following sub-
sections elaborate on the coordination and adaptation sub-questions. 
1.4.1 Coordination of co-producing actors 
Actors collaborate on the assumption that the ability and motivation to coordinate is 
present (Olson 1965). For coordination to be efficient it requires complete and shared 
information. The literature has identified bounded rationality (Simon 1972) and 
information asymmetry (Williamson 1975) to bungle coordination. The bounded 
rationality problem to secure complete information has been solved through loose 
coupling (Weick 1976), relational contracting (Heide and John 1992), implicit 
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contracting, and learning (Simon 1991). All of these are required to perform a 
coordination that can handle unforeseen conditions, and thus are more flexible than 
formal contractual arrangements. Information asymmetry has been solved through 
ex-ante extensive selection processing to uncover private information (Bergen, Dutta, 
and Walker 1992). The partner’s motivation to coordinate is important in that it stops 
parties from cheating and/or shirking (Williamson 1985). For motivation to be 
present, the gain of coordination must exceed the costs of coordinating (Olson 1965). 
As a means of securing partner participation, literature on the subject has discussed 
coercive power (Olson 1965), integration (Williamson 1979), contracting (Van de 
Ven 1976), incentives (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Knoke 1988; Olson 1965), group 
size (Granovetter 1978; Olson 1965), social norms (Coleman 1988), and social 
structure (Chwe 1999; Coleman 1988) to prevent free riding. Challenges arise when 
the parties are self-governing actors who want to retain their autonomy. In such 
situations power cannot be used to direct the parties. Drawn from existing theory I 
will identify a means to coordinate co-market orientation among co-producing actors. 
Attention will be given to centralization and formalization, which will substitute fiat 
as a way of directing self-governing partners into a common direction (Van de Ven 
1976; Williamson 1991). However, formal contracts can lead to free riding (Nygaard 
1992; Nygaard and Silkoset 2003; Rokkan 1997), and environmental factors can 
make it impossible to capture future events in contracts (Heide 1994; Williamson 
1985). Therefore, social capital (Coleman 1988), which reflects the social structural 
network in which the actors operate, is included. Thereby I will be able to investigate 
how societies affect the behavior of self-governing parties. Finally, the structural 
position of the actors in the network is included. As Olson (1965) indicates, group 
asymmetry, in terms of individual tastes and/or endowments, is related to collective 
failures.  
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Sub-question1): How do specialized actors in co-producing networks coordinate their 
businesses toward each other when they participate in a co-market 
orientation?  
1.4.2 Adaptation of co-producing actors 
The second factor of interest is the adaptation between actors in co-producing 
networks. The actors adapt their products toward each other to prevent sub-
optimization, and toward their collective customers to prevent unsolved tasks. 
Product adaptation is undertaken to increase attractiveness to the customer. However, 
such attractiveness benefits all of the actors operating in the same market. Therefore, 
the adaptation is identified as a public good (Olson 1965). To reiterate, the motivation 
to engage in collective activities depends on the gain of coordination, thus the gain 
must exceed the cost of coordination (Olson 1965). The cost of coordination is 
identified as the resources used in contracting and adapting the product to the market. 
Customer adaptation requires information to be exchanged, and resources have to be 
allocated with the purpose of synchronizing activities and products. The adaptation 
requires coordinated effort by two or more individuals (Olson 1965; Sandler 1992). 
As such, the adaptation involves group actions intended to further the interests or 
well being of the members (Olson 1965; Sandler 1992). Based on this, I will 
investigate how specific investments in actor adaptation affect collective customer 
adaptation.  
Second, the benefit from the adaptation is measured through customer value. 
This value is identified as the offering and benefit the customer receives from 
exchanging in the co-producing network. The offerings are evaluated by the price the 
customer has to give up to receive the total product (includes financial costs in 
addition to the use of time, and value and risk involved with the transaction of the 
total product), compared to alternative exchanges (Murphy and Enis 1986). Measured 
in a co-producing network setting, the customer value is defined through the 
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customer’s evaluation of the total product - a total product that will vary with 
different levels of product adaptation and synchronization.  
 
Sub-question 2): In a situation where specialized actors operate in a co producing 
network, what affect does adaptation from businesses with regard to the 
total product have on the customer’s evaluation of the total product?  
 
The following accomplish the two goals of this research. In Chapter two I identify co-
market orientation as a type of collective action. The reason for doing so is that it 
enables us to use the logic of collective failure to identify failure to perform a co-
market orientation in co-producing networks. By this, I have a well-established 
framework to use when testing my research questions. The next part in Chapter two is 
to identify factors that affect an actor’s participation in co-market orientation, explore 
its link to adaptation, public goods and customer value. In Chapter three the 
hypotheses are discussed. It starts with a discussion of antecedents to co-market 
orientation, of this contractual control, social capital, and structural position, which is 
followed by a discussion of consequences, such as specific investments and customer 
value. The methodological part starts in Chapter four, where the concepts are 
evaluated and choices are made to test the theories put forward in the research model. 
This chapter includes the operationalization and measurement of the research 
constructs, followed by a discussion on the questionnaire design and control 
variables. Chapter five examines the data and validates the measures. A non-response 
and missing value analysis are performed to the measurement model. The construct 
of social capital and second order model of co-market orientation is validated, 
followed by a multitrait-multimethod analysis to test for convergent and divergent 
validity at the dyadic data level. In Chapter six the hypothesis in the theoretical model 
are tested. This test is three fold; it starts with a test for the single-firm sample, then it 
includes control variables, and the chapter ends with a test of the dyadic structural 
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model, using a multitrait-multimethod approach. In Chapter seven the research is 
summarized. It discusses the results from the research, its theoretical and managerial 
implications, and closes with a discussion of the limitations and makes suggestions 
for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Co-market orientation in 
networks 
 
 
 
 
 
Of particular interest in this research is, firstly, the investigation of how specialized 
actors in co-producing networks coordinate with the purpose to perform a co-market 
orientation, and, secondly, whether co-market orientation among the actors affects the 
products offered in such networks. The use of collective action to explain co-market 
orientation enables us to grasp the problem through using a well-established theory to 
explain the questions in focus. Further, to investigate factors affecting collective 
failure, theories regarding contractual arrangement and theories within sociological 
economy, hereof social capital, are discussed. Finally, theory regarding specific 
investments, such as creation of public good, and the concept of customer value, is 
included. Therefore, the purpose of the theory chapter is threefold: first to identify co-
market orientation as a type of collective action; second to identify factors that affect 
an actor’s participation in co-market orientation; and third to explore concepts of 
adaptation, public goods and customer value. First, however, I will start with a brief 
discussion of the theoretical arrangements that influence the collective action 
situation.   
20 
 
 
This research builds on the basic principle that people in the economic world produce 
more if they cooperate by specializing in their productive activities and then 
transacting with one another to acquire the actual goods and services they desire 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1990). In co-producing networks the collective action comes 
into being when the efforts of two or more individuals are needed to accomplish an 
outcome. Collective action builds on one fundamental sociological question: when 
will a collectivity act to maximize its collective interest even though such behavior 
conflicts with a course of action that would maximize the short-term interest of each 
individual separately? (Marwell and Ames 1979, p. 1335, italics in original). The 
problem of collective action can be found in a variety of disciplines: as “irrationality 
of voting” in political science, the “free rider problem” in economics, and the 
“prisoner dilemma” in psychology. Economic theory builds on rational choice theory 
as motivation for participation in collective action. Rational choice theory is based on 
the assumption that human behavior is self-interested, so that achieving cooperation 
toward collective objectives is inherently problematic (Olson 1965). Hence, a basic 
tenet of Olson’s (1965) formulation of the free rider problem is that a rational actor 
will abstain from contributing to a public good if his or her contribution has a 
negligible impact on the total amount of the good produced (and consequently a 
negligible impact on his or her consumption of the good).  
Rational choice theory in collective action is exemplified by Coleman’s (1990) 
simple, yet groundbreaking, question, “Why do rational actors create obligations?” 
Coleman’s work is especially interesting in that he argues that actors enter into 
relations because they can achieve something in these relations that they could not 
achieve by themselves (p. 298). Thus, the value [of social capital as a concept] lies 
primarily in the fact that it identifies certain aspects of social structure by their 
function. When the relations among parties change in ways that facilitate action, 
social capital is created. Coleman (p. 302) writes that the public good, which it would 
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not be in an actor’s self interest to create [the rational choice argument], is often 
generated as a by-product of relationships initially entered into because of their direct 
reward. Also, studies demonstrate that structural position affects thresholds for 
participating in collective action (Chwe 1999; Granovetter 1978).  
In this research I propose that co-market orientation is a type of such collective 
action. It should be noted, however, that the concept of market orientation is an 
ambiguous one that has been defined in a variety of ways (see Deshpandé, Farley, 
and Webster 1993; Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Narver and Slater 1990; Webster 1988, 
among others). Further, the concept of ‘co’ market orientation is introduced in this 
research. Consequently, it is necessary to start the next section with an analysis of 
market orientation, followed by a discussion of this research’s extension of market 
orientation into the collective action framework and the ensuing co-market 
orientation.  
2.1 The ‘orientation’ in co-market orientation 
By co-market orientation I mean the market orientation activities actors in co-
producing networks perform together. Individual market orientation activities, on the 
other hand, are not coordinated with the other actors in the business network, but 
performed separately. Accordingly, it is relevant to anticipate that co-market 
orientation is less frequent than individual market orientation.  
My treatment of co-market orientation builds on an implicit assumption that 
market orientation is identified from behavioral orientation (that is, activities, see 
Kohli and Jaworski 1990), rather than philosophical orientation, which focuses on 
the cognitive aspects of orientation. This statement is important when, at a later stage, 
I connect market orientation to the collective action theory. Accordingly, the 
‘orientation’ in market orientation plays a crucial role when extending individual 
market orientation into co-market orientation. Dreher (1994) argues that the different 
interpretation of an orientation construct has advantages and disadvantages depending 
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on the objective of the research . To fully understand the consequences of this 
research’s treatment of market orientation from the behavioral orientation paradigm, 
a more in-depth discussion of the two concepts of ‘orientation’ is consequently 
required. Therefore, the next section will discuss the two different paradigms on 
market orientation, the behavioral perspective and the philosophical perspective, from 
an inter-organizational point of view.  
2.1.1 Two concepts of orientation 
Behavioral orientation. The concept of behavioral orientation builds on two 
assumptions: that managers are rational actors, and that a phenomenon can be 
understood through breaking it down into components. Hence, from this point of 
view, co-market orientation in inter-organizational relations is expressed through the 
organization’s rules and attitudes, which are developed under certain conditions of 
internal coordination, culture and philosophy (Dreher 1994). Here, co-market 
orientation leads us to understand that organizations have a deterministic function in 
their world (Thompson 1967). In other words, if managers in one organization 
perform a particular form of market orientation behavior on behalf of themselves and 
a cooperating organization, this behavior reflects a specific belief that is shared by the 
cooperating organization. For example, if one organization gathers customer 
satisfaction data (on behalf of a cooperating organization), the behavioral perspective 
of an orientation assumes that this behavior reflects a shared belief that customer 
satisfaction is important. Following this logic, the effects of co-market orientation as 
a cause can be discovered (or at least estimated) through “laws” regarding 
organizational functions and performance. The primary interest of such a 
rational/mechanistic perspective of co-market orientation is to identify the collective 
set of activities organizations undertake in order to perform a co-market orientation. 
In this way, the “manifestation” of the orientation is determined through the co-
market orientation behavior (Dreher 1994).  
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To fully understand the notion of behavioral orientation in co-market 
orientation, a closer look into an individual organization’s market orientation, within 
the behavioral orientation paradigm, is necessary. The behavioral orientation 
perspective came into focus after problems in implementing the marketing concept 
were experienced. Felton (1959) provided an extensive discussion regarding the 
implementation of the concept in the early stages of marketing concept research. 
Barksdale and Darden (1971) reported that many managers, while reporting they had 
accepted the philosophy of the marketing concept, indicated that they were frustrated 
in their attempts to implement it on a day-to-day basis. A growing interest in 
implementation of the marketing concept thus came into focus for researchers. In line 
with the rational behavior paradigm, Bell and Emory (1971) suggest taking specific 
action in order to implement the marketing concept. Shapiro (1988) even provided a 
market-oriented behavior "check-list" that includes providing information rapidly, 
making reasonable promises, meeting agreed on performance standards, and doing 
follow-ups. Kohli and Jaworski (1990) extended the understanding of market 
orientation as a behavior by breaking it down into specific behavioral components. 
These activities then represented guidelines that facilitated the day-to-day approach 
to performing market orientation.  
As mentioned previously, co-market orientation from a behavioral orientation 
view finds its expression in certain inter-organizational rules and attitudes, and is 
developed under certain conditions of internal coordination, culture and philosophy 
(Dreher 1994). For instance, Kohli and Jaworski (1990) and Jaworski and Kohli 
(1993) emphasize the importance of organizational antecedents (e.g., top 
management emphasis on market orientation, interdepartmental conflicts) on 
relations to market orientation behaviors. The contribution of Kohli and Jaworski 
(1990) is important in three ways (Graves and Matsuno 1995). First, they lend 
support to the argument that implementing the marketing concept leads to a positive 
economic performance (e.g. Barksdale and Darden 1971; King 1965). Second, the 
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degree of abstraction is less when one measures observable phenomena, such as 
behavior, than for abstract constructs such as attitudes and philosophies. Therefore, 
the behavior tradition implies less measurement error. Third, the implications they 
offer are managerially relevant. The activity-based construct represents a set of 
behaviors which managers have control over. In short, the construct represents 
activity guidelines that facilitate the implementation and control of day-to-day 
operations. The activities necessary to implement co-market orientation are thus 
identified.  
Philosophical orientation. The concept of philosophical orientation builds on 
an assumption that organizations are intertwined with their environment. Since 
members of a particular organization create their own subjective world, relations 
between causes and effects are seen as being idiosyncratic (Graves and Matsuno 
1995). This organic perspective assumes that particular elements of a phenomenon 
are meaningful only in the context of the other elements, while the 
rational/mechanistic approach calls for breaking a phenomenon into components. In 
other words, co-market orientation is expressed through the cognitive and mental 
element, being influenced by the attitude the organization has towards the orientation 
in addition to its knowledge of and skill in performing this orientation (Dreher 1994). 
The organic perspective suggests that co-market orientation should be understood in 
terms of the organizations’ shared views. This leads to co-market orientation 
influencing the organizations’ strategy, activities, programs, and cooperation. As 
Dreher (1994) puts it, orientation in this sense can best be described as a phenomenon 
which is embedded in the cognitive sphere and influenced by personal factors, 
leading to a certain view of reality and forming organizational characteristics such as 
goals, strategies, structures, systems, and activities.  
Discussions of individual market orientation in terms of a business philosophy 
or organizational culture reflect the view of orientation from the cognitive sphere and 
mental element (Graves and Matsuno 1995). In response to King's (1965) call for 
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research to investigate the state of implementation of this marketing concept, 
McNamara (1972) studied both acceptance of the marketing concept as a philosophy 
and actual implementation of the concept. He argues that acceptance of the concept is 
a necessary condition to its implementation. Webster (1988) emphasizes the 
importance of a corporate culture that values customer orientation. He argues that an 
organization could foster manifestations of the marketing concept and customer 
orientation by directing an adequate level of resources and development and reward 
programs to marketing personnel. Deshpandé and Webster (1989) and Deshpandé, 
Farley, and Webster (1993) describe the marketing concept in terms of organizational 
culture. Narver and Slater (1990) define market orientation as a culture that leads to 
certain outcomes that is, the creation of superior value for buyers, rather than a 
culture that has certain attributes. In terms of implementation of the market 
orientation, the subjective organic view suggests that an organization should adopt 
the philosophy or culture of market orientation. 
Choice of orientation. This research’s treatment of co-market orientation draws 
on the concept developed by Kohli and Jaworski (1990). There are several reasons 
for this. By treating co-market orientation as a behavior I are able to grasp the 
systems in process. Constructs such as culture, philosophy, and beliefs, which had 
been seen as the orientation phenomenon itself or as elements of the phenomenon in 
the philosophical perspective, are treated as influencing factors in the behavioral 
approach (Shapiro 1988). By treating co-market orientation as a behavior, the 
challenge will be to identify the integrative relationship among the factors that 
comprise the overall market orientation and specific marketing actions of an 
organization (Day 1994a). When identified they can be converted into capabilities 
and strategies that represent a sustainable competitive advantage for the organization. 
Thus, by viewing capabilities and resources in conjunction with co-market 
orientation, my understanding of its effects is broadened, without us having to 
include capabilities and resources as separate elements of the definition, something 
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Hunt and Morgan (1995) have been criticized for mixing. The behavior and its 
activities represent the orientation phenomenon in itself and its components, whereas 
the philosophical approach treats these as a consequence of the orientation. In other 
words, focus and strategies have become elements instead of consequences of the 
orientation.  
Dreher (1994) elaborates on several pitfalls of the behavioral perspective. Co-
market orientation from the philosophical orientation point of view would emphasize 
factors such as shared cultural values. For instance, Achrol, Scheer and Stern (1990) 
identify organizational compatibility, goal compatibility, partner commitment and 
trust as important characteristics of partner firms. The philosophical value/beliefs 
perspective on co-market orientation enables one to make a connection to 
organizational cognition, hereof schemata, scripts, cognitive maps, standard operating 
procedures, groupthink, theories in use, or frames of reference. The behavioral 
perspective on market orientation, reflecting market intelligence activities, does not 
guarantee marketing success (Diamantopoulos and Hart 1993). Beliefs and values 
have been demonstrated to be important for orientation as a phenomenon. Moreover, 
empirical tests of theories connecting beliefs and values on implementation are rather 
vague. When implementing a behavioral perspective on co-market orientation this 
will support a strategy-structure perspective. This decomposed understanding of co-
market orientation builds on the behavioral school and industrial organization 
economics. This enables the determination of factors affecting co-market orientation 
in social networks, which is the purpose of this research. 
2.1.2 Co-market orientation as a behavior  
Interestingly, the collective action theory does not pay any attention to identifying the 
process of coordination between self-governing organizations (Olson 1965; Sandler 
1992). Rather, it focuses on the result of the coordination, i.e. the creation of public 
goods, and the mechanism of securing participation in collective action, i.e. 
antecedents and consequences of collective action. Thus, the literature takes for 
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granted that organizations know what to coordinate. In this research I identify co-
market orientation as one such coordination process. In other words, coordination is 
about processing market intelligence between organizations. Further, as a 
consequence of treating co-market orientation from the behavioral phenomenon point 
of view, the organizational coordination mechanism is manifested through the 
coordination of market orientation intelligence activities (Kohli and Jaworski 1990).  
Few studies have investigated market orientation at the inter-organizational level 
(for exceptions see Baker, Simpson, and Siguaw 1999; Siguaw, Simpson, and Baker 
1998). Therefore, to identify the dimensions in co-market orientation, it is defined 
through individual market orientation. The behavioral definitions of market 
orientation distinguish between measuring the motivation to perform the behavior 
(Narver and Slater 1990) and measuring the actual activities performed (Kohli and 
Jaworski 1990). The latter argues that a marketing concept attitude is necessary but 
not in itself sufficient if the organization lacks the capability to implement the 
intelligence processing activities (Kohli and Jaworski 1990). Kohli and Jaworski 
(1990) define market orientation as follows: 
 
”Market orientation is the organizationwide generation of market intelligence 
pertaining to current and future customer needs, dissemination of the 
intelligence across departments, and organizationwide responsiveness to it” 
(Kohli and Jaworski 1990, p. 6, emphasis in original).  
 
Co-market orientation in this vein is identified as the collective intelligence 
generation, collective intelligence exchange, and collective intelligence response of 
customers' needs and the influence of technology, competition and other 
environmental power. Information is collected from existing and future customers, 
from present and potential competitors and from environmental conditions, all of 
which affects the choice of end users (Kohli and Jaworski 1990). As a result, the 
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existence of co-market orientation among collaborating firms can be identified 
through their collective market intelligence activities. For instance Hansen (1999) 
identifies how greater openness affects a party’s willingness to share important, even 
proprietary, information. In practice, this information exchange might include 
involving the other party in the early stages of product design, opening books and 
sharing cost information, discussing future product development plans, or providing 
joint supply and demand forecasts (Cannon and Perreault 1999). Therefore, from the 
behavioral phenomenon point of view, a co-market orientation involves gathering, 
exchanging, and responding to market intelligence (Kohli and Jaworski 1990) among 
organizations (Olson 1965).  
The purpose of a co-market orientation is to investigate whether it is a tool for 
solving tasks that are not economically viable for one company separately, and/or 
whether it affects the coordination of separate market offerings. According to the 
collective action theory (Olson 1965), the motivation to participate in co-market 
orientation depends on whether the organization’s contribution has an impact on the 
good produced. Consequently, the actors make rational considerations as to whether 
their contribution in co-market orientation has a significant impact on the output, and 
whether they can achieve this good without participation. Based on this, the purpose 
of the next chapter is to identify the background for problems with collective failure, 
hereof co-market orientation, in order to be able to identify the means to and 
consequences of the problems.  
2.2 Problems of co-market orientation  
Co-market orientation is treated as a type of collective action, based on behavioral 
orientation and rational choice theory. Thus, the logic behind failure of collective 
action is used to identify problems of co-market orientation in co-producing networks 
(Olson 1965). Motivating actors to participate in co-market orientation cause 
problems. This is because rational choice theory is based on the assumption that 
29 
 
human behavior is self-interested so that achieving cooperation toward co-market 
orientation is inherently problematic (Olson 1965). Hence, a basic tenet of Olson’s 
(1965) formulation of the free rider problem is that a rational actor4 will refrain from 
contribution to a co-market orientation if his or her contribution has a negligible 
impact on the total amount of the good produced (and consequently a negligible 
impact on his or her consumption of the good). Consequently, when actors decide 
whether or not to perform a co-market orientation, they base their decisions on a 
rational choice of alternatives (see Hart 1992) or, as Simon (1972) states, by bounded 
rationality, resulting in the assumption that an actor is a profit maximizer and adverse 
to risk. A goal for firms is, thus, either to overcome constraints in the network they 
operate, or to utilize opportunities in the same network (Galaskiewicz 1996).  
According to rational choice theory, a company performs a co-market 
orientation if these actions have value for the company. This value might be directly 
connected to the utility of the object or matter at hand, or it might be based on certain 
other preferences. The actor consequently makes an assessment of the opportunity 
costs associated with performing a co-market orientation, keeping in mind the costs 
associated with not making their second-favorite choice, that is, performing an 
individual market orientation, or not being market oriented at all.  
Rational choice theory has been criticized for categorizing individuals into one 
group, termed “individualism” (Udéhn 1993), whereas a mixed motivation for 
participation should be used. This criticism affects the logic of collective action as 
propounded by Olson (1965), since Olson’s theory builds on the rational choice 
theory. This means that the theory of collective action purports the view of “either/ 
                                                     
4 Rational choice theory has discussed organizations as actors. Coleman (1990) extends rational choice 
theory beyond the level of individuals (see Park 1927) by discussing corporate actors as a type of collective 
“actor”, such as modern corporations. The corporate actor behaves in ways that maximizes the collective 
unit, as opposed to social or human actors, who acts in the interest of the individual. The actions taken by the 
corporate actor may benefit or harm the individual, depending on what the individual’s goals would have 
been. 
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or” rather than “how much?” Therefore, motives, other than self-interest have been 
argued to be a part of the explanation of collective action.  
2.2.1 Source of the failure of co-market orientation  
An actor’s decision of whether or not to participate in a co-market orientation 
depends on the “notion of the privilege” of participating in this collective action 
(Olson 1965). A group is “privileged” when at least one individual derives sufficient 
net benefits from the co-market orientation to go for it alone (Sandler 1992). Failure 
to perform a co-market orientation is rooted in the two factors group size and group 
asymmetry. To understand this failure, each of these factors will be discussed below. 
Sandler (1992) lists the problems in the following way (p. 8-9):  
 
1. Group size is, in part, a root cause of collective failure.  
a) Large groups may not provide themselves with a collective good; hence, no 
individual or coalition within the group may satisfy the sufficient condition of 
a privileged group. 
b) The larger the group, ceteris paribus, the greater the departure of individual 
uncoordinated behavior from optimality; that is, the more suboptimal is the 
equilibrium. 
c) The larger the group, the smaller the collective provision level. 
2. Group asymmetry, in terms of individuals’ tastes and/or endowments, is related to 
collective failure. 
a) Larger members (those with greater endowments) will bear a disproportionate 
burden of collective provision.  
b) Asymmetric groups are more likely to be privileged.  
Point 1 concerns group size. Group size affects an actor’s motivation to participate in 
a co-market orientation because the privilege decreases with the size of the co-
producing network. Olson (1965) argues that larger groups are less likely, ceteris 
paribus, to be privileged than smaller groups in situations where the individual’s 
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share of group benefit from collective action declines with group size (p. 33-34, 48). 
This holds in situations where an individual’s benefit declines with group size but 
costs remain unchanged. Because of this, group size affects what benefit the actors 
obtain from participation in co-market orientation, which again affects whether some 
tasks will be solved through the co-market orientation, and whether the actor is 
motivated to adapt their goods for the common best, at the cost of individual short-
term profit. Olson (1965) does not give any operational definition of optimum group 
size, but separates between a) a privileged group, which contains at least one 
individual or coalition whose benefits from collective action exceed the costs of 
association, even if these costs are solely borne by the individual or coalition. In a 
privileged group each member, or at least some of them, has an incentive to see that 
the collective good is provided. b) In an intermediate group the group is sufficiently 
small for members to be aware of those who assist collective action or not. No single 
member in such group gets a share of the benefit sufficient to give her an incentive to 
provide the good herself, but which does not have so many members that no one 
member will notice whether any other member is or is not helping to provide the 
collective good. c) In a large, or latent group, where the members are neither 
privileged nor intermediate, the individual cannot make a noticeable contribution to 
any group effort, and since no one in the group will react if she makes no 
contribution, she has no incentive to contribute (Olson 1965, p. 50). This research 
identifies co-producing networks as a type of intermediate group. This is because 
these networks consist of several actors (suppliers), but these actors operate toward 
the same customers. Therefore, there is reason to anticipate that they are aware of 
their fellow actors and the contribution they make. This anticipation is important 
when I proceed to connect social capital to the collective action problem (Coleman 
1988).  
Point 2 is about a member’s endowment. Olson (1965) argues that 
heterogeneous actors promote privileges in a group. Thus, the greater disparity 
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between potential contributors, the greater privilege ensures that at least one member 
(that is, the most endowed) might derive sufficient benefits to bear the entire burden 
of collective provision alone. I see many examples of this in the tourist industry, such 
as at resorts where one main actor guides the development of the destination. Olson 
(1965) observed “there is accordingly a surprising tendency for the ‘exploitation’ of 
the great by the small” (p. 35), resulting in the free riding problem since, if the largest 
member of a group satisfies his or her collective good demand, the smaller members 
are likely to have their own demands satisfied free without the need to contribute. On 
the other hand, when the leading firm knows that the other firm is following their 
behavior because of a desire to exploit their market treatment, the leading firm can 
take advantage of the market and optimize with respect to themselves.   
2.2.2 Types of coordination problems 
Actors in co-producing networks are interdependent on each other through their 
collective customers, and since the actors are self-governing to each other, the 
problem of collective failure comes into being. In co-producing networks, business 
actors are specialized in different products and/or services. The sum of the products5 
utilized by end users in such networks is identified as a ‘total product’. Co-producing 
networks can be identified as fragmented markets, characterized by specialized 
businesses that focus on divided or limited tasks (Dollinger 1990). In co-producing 
networks, customers have to transact with several suppliers to satisfy their demand 
(Stigler 1951). For example, a tourist on vacation may interact with a travel agency, a 
transportation company, providers of accommodation, restaurants, as well as 
countless other service providers. When one of these actors fails, the total product 
suffers. This interdependency between actors in co-producing networks generates the 
need for collective behavior. However, this interdependency is also the root of the 
problem of collective failure, as discussed in the previous chapter. Thus, business 
                                                     
5 The sum of the products, i.e. the total product, varies with different segments.  
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specialization in co-producing networks creates three coordination problems of 
collective failure. Of these, two problems regard adaptation of an actor’s 
products/services: a) the problem of unsolved tasks, and b) the problem of 
synchronization (sub-optimization), and one problem regards participation: c) the 
problem of free riding. Each of these three coordination problems is discussed below.  
a) Unsolved tasks 
Specialization can lead to unsynchronized offerings in co-producing networks, and 
several important tasks in the network risk not being solved if one single firm does 
not find it profitable to solve them (Olson 1965; Ouchi 1980). As an example from 
the travel industry, actors in a particular resort might collaborate to offer activities 
that otherwise would not be economically viable for one single actor to perform. 
Simple examples from a tourist resort are the construction and maintenance of 
parking spots, infrastructure, and the work of a booking company. These activities do 
not lead to a short-term profit for any of the companies, so tasks risk being not done, 
even though they are important in providing for the tourists. The rationality is rooted 
in the problem of privilege, where the group size and/or group asymmetry does not 
give any incentive to perform the tasks (Olson 1965).   
A social institution can further limit the effect of a co-market orientation. For 
instance, laws, politics or norms stemming from legal, state, religious, educational or 
service institutions often make certain courses of action difficult or impossible for 
social actors to follow. Once again, the tourist industry can be used as an example. In 
a situation where local government fulfils the public good in a limited tourist resort, 
benefit from collaborating on a co-market orientation decreases, reducing the tourist 
organizations’ motivation to perform a collective behavior in that area. 
b) Sub-optimization 
Co-market orientation fails when the pursuit of individual gains results in a 
suboptimal or inefficient outcome (Sandler 1992). Individual profit does not motivate 
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synchronized action (Olson 1965), and the problem of collective action comes into 
being when sub-optimal performance is not optimal for the common good. Because 
of this there does not exist any short-term incentive to participate in adaptation 
between the specialized businesses. As an example, uncoordinated activities between 
a ski lift company and a snow clearing company decrease the attractiveness of a ski 
resort by. This happens when, for example, the short-term incentive for the snow 
clearing company is to prioritize other roads than those leading to the ski lifts, in an 
effort to increase their own short-time effectiveness.  
Another example is when a hotel at a tourist destination fills up its spare rooms 
with students. In this case, the hotel contributes positively to the rate of tourism at the 
destination (% of the revenue) (that is, investments in the public good), but decreases 
the other tourists’ comfort because of noise and party music (externalities). In other 
words, a lack of coordination creates externalities in that the welfare fare in Pareto 
optimal is not fulfilled (Sandler 1992). Sub-optimization can be connected to the 
noncooperative games in the Nash equilibrium, where each individual pursues their 
own best payoffs without coordinating with others. According to this theory, an actor 
in a co-producing network decides his or her contribution level when confronted with 
the optimizing contribution levels of everyone else. Equilibrium is reached if all 
optimizing choices are mutually consistent in the sense that no one would want to 
change his or her behavior alone. Thus, sub-optimization of actors in co-producing 
networks is at the cost of the common best, and, in the worse case can be connected 
to the “Tragedy of the common”, see Ingram and Inman (1996).  
c) Free riding behavior 
The problem of free riding is that when a number of self-interested parties are 
interested in one outcome that can only be brought about by effort that is more costly 
than the benefits it would provide to any of them, then, in the absence of explicit 
organization, there will be a failure to bring about that outcome, even when an 
appropriate allocation of effort would bring it about at a cost to each which is less 
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than the benefits each would experience (Coleman 1990, p. 273). It is in this vein 
Coleman (1990) and Olson (1965) support sanctions that encourage action, such as 
norms (e.g. closing networks) and selective incentives, rather than sanctions that 
discourage it, such as institutional design. This policy-oriented argument investigates 
a reduction in group size, closer contact between participants, and the use of coercion 
to engineer group compliance. The means of coordinating actors in co-producing 
networks is discussed in the next section.  
2.3 Coordination of co-producing actors 
As discussed previously, the problem with coordination and adaptation between 
specialized businesses in co-producing networks is rooted in the ability and 
motivation to cooperate (Coase 1937; Olson 1965). The research of a partner’s 
motivation to coordinate in co-producing networks is important in that it discourages 
parties from cheating and shirking their obligations (Williamson 1985). For 
motivation to participate in collective action to be present, the gain of coordination 
(privilege) must exceed the costs of coordinating (Olson 1965), and when the rational 
choice is to free ride, means to secure participation must be introduced. Literature on 
the subject has discussed coercive power (Olson 1965), integration (Williamson 
1979), contracting (Van de Ven 1976), incentives (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Knoke 
1988; Olson 1965), group size (Granovetter 1978; Olson 1965), social norms 
(Coleman 1988), and social structure (Chwe 1999; Coleman 1988) to prevent free 
riding.  
Olson (1965) contends that the failure of a collective action, in this research co-
market orientation, may be overcome through selective incentives (giving private 
benefit inducements) and institutional design. This is done through minimizing the 
harm error from the two factors identified as the root of the collective failure; 
reducing group size and creating closer contact between participants, and the use of 
coercion to engineer group compliance. Regarding coercive power, Coleman (1990) 
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disagrees with the use of coercive power and argues that in collective decision-
making the outcome of a decision is not the result of a choice made by a central 
authority, but depends on the virtually simultaneous individual choices of the relevant 
actors. Stinchcombe (1985) identified legal contracts as an alternative to integration 
to facilitate decision control. 
A combination of the two control mechanisms: formal control and social 
control, is investigated as the coordination mechanism for co-market orientation in 
co-producing networks. While former research within the area of control mechanisms 
focused on each control variable in isolation (Ouchi 1979; Thompson 1967), Ouchi 
(1979) commented that the “problem of organization design is to discover that 
balance of socialization and measurement which most efficiently permits a particular 
organization to achieve cooperation among its members” (p. 846). Bradach and 
Eccles (1989) mapped price, authority, and trust as control mechanisms onto market, 
hierarchy, and network, respectively, and noted that these are ideal elements that in 
are reality often combined. Such combinations have been documented by 
Stinchcombe (1985), who described different hierarchical dimensions in oil-
exploration project contracts; Eccles (1985), who described market forces and 
hierarchical authority at work in transfer pricing within firms; and Jaworski, 
Stathakopoulos, and Shanker (1993), who demonstrated how various combinations of 
marketing controls affect the psychological and behavioral responses of marketing 
managers. At the inter-organizational level, Achrol and Gundlach (1999) empirically 
demonstrated that legal and social governance mechanisms operate in relation to 
opportunism. They purported that there was an interaction effect between legal and 
social control mechanism, an effect who turned out to not to be significant. Because 
of previous research the two control mechanisms are investigated in this research, 
staring with the contractual control.  
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2.3.1 Contractual control  
Coordination of actors for co-market orientation in co-producing networks through 
formal control is characterized as a management-initiated written control mechanism. 
This research’s use of contractual arrangement as a formal control mechanism 
simulates the elements of hierarchical control. This builds on Stinchombe’s (1985) 
theoretical extension of transaction cost economics, where he demonstrates that long-
term market contracts can sometimes be used to safeguard long-lasting specific assets 
because the value of those assets can be safely depreciated over the time period. Such 
intervening arrangements between market and hierarchy have been described as 
hybrid arrangements, and neoclassic contract law regulates these kinds of 
relationships (Williamson 1991). Examples of such hybrid contractual arrangements 
are exchange arrangements or reciprocal trading arrangements, such as co-producing 
networks, and franchising (Heide and John 1988; Williamson 1991). Neoclassic 
contract law applies to contracts in co-producing networks because the parties to the 
transaction maintain their autonomy, but the actors are bilaterally dependent to a 
substantial degree. A contractual option to adapt toward disturbance is described as 
elastic contracting (Williamson 1991). A neoclassic contract in such a network would 
refer disputes to arbitration rather than the courts. The general proposition is that 
when the 'lawful' gains to be had by insistence upon literal enforcement exceed the 
discounted value of continuing the exchange relationship, deviation from the spirit of 
the contract can be anticipated.  
The treatment of formal control in this research builds on contractual control 
among self-governing actors for the purpose of safeguarding against the hazard of 
opportunism (Williamson 1985, p. 32). This builds on the basic presumption that 
effects of governance on performance are contingent on the characteristics of the 
exchange (e.g., Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990). Opportunism, in this context, is 
behavior by an economic agent that involves “self-interest seeking with guile” 
(Williamson 1975, p. 26). At the inter-organizational level, opportunism is not readily 
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monitored and sanctions are infrequent (Provan and Skinner 1989). This can result in 
suboptimalization in co-producing networks, as demonstrated by the Nash 
equilibrium (see Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 263), where each actors operate for 
their own best at the cost of the common. Because the exchange involves 
idiosyncratic investments (resources used to perform a co-market orientation), 
internal organization or hierarchy is predicted to be a more efficient form of 
governance than the market.  
Formal control in this research builds on planning on the one hand, and 
developing rules, programs and procedures for task coordination on the other (March, 
Simon, and Guetzkow 1958). The planning involves presetting schedules, outcomes, 
and targets; rules, programs and procedures to provide a formal framework in the 
form of decisions made a priori for various likely scenarios. All of these serve the 
common purpose in co-producing networks of minimizing necessary communication 
and thereby simplifying decision-making, reducing uncertainty about future tasks, 
and preventing disputes (Provan and Skinner 1989). In formal alliances, hierarchical 
controls institutionalize, or formalize, interactions between partners (Van de Ven 
1976). The centralization of hierarchical control clarifies boundaries on decisions and 
activities, and simplifies the decision- making (Galbraith 1977). In addition to 
regularizing meetings between partner representatives, such hierarchical controls may 
also formally designate roles for the partners (Stern and Reve 1980). Formalization 
makes the division of labor and the interaction between partners more predictable and 
allows for joint decisions to be made primarily by rules rather than exception (Gulati 
and Singh 1998).  
The use of formal contracts has, however, some negative effects. A neoclassic 
contract in a co-producing network is perceived as an incomplete contract because of 
the partners' autonomy (Williamson 1991), and Buvik and John (2000) found that the 
contractual safeguard of investments in the initial stage of a bilateral relation is at the 
sacrifice of contractual elasticity. Relationships develop different norms through 
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time, and because it takes time to develop relations, norms are not yet operative at the 
initial stages of a relationship (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987). For instance, game 
theory demonstrates how relational norms will not be operative in the declining phase 
of a relationship (Buvik and John 2000). This is because the perception of continuity 
is not present (Heide and Miner 1992). Therefore Buvik and Grønhaug (2000) 
recommend that to maintain adaptation, and in the absence of a control mechanism, 
transaction specific investments should be reduced in the initial and declining phases 
of a relationship. Adapted to co-market orientation in co-producing networks, where 
collective action affects the actor’s long-term profit, some degree of free riding and 
shirking (of obligations) should be accepted in situations where the costs of 
integrating are high, such as during high environmental uncertainty (Barney 1999), 
and in the initial and declining phases of a relationship (Buvik and John 2000). 
However, another means for coordination is through the actor’s social network. Such 
a control mechanism is affected by the size of the network, and the strength of the 
bonds between the network actors. The social control mechanism operating in a co-
producing network is discussed below.    
2.3.2 Social control 
According to sociologists, the social network in which exchange participants are 
embedded yields a fuller explanation of economic behavior than the formal contract 
structure (Achrol and Gundlach 1999, p. 108). In other words, social structure matters 
more than institutional structure. Further, studies have demonstrated that the social 
structure of how network actors are connected affects their behavior (Ahuja 2000; 
Burt 1992; Coleman 1988; Granovetter 1973; Olson 1965; Rindfleisch and Moorman 
2001; Uzzi 1997). For that reason, an investigation of social structure is included in 
this research. The inclusion in this research is important since it reflects situations 
where authority control is difficult. Alternative control mechanisms could therefore 
have an impact.  
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Where the contractual control view focuses on governance structures as a 
control mechanism to protect resources in social networks, the social control 
perspective takes the opposite view and focuses on sanctions that encourage action 
(Coleman 1990; Galaskiewicz 1996; Olson 1965). For many, the benefits gained 
from collective action outweigh the loss in personal autonomy (Coleman 1973). This 
problem applies especially to groups that cannot compensate their participants for 
their involvement.  
Actors in co-producing networks are partners in an intermediate group (Olson 
1965), implying that the actors know about each other’s existence. The ties between 
the actors affect their behavior and information flow (Baker 1984; Burt 1982). For 
instance, socioeconomics have demonstrated that the social structure of ties which 
economic actors are embedded in would influence the actors’ subsequent action 
(Granovetter 1985). This follows their understanding of strength of network ties to be 
useful in finding out who is trustworthy; an important element in overcoming the 
problem of opportunism in marketing settings (Granovetter 1985; Powell 1990). In 
addition, innovation, access to new information, knowledge creation, and social 
coordination are also important effects of social networks (Burt 1992; Rindfleisch 
and Moorman 2001; Uzzi 1997).  
Following socioeconomic theory, ties between actors in co-producing networks 
represent a value for the actors in the network. This value is identified as a social 
capital because the individual can use it to further their own interests (Coleman 1988; 
Granovetter 1985). The analysis of social capital in co-producing networks is 
therefore fundamentally concerned with the significance of relationships as a 
resource for social action (Burt 1992; Coleman 1988). The central proposition of 
social capital theory is that a network of relationships constitutes a valuable resource 
for the conduct of social affairs, providing their members with collectivity-owned 
capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in its various senses of the word 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). The linking or disconnection to others in the network 
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gives the individual a strategic advantage as they are in a position to bridge or 
negotiate discourse between disparate and disconnected actors/cliques. In such an 
enablement view (Galaskiewicz 1996), social structures are regarded as opportunity 
structures which represent a source to unique resources (Coleman 1988).  
Although its origins lie in the classical nineteenth-century sociology, the 
concept of social capital is closer to the more recent work of two sociologists, Pierre 
Bourdieu (1986) and the late James Coleman (1988). Bourdieu first used the term in 
the 1970s to refer to the advantages and opportunities accruing to people through 
membership in certain communities. Coleman used it to describe a resource of 
individuals that emerges from their social ties. Coleman cites the example of Jewish 
diamond merchants in New York, who save a great deal in lawyers' fees by 
conducting their transactions informally. Sacks of jewels worth thousands of dollars 
are lent for examination overnight without any paper signed. What makes these 
expeditious exchanges possible is the trust that associates will not shirk their 
obligations since they belong to the same tight social circles. Anyone found guilty of 
malfeasance can say good-bye to their future chances of ever taking part in this 
lucrative market again.  
Adler and Kwon (2002) reviewed the concept of social capital and connects it 
to the location in the structure of actors social relations. Social relations are 
distinguished among three dimensions a) market relations, in which products and 
services are exchanged for money or bartered, b) hierarchical relations, in which 
obedience to authority is exchanged for material and spiritual security, and c) social 
relations, in which favors and fits are exchanged (p. 18). It is the third type of 
relationships that constitutes the dimension of social structure underlying social 
capital. The definitions of social capital varies between whether their focus is on a) an 
external focus: the relations an actor maintains with other actors (Baker 1990; 
Belliveau, O`Reilly, and Wade 1996; Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; 
Boxman, De Graaf, and Flap 1991; Burt 1992; Knoke 1999; Portes 1998), b) an 
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internal focus: the structure of relations among actors within a collectivity (Brehm 
and Rahn 1997; Coleman 1988; Fukuyama 1997; Inglehart 1997; Portes and 
Sensenbrenner 1993; Putnam 1993; Thomas 1996), or c) both types of linkages 
(Loury 1992; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Pennar 1997; Schiff 1992; Woolcock 
1998). A summary of definitions of social capital is included in Appendix A.  
In this research, the perspective of external and internal focus is included. I 
define social capital as the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded 
within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships processed by 
an individual or social unit (Coleman 1988; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). This 
definitions neutrality has the advantages that the distinction between the external and 
internal view, which is a matter of perspectives and unit of analysis, is eluded. The 
external and internal view is therefore not treated as exclusive, and external linkages 
to other firms and institutions are seen as influencing the behavior of a collective 
actor. This research’s view of social capital therefore sees the social capital in the co-
producing networks to consist of social resources embedded within relationships 
(Burt 1992; Greve and Salaff 2001), including shared norms and values associated 
within the relationships as part of the definition (Coleman 1988). As an individual 
resource, social capital is roughly analogous to other individual assets. For Coleman 
(1988), it differs from the financial capital found in bank accounts and the human 
capital inside people's heads by being rooted in interpersonal relations. This analogy 
should not be carried too far, however, because social capital has certain 
characteristics, such as the expectation of reciprocity, that distinguish it from the 
capital that appears on balance sheets.  
Two dimensions of social network structures affect the creation of social 
capital in inter-organizational relationships: the strength of ties in relational 
embeddedness, and network structure in knowledge redundancy (Ahuja 2000; Burt 
1992; Coleman 1988; Granovetter 1973; Olson 1965; Rindfleisch and Moorman 
2001; Uzzi 1997). Based on these two dimensions, three types of social capital are 
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identified: structural social capital, relational social capital and cognitive social 
capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). First, social structure, explaining how structural 
ties (both formal and informal) function, has a value because it gives access to new 
resources (Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1997). Second, relations rooted in these 
relationships have a value through the trust and norms affecting an actor’s behavior 
(Coleman 1988; Granovetter 1985; Putnam 1993). Finally, it has been suggested that 
social capital is a cognitive resource that emphasizes the ability to communicate and 
make a common interpretation of the environment developed through participation in 
a social community (Huber 1991; Kogut and Zander 1992; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
1998), its value stemming from the shared knowledge in the network. For instance 
studies have demonstrated that network linkages affect the content of the information 
exchanged (Hansen 1999).  
The next sub-chapter reviews each of the two dimensions of social network 
structure, knowledge redundancy and relational embeddedness, as they relate to co-
producing networks and their connection to resources derived though the three types 
of social capital. The three types of social capital and their relation to network 
structure and strength of ties are illustrated in Figure 2.1. The figure illustrates how 
different social structures are connected to different types of social capital. Cognitive 
social capital, for instance, can come into being when actors have a high level of 
redundant knowledge through operating at the same level in the market. This social 
capital is in contrast to structural social capital, which centers on structural holes, and 
can come into being when actors have a low level of redundant knowledge, meaning 
that they operate at different levels in the market, or what Scott (1991) labels 
different ‘ego networks’. The figure also illustrates that relational social capital 
comes into being when network actors have a high level of relational embeddedness, 
meaning that they operate in closed networks. Thus, actors that operate in open 
networks do not have relational social capital. Each of the two dimensions in the 
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model, knowledge redundancy and relational embeddedness, are discussed in greater 
depth below6. 
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Figure 2.1 Dimensions of social capital in social networks.  
Extended from Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001) 
 
a) Knowledge redundancy 
Co-producing networks are characterized by actors operating at the same level in the 
market. This means that the actors operate toward the same customers and offer 
complementary products. Such operations are in contrast to actors that define each 
other as either their customers or suppliers. When actors occupy similar social 
positions in the network, their knowledge is to a larger degree redundant than for 
actors that have dissimilar positions. Based on this, there is cause to anticipate that 
                                                     
6 As can be seen from Figure 2.1 cognitive social capital and structural social capital is in contrast to each other. The 
cognitive social capital corresponds to co-producing networks and is therefore investigated in this research.  
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social actors with similar positions have some degree of redundant knowledge (Burt 
1992; Krackhardt 1992).  
Knowledge redundancy is a type of cognitive social capital, a resource based 
on the shared representations, interpretations, and system of meanings among the 
network parties through the existence of a shared language and vocabulary and the 
sharing of collective narratives (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). This resource enables 
an increased capability to learn collectively (Huber 1991; Moorman and Miner 1997), 
and the absorptive capacity to interpret information collectively (Chwe 1999; Kogut 
and Zander 1992). The value is created because mental maps have to be shared for 
information to be interpreted into shared knowledge (March 1991). Redundant 
knowledge is, however, at the cost of innovation (Ahuja 2000; Rindfleisch and 
Moorman 2001) since similar positions eliminate structural holes, and it therefore 
hampers access to new information (Burt 1992) in contrast to the resources derived 
from structural social capital. In other words, because the co-producing network has 
cognitive social capital, structural social capital is absent. Also, the value of 
knowledge redundancy can be present in both open and closed networks.  
b) Relational embeddedness 
Among the dimensions of frequency and distance that reflect relational 
embeddedness (Hansen 1999), actors in co-producing networks that are characterized 
by high frequency and short distance have access to relational social capital through 
their relationships. According to Hansen (1999), strong ties require a short distance 
between actors and weak ties are characterized by a greater distance. Based on this, 
actors in co-producing networks that have a high degree of proximity and are 
motivated to collaborate view each other as partners in the co-production and not 
competitors in the same market. This is important because I then have situations 
where actors operating toward the same customers have a high degree of relational 
embeddedness. Though Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001) identify only vertical 
cooperating arrangements as obtaining relational embeddedness, their argument 
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builds on horizontal arrangements that are independent of each other. Unfortunately, 
Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001) do not include co-producing networks in their 
framework. Rather they empirically test and find evidence that horizontal alliance 
actors act as competitors, and that vertical alliance actors act as collaborators, based 
on their motivation behind the co-operation. I characterize co-producing networks as 
having the potential to have a high degree of relational embeddedness based on the 
existence of strong ties in these relations. Such understanding is in accordance with 
Gulati (1998), who argues that horizontal networks consisting of competitors will be 
threatened by opportunistic behavior, because they have a low degree of reciprocity. 
Reciprocity depends on whether the actors in the network view themselves as 
competitors or as collaborators, which again affects an actor’s motivation to 
collaborate. Interdependency among co-producing actors has already been identified 
as a prerequisite for collective action in such networks, see Chapter 2.2.2. 
Co-producing networks with strong interunit ties provide more opportunities 
for action between the actors than those with weak ties (Hansen 1999). There are two 
reasons for this. First, strong ties are associated with reciprocal arrangements in 
which advice and help flow in both directions. A firm has to exchange information 
and interact more frequently with firms to whom they are strongly tied, under the 
assumption that commitment to interaction is proportional to the strength of the 
relationship. Weakly tied firms, in contrast, escape the time-binding interaction 
because their relationship is less likely to be reciprocal. Weak ties are used in search 
activities but are less likely to be used in time-consuming activities. Second, strong 
inter-organizational ties result in more inertia than weak ones. More effort is required 
to search for new information and impulses when organizations step out of strong 
ties. Breaking these patterns requires relearning and the ability to search outside 
existing ties (Huber 1991), which in turn requires more of the firm (Nelson 1991).  
Relational embeddedness is a resource to the actors because it affects a party’s 
willingness to combine and exchange resources. Extensive relations between partners 
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foster the development of shared norms of behavior (Dyer and Noboeka 2000; Uzzi 
1997; Walker, Kogut, and Shan 1997), and close ties between partners are likely to 
help in curbing opportunism (Coleman 1988; Walker, Kogut, and Shan 1997). My 
understanding of reciprocity builds on Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001) and 
Granovetter (1985), who define reciprocity as a proxy of relational embeddedness, 
identified by frequency.  
Additionally, in closed networks, where an ego’s partners are connected to 
each other, information about one actor’s opportunistic acts diffuses rapidly to other 
related partners, and sanctions for deviant behavior are more easily imposed (Walker, 
Kogut, and Shan 1997). In such a highly interconnected system, deviant behavior is 
less likely to arise because the threat of reputation loss with respect to multiple 
partners will discourage firms from behaving opportunistically with any single 
partner (Ahuja 2000). 
2.4 Adaptation of co-producing actors 
Co-producing networks consist of specialized actors. Because specialization can lead 
to unsynchronized offerings in co-producing networks, several important tasks in the 
network risk not being solved if one single firm does not find it profitable to perform 
the tasks. Since sub-optimal performance in some cases is not optimal for the 
common best, the means for adapting product offerings from specialized actors is 
included. Therefore, the investments used to adapt products between actors in co-
producing networks, and their effect on customer evaluation, is discussed. The 
discussion starts with an evaluation of the characteristics of products created through 
collective effort in co-producing networks: the public good.  
2.4.1 Public goods 
The type of good created from collective action in co-producing networks is 
characterized as public. This is because the good provides benefits that are non-
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excludable and non-rival or indivisible between the network actors. This is in contrast 
to a private good, which possesses benefits that are fully excludable and rival 
between prospective users. More precisely, because the public good has a private 
enterprise, the goods are labeled a “privately owned public good” (Forster 1999). The 
characteristic of these goods is that they are different from common goods (such as 
ocean fish stock, fresh air, national parks, and pollution), which largely involve 
national or local governments.  
The goods provided in co-producing networks through collective action are 
characterized by two dimensions: non-excludability and non-rivalry of benefits 
(Olson 1965). Non-excludability of benefits means that the benefit from a good is 
available to all in the co-producing network once the effort has been provided. In 
contrast, excludability exists only in cases where the owner or provider can withhold 
the benefits of a good without cost (Sandler 1992), and the good becomes private. 
The second concept used to define goods in co-producing networks is the non-rivalry 
of benefits. The good is non-rival or indivisible when one individual can consume a 
unit of the good without detracting in the slightest from the consumption 
opportunities still available for others from that same unit (Sandler 1992). In contrast, 
the benefits of a good are rival when the consumption of a unit of the good by a 
person uses up some of the available benefits. 
The treatment of public goods in this research concerns those goods and 
services that are provided by private enterprise, but which are immediately accessible 
to those who have not contributed to their development. The coordinating activities of 
a public good occur over a large set of activities, including tool development and 
product design, value analyses and cost targeting, design of quality control and 
delivery systems, and long-term planning (Heide and John 1990). Van de Ven (1976) 
describes coordinating activities as occurring when two or more organizations 
transact resources (money, physical facilities and materials, customer or client 
referrals, technical staff services) among each other. To summarize, the result from 
49 
 
coordination between actors in co-producing networks is identified as a privately 
owned public good because the coordination among private actors increases the 
attractiveness of the customers in the network, and all actors in the network can 
benefit from the effort, independent of their participation or not.  
The resources used to adapt toward each other to create the public good are 
identified as specific investments in the relation, and the next chapter identifies these 
investments in greater depth.  
2.4.2 Specific investments 
When co-producing networks experience problems with sub-optimization and 
unsolved tasks, a potential for product coordination exists. The adaptation is a result 
of the collective action in the network. Such adaptation requires the coordination of 
effort by two or more individuals (Sandler 1992), and in order for it to happen, 
resources must be allocated for this purpose. These resources are identified as the 
actors’ specific investments in customer adaptation.  
The specific investments among actors in a co-producing network differ from 
transaction specific investments in the transaction cost economy in that the network 
actors do not exchange resources vertically (Williamson 1985). Rather, the 
transaction is directed toward the customers, whereas the investments are made 
among firms at the same level in the market. Therefore, investment for product 
adaptation in co-producing networks is endogenous to the coordination of the co-
producing actors (Ghosh and John 1999). In other words, the purpose of the 
investments is value creation (Cannon and Perreault 1999) and the specific 
investments are treated as endogenous to governance. Such treatment of investments 
is in accordance with Cannon and Perrault (1999) and their empirical work, and the 
IMP treatment of resources, see Håkansson (1995), but in contrast to the exogenous 
treatment of investments in transaction cost economy (Williamson 1985), where the 
governance structure is applied to protect the investments.  
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The investments used to adapt products toward each other in a co-producing 
network have a greater value than investments that have to be withdrawn and 
reinvested. Thus, transaction specific investment is any investment that is 
significantly more valuable in the particular exchange than in any alternative 
exchange (Williamson 1985). Williamson (1985) identifies such transaction specific 
assets as those assets (tangible and intangible) required to support exchange and 
which are specialized to the exchange relationship. To take an example, a firm may 
develop inventory practices to match that of a partner (such as a just-in-time system), 
redesign a product around a supplier's proprietary component, or invest in specific co-
marketing programs (Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach 2000). Transaction specific 
assets are distinct from general purpose assets (such as machinery and capital) in that 
they are tailored to the transaction (Williamson and Ouchi 1981). Asset specificity 
refers to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative use and to 
alternative users without sacrificing productive value (Williamson 1991). If the 
relationship were to be terminated, the value of these assets would be largely lost 
because their salvage value outside the relationship is very low. Transaction specific 
assets are valuable in that they eliminate competitive pressure, which is the major 
basis of the market superiority argument (Anderson 1985).  
Williamson (1991) differentiates between six types of assets: (1) site specificity 
(for example, the location of Fed-Ex close to Amazon.com), (2) physical asset 
specificity (for example, the adaptation of machinery to produce components for a 
manufacturer), (3) human asset specificity (for example, training systems), (4) brand 
name capital, (5) dedicated assets, which are discrete investments for a general 
purpose, and (6) temporal specificity, which is similar to technological non-
separability, and can be thought of as a type of site specificity in which timely 
responsiveness by on-site human assets is vital. The narrower the range, the more 
specific the asset. In some cases, certain dedicated equipment must be purchased in 
order to sell and/or service the principal's line effectively. In other cases, the 
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employees of the agency must be trained specifically for the product line of a 
particular principal. 
In co-producing networks the asset specificities in focus are physical asset 
specificity, and activity asset specificity. 1) Physical investments represent what 
Williamson (1991) refers to as tangible assets. Examples of physical investments 
would be common investment in a parking spot at a tourist resort, or a round bus trip 
between different activities. If this collaboration collapses the business will lose the 
value it gained from investing in collective action. In co-producing networks, an 
alternative use to this kind of investment would be to develop individually, and 
therefore lose the added value gained from collective adaptation. Another example of 
physical investment is investment in a combined brochure at a resort. In this case, if 
the collaboration terminated, each company would have to invest in development and 
distribution by themselves. Individual action will reach fewer customers in their 
target group, and they will be less attractive for the customer because customers 
search for a total product (this assumption is made on the basis of the definition of 
customer value, where for instance the use of time in searching and evaluating 
alternatives is taken into account). Finally, in the case of a collective investment in a 
database system for customer information, if one actor were to end the collaboration, 
they would lose access to the information.  
2) Activity investments represent tacit assets (Williamson 1991). Human 
investments, such as spending time at meetings to adapt schedules and openings 
times toward the customer, are examples of activity assets. It is relevant to predict 
that different types of assets will vary in frequency and size. For instance physical 
investments will often be less frequent but involve larger monetary investments. The 
decision to take such investments is mainly a top-level one. Activity investments, on 
the other hand, are predicted to be more frequent, with the amount of money involved 
being lower. They are characterized by human participation, and the level of 
acceptance is delegated further down the organization.  
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2.4.3 Customer value 
Specialized actors in co-producing networks offer fragments of a customer’s total 
product. Therefore the services, products and activities are complementary to each 
other. Usage of complementary products implies that the product attributes 
complement each other in such a way that the total customer value will be greater 
than if the products had been offered to the market separately (Ramírez 1999). This 
understanding of value is not simply 'added' but is mutually 'created' and 're-created' 
among actors with different values. By co-production, Ramírez (1999) focuses on 
value co-produced by two or more actors, with and for each other, as well as with and 
for other actors. Thus, the co-production is between seller and buyers, and between 
sellers with the purpose of buyers. Ramírez (1999) evaluates value from co-
production with regard to its intellectual origin and implications for practice and 
research. In the traditional industrial view customer value was identified as the price 
the customer was willing to pay, where “in competitive terms, value is the amount 
buyers are willing to pay for what the firm provides them” (Porter 1985, p. 38). In the 
co-producing view, value is created, added, and recreated among actors. A value co-
production view emphasizes that economic actors perform different roles in relation 
not only to different counterparts (as one's suppliers' customer and as one's customers' 
supplier), but also in relation to a single counterpart. For example, one economic 
actor A may simultaneously be (i) a supplier for another economic actor B, (ii) a 
customer of economic actor B, (iii) a competitor of B, (iv) a partner with B to co-
produce value with and for a third economic actor C, and (v) a competitor of B’s 
partners if A’s own alliance with others competes with B’s. This shows that with 
'value co-production', researchers researching business definition can research how 
economic actors (i) design new offerings, joining actors in innovative co-productive 
relationships; and (ii) reconfigure the roles each co-producer holds in relation to 
others; resulting in (iii) new value creation systems (Ramírez 1999, p. 54). 
Combining complementary products in the way computer software manufacturers 
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have done has provoked renewed controversy in recent years, (Business Week 2001). 
A case in point is the way the hardware producer IBM, the software producer 
Microsoft and the integrator EDS bundled their products to increase customer benefit. 
Recently the mobile phone producer Ericsson and the innovative electronic 
component manufacturer Sony entered into a collaboration “SonyEricsson” to 
improve their competitive power (Forbes 2001).  
Coordination of actors in co-producing networks can be identified as a type of 
co-marketing alliance. Such alliances are defined as showing a mutual recognition 
and understanding that the success of each firm depends in part on the other firm 
(Anderson and Narus 1990). Unlike buyer-seller or manufacturer-distributor 
partnerships, as in vertical coordination, co-marketing alliances are lateral 
relationships between firms at the same level in the value-added chain and represent 
Adler’s (1966) definition of  “symbiotic marketing”. “Symbiotic marketing” is the 
concept of inter-organizational relationships between firms other than those linked by 
traditional marketer-marketing intermediary relationships (Adler 1966). Co-
marketing alliances (as opposed to alliances formed for technological or financial 
reasons) are conceptualized, designed, and managed from the perspective of the 
customer (Varadarajan and Cunningham 1995). Varadarajan and Cunningham (1995) 
recommend usage complementarily, as opposed to resource complementarily (see Jap 
1999), to be used as a basis for determining partner selection. Such a focus 
corresponds to the treatment of public good in this research. 
In this research, customer value in co-producing networks is defined to be 
present when the benefits to the customer associated with a product or a service 
exceed the offering’s life-cycle costs to the customer (Slater and Narver 2000). In 
other words, customer value is the benefit that exceeds the cost of the offering (Slater 
and Narver 2000), from search for alternatives, to exchange and usage. The variety 
definition of customer value differs based on whether value is identified as benefits or 
quality. It also differs in time, from the purchase definitions toward the experience 
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during, and/or after the use. Zeithaml (1988) defines customer value as the 
consumer’s overall assessment of the utility of a product based on perceptions of 
what is received and what is given. Anderson and Narus (1998) define customer 
value as the perceived worth in monetary units of the set of economic, technical, 
service and social benefits received by a customer in exchange for the price paid for a 
product, taking into consideration the available suppliers’ offerings and prices. 
Monroe (1990) defines customer perception of value as a trade off between the 
quality of benefits they perceive in the product relative to the sacrifice they perceive 
they make by paying the price. Woodruff (1997) emphasizes perceived preferences of 
evaluation and defines customer value as a customer’s perceived preference for and 
evaluation of those product attributes, attribute performance, and consequences 
arising from use that facilitate (or block) achieving the customer’s goals and 
purposes. The common denominator between these definitions is that customer value 
is inherent in or linked through use to a product. The definitions agree that customer 
value is something perceived by customers rather than objectively determined by a 
seller. However, the definitions differ in whether they define value as a quality or as a 
benefit. They also differ in time, from the decision to purchase toward the experience 
during or after use.  
In this project I will draw on the product8 classification scheme developed by 
Murphy and Enis (1986) and their dimension of price to identify the customer’s effort 
and risk inherent in transactions. The Murphy and Enis (1986) framework is superior 
in that it is buyer oriented and bundles benefit/costs. Murphy and Enis (1986) identify 
the customer’s price (what you have to give up to receive a product) as varying 
among the two dimensions of effort and risk, and as divided by monetary and non-
monetary aspects. The inclusion of non-monetary elements supports the broad view 
on marketing, as stated by Kotler and Zaltman (1971, p. 9) that “Price includes 
                                                     
8 In product they include goods, services and ideas. 
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money costs, opportunity costs, energy costs, and physical costs “ (p. 9). The Murphy 
and Enis framework is illustrated in Table 2.1.  
First, effort is defined as the amount of money and time it take to purchase a product 
(Murphy and Enis 1986). Effort is divided into monetary effort and non-monetary 
effort. i) Monetary effort is divided into financial price, hereof cash, credit and 
countertrade. Monetary effort is thus a direct cost associated with an exchange. In a 
market transaction, this refers to the financial price paid for the product/service. ii) 
Non-monetary effort is divided into travel time (the time it takes to physically get to 
the store), shopping time (the time it takes a buyer to search for and evaluate a 
product), waiting time (the time it takes a buyer to get checked out of a store, waited 
on by a salesperson, waited on in a service firm, or to wait for ordered products), 
performance time (the time it takes to use a product or carry out a certain action) and 
monitoring time (the time it takes to remember to carry out a certain action). The 
agency theory has identified time to be an important transaction cost regarding 
partner selection (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992). Such transaction costs are 
associated with screening and selection costs ex-ante, and measurement costs ex-post. 
In end-user transactions the customer spends time to travel to- and between the 
different outlets, in addition to time used to search for, and the evaluation of 
alternatives. Stigler (1961), for instance, identifies price to be one such information 
signal in the market.  
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Table 2.1 
Dimensions 
 Effort Risk  
Monetary: Financial 
Cash 
Credit 
Countertrade  
Financial 
Personal 
Organizational 
Non-
monetary: 
Time 
Travel 
Shopping 
Waiting 
Performance 
Consequences
Social 
Psychological 
Physical 
Functional  
 
Effort 
 Financial Price  
 - Cash Currency, checks, drafts, debit cards 
 - Credit Credit cards, charge accounts, line or credit, accounts payable 
 - Countertrade  Barter, swap, or trade products 
 Travel time The time it takes to physically get to the store (seller’s location) 
 Shopping time The time it takes a buyer to search for and evaluate a product 
 Waiting time The time it takes a buyer to get checked out of a store, waited on 
by a salesperson, waited on in a service firm, or to wait for 
ordered products 
 Performance 
time 
The time it takes to use a product or carry out a certain action 
 Monitoring 
time 
The time it takes to remember to carry out a certain action 
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Risk  
 Financial risk The risk that the product will not be worth the financial price 
 Psychological 
risk 
The risk that a poor product choice will harm a consumer’s ego 
 Physical risk The risk to the buyer’s or others’ safety in using products 
 Functional risk The risk that the product will not perform as expected 
 Social risk The risk that a product choice may result in embarrassment 
before one’s friends/ family/ work group 
 
 
Table 2.1 Effort and risk associated with customer’s evaluation of value 
Based on Murphy and Enis (1986). 
 
Second, risk is the buyer’s subjective feeling about the monetary and non-
monetary price of the product; more precisely, risk is the buyer’s subjective 
assessment of the consequences of making a purchase mistake (Murphy and Enis 
1986). The dimension of risk is divided into monetary risk, and non-monetary risk. i) 
The monetary dimension of risk represents an opportunity cost in the exchange 
through the risk that the product will not be worth the financial price, compared to 
other products/services. Maladaption costs are associated with failure to identify an 
appropriate supplier, or costs associated with a forgone transaction due to making a 
wrong decision (Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999). 
ii) Non-monetary risk is divided into psychological risk (the risk that a poor 
product choice will harm a consumer’s ego), physical risk (the risk to the buyer’s to 
others’ safety in using products), functional risk (the risk that the product will not 
perform as expected, and social risk (the risk that a product choice may result in 
embarrassment before one’s friends/family/work group). The level of non-monetary 
risk, hereof perceived risk, is therefore the subjective perception of making a 
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purchase mistake (Murphy and Enis 1986). The literature identifies collaboration 
among firms to reduce a customer’s subjective risk. For instance, umbrella-branding 
transfers brand equity and reduce a customer’s perception of social risk (Jap 1993), 
and trademarked chains in franchising (Nygaard and Silkoset 2003) reduce quality 
uncertainty in the market (Akerlof 1970).  
2.5 Summary 
To summarize, the conceptual model of particular interest in this research deals with 
coordination, collective action and public goods, and is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The 
model firstly illustrates that coordinating activities affect the fulfillment of a 
collective action. Collective action by this means affects the production of public 
goods in co-producing networks. The model further illustrates how coordination in 
my research comprises contractual arrangements and social capital, that collective 
action is co-market orientation, and finally, that a public good is identified through 
product adaptation. Based on this conceptual model, the next chapter will explore the 
hypotheses this framework puts forward. 
 
Figure 2.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Conceptual model 
 
Contractual 
arrangements  Co-market 
orientation 
Product 
adaptation  
Public good Collective action Coordination  
Social capital 
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Chapter 3: Antecedents and effects of co-
market orientation 
 
 
 
 
Based on the preceding discussion, including the framework introduced, this chapter 
argues for the derived hypotheses, which will be tested empirically. The chapter starts 
by discussing the antecedents to co-market orientation, and then goes on to discuss 
the effects of this co-market orientation. 
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3.1 Antecedents to co-market orientation 
In co-producing networks, lack of exclusion of benefit facilitates free riding from 
non-participating actors (Olson 1965). To prevent this, the gains (privilege) of 
coordination must exceed the costs (Olson 1965). When the possibilities for free 
riding exist means to secure a partner’s participation must be introduced. This chapter 
introduces and adapts the role of coercive power through contractual control, social 
control through social capital, and the role of social structure (Coleman 1988).  
Contractual control is the formal control mechanism that simulates the 
elements of hierarchical control (Stinchcombe 1985). Centralization in hierarchical 
control clarifies boundaries on decisions and activities, and simplifies decision-
making (Galbraith 1977), while formalization makes division of labor and interaction 
between partners more predictable and allows joint decisions to be made by rules 
rather than by exception (Gulati and Singh 1998).  
Further, studies have demonstrated that the social structure through which 
network actors are connected affects their behavior (Hansen 1999; Rindfleisch and 
Moorman 2001; Uzzi 1997). Therefore, two dimensions of social control are 
investigated: relational embeddedness and knowledge redundancy, as types of social 
capital; and finally structural position, derived from collective action theory (Olson 
1965). The discussion will start with contractual control. 
3.1.1 Centralization 
Centralization refers to the locus of decision-making in a collectivity (Van de Ven 
1976). Centralization in intra-organizational studies is different from inter-
organizational studies in that the latter stresses the research of social behavior among 
autonomous agencies under conditions of non-hierarchical authority (Van de Ven 
1976). For situations with centralization in intra-organizational relationships, 
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centralization focuses on determining who governs, where and when they govern, and 
with what effect.  
Thompson (1967) points out that effective exchange agreements, such as 
between firms in alliances, rely on prior consensus regarding the responsibilities of 
the parties involved, and a clear understanding of what each partner will do. 
Centralized decision-making reduces the potential for uncoordinated behavior among 
network members. Furthermore, it can lower opportunism and free riding (Ruekert 
and Walker 1985). However, there are also certain negative effects of centralization. 
The concentration of decision-making authority typically impairs effectiveness 
because it increases perceptions of bureaucratic structuring. This decreases the 
favorability of participants' attitudes toward the cooperative arrangement, and can 
actually result in increased opportunism (see John 1984; Nygaard and Silkoset 2003). 
One research at the inter-organizational level within market orientation has 
investigated centralization for its effect on market orientation. Jaworski and Kohli 
(1993) did not find that centralization facilitates market orientation. As a matter of 
fact, their research, using two different samples, identified centralization to hamper 
the three dimensions in market orientation.  
At the inter-organizational level, legal contracts have proved to be an 
alternative mechanism to control, avoiding integration while having the same effects 
(Stinchcombe 1985). Empirical research has demonstrated that vertical integration 
leads to higher channel productivity and lower retail prices, whereas horizontal 
alliances shift channel power from the wholesaler to the retailer (Ytreberg and Reve 
1989). Centralization provides a relatively high level of decision control by one party 
over another. Therefore, a party’s ability to participate in co-market orientation 
increases with the increased level of centralization. This is because the actors have 
accepted that decisions are ruled by the contracts. Accordingly, centralization leads to 
greater efficiency due to the ability of the decision-maker to plan, coordinate and 
control their market orientation activities. I hypothesize the  following: 
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H1: Centralization has a positive effect on co-market orientation in co-
producing networks.  
 
3.1.2 Formalization  
Formalization refers to the extent to which rules and procedures govern the 
relationship between inter-organizational partners (Van de Ven 1976). Formalization 
increases as the agreement is specified, written down, contractual, and mandatory 
(Van de Ven 1976). For instance, formalization is necessary for a clan team to 
develop shared goals (Ouchi 1979). In other words, formalization can be viewed as a 
form of fiat in relations characterized by the non-existence of bureaucratic authority 
(Williamson 1991). This corresponds to my situation where self-governing parties co-
operate toward identified segments of customers. In the political economy 
framework, the interaction between power and efficiency has been investigated with 
relation to its effect on strategizing (Reve 1986). The contractual safeguard of 
investments in a bilateral relation has been found to be at the sacrifice of contractual 
elasticity (Buvik and Reve 2001). However, the political economy perspective has 
been criticized for not taking into account a partner’s experience when relating over 
time (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987). 
In contract theory, and as used in the transaction cost economy, formalization 
(the economic structure component in the political economy framework) fosters 
convergent expectations (Reve 1986). Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) describe how 
interaction between members is necessary for the participants to develop a common 
understanding and interpretation of the environment. Empirical findings, however, do 
not support formalization to have an effect on market orientation at the intra-
organizational level (Jaworski and Kohli 1993). Questions have been raised about 
whether formalization enables the fulfillment of market orientation if it is measured 
as, for example, the degree of formal meetings necessary to disseminate intelligence 
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in an organization (Jaworski, Stathakopoulos, and Krishnan 1993). This corresponds 
to the inter-organizational treatment of formalization, which identifies duties and 
responsibilities for parties in a bilateral collaboration (Heide 1994), and in franchise 
contracts (Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999). Formalization reduces the scope for 
political activities (Milgrom and Roberts 1988) and is a base for establishing 
common goals (Ouchi 1979). By this, formalization between inter-organizational 
partners reduces their ability to operate outside the proposed actions (Nygaard and 
Silkoset 2003). 
The formalized connection between firms decreases information asymmetry in 
that it provides for information exchange through procedures on what and how to 
exchange information. Hence, when establishing a co-market orientation in a network 
of self-governing, specialized parties, formalization is necessary in order for parties 
to know what to do and when. Based on this I proposes the following: 
 
H2: Formalization has a positive effect on co-market orientation in co-
producing networks 
 
3.1.3 Relational embeddedness  
By relational embeddedness I mean actors that are connected to each other through 
direct ties, with interaction being characterized by high frequency and low distance. 
This identification of social structure builds on Ahuja’s (2000, p. 428) identification 
of network by (1) the number of direct ties maintained by a firm, (2) the number of 
indirect ties maintained by a firm (the firms it can reach in the network through its 
partner(s) and their partners), and (3) connection between partners (the degree to 
which a firm’s partners are linked to each other, that is, whether there is a structural 
hole in the firm’s ego network). The optimal structure of interfirm networks depends 
on the objective of the network. To take an example, direct ties may reduce 
innovation, but, as demonstrated by Ahuja (2000), too many structural holes may 
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decrease innovation output (Ahuja 2000, p. 451). He also demonstrates that a closed 
network is more beneficial for overcoming opportunism, while it has also been shown 
that network structure affects information transfer (Ahuja 2000; Hansen 1999; 
Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). 
The degree of personal relations describes the parties’ willingness to combine 
and exchange resources. Extensive relations between partners can foster the 
development of shared norms of behavior (Dyer and Noboeka 2000; Uzzi 1997; 
Walker, Kogut, and Shan 1997). For instance, a wide range of studies has 
demonstrated that relational norms develop over time through close relationships 
(Buvik and John 2000; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Heide 1994; Heide and John 
1992). These norms consist of partners showing flexibility, solidarity, mutuality, 
harmonization of conflict, and restraint in the use of power. The parties have, through 
experience, learned that the other parties can be trusted and are working for the 
common best. Such reciprocity prevents opportunistic behavior because partners 
know that unselfish effort, for the purpose of the common good, will be reciprocated 
(Granovetter 1985). Networks of collaborating actors perceive each other as partners, 
and the level of shared goals creates motivation for collaboration. Based on this, 
relational embeddedness is expected to prevent actors from opportunistic behavior 
(Gulati 1998).  
As discussed above, networks with direct ties, developed over time, are 
characterized by trust, norms, and shared values (Coleman 1988; Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal 1998). It can be argued that trust is both an antecedent and consequence of 
cooperation. For instance, trust affects cooperation positively in that once trust is 
established, firms learn that coordinated, joint efforts will lead to outcomes that 
exceed what the firm would achieve if it acted solely in its own best interests 
(Axelrod 1984). Cooperation can also facilitate trust in that cooperation leads to trust, 
which in turn leads to a greater willingness to cooperate in the future, which then 
generates greater trust, and so on (Anderson and Narus 1984). 
65 
 
Among studies that have investigated the relationship between market 
orientation and relational norms at the inter-organizational level are Siguaw, 
Simpson, and Baker (1998). Based on economic theory and signaling, they found that 
supplier market-oriented behavior affects a distributor's market orientation, and that 
distributor market orientation affects trust and cooperative norms in the relationship. 
They did not report supplier market orientation as having a significant effect on 
distributor trust, or a negative effect on cooperative norms (Siguaw, Simpson, and 
Baker 1998).  
Another effect of social structure is that when actors operate in a closed 
network, such as a local community, (identified as an intermediate group, see Chapter 
2.2.1 at page 30), the actor’s ability to exclude or socially force the other parties to 
collaborate on market orientation is present (Coleman 1988). In closed networks 
where an ego’s partners are connected to each other, information about one party’s 
opportunistic actions diffuses rapidly to other related partners, and sanctions for 
deviant behavior are more easily imposed. This is because close ties between partners 
are likely to help in curbing opportunism (Coleman 1988; Walker, Kogut, and Shan 
1997). Further, in such a highly interconnected system, deviant behavior is less likely 
to arise because the threat of reputation loss with respect to multiple partners will 
discourage firms from behaving opportunistically with any single partner (Ahuja 
2000).  
The previous discussion identified relational embeddedness as facilitating co-
market orientation based on two factors: reciprocity in direct ties and the risk of 
social exclusion in closed networks. I predict relational embeddedness to affect an 
actor’s motivation to perform co-market orientation and thereby reduce free riding in 
the network.  
 
H3: Relational embeddedness has a positive effect on co-market orientation in 
co-producing networks 
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3.1.4 Redundant knowledge 
Redundant knowledge is the opposite of structural holes (Burt 1992). In social 
structures where the actors are connected to each other and share similar ego 
networks (Scott 1991), the actor’s knowledge about the market is redundant. In such 
situations the degree of shared language, vocabulary and collective narratives is 
present (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). Moreover, for parties to be willing to exchange 
sensitive information, as in co-market orientation, strong ties are required (Hansen 
1999). This is because weak ties risk the possibility that information will be misused 
(John 1984). In addition, complex information requires strong ties to be transferred 
(Hansen 1999). This has been empirically demonstrated for complex product 
innovation (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). Under situations of information 
impactedness, the ability to sort out and transact relevant information is a critical 
factor for interpreting information.  
Market-oriented businesses are sustain in developing market knowledge 
through their emphasis on and processing of market information (Day 1994b). The 
fulfillment of the market orientation process, however, requires the participation of 
the entire organization in processing the three market orientation activities: 
intelligence gathering, intelligence dissemination and intelligence response. 
Individuals in the organization cannot perform the three market orientation activities 
by themselves, and absence of participation in the business can obstruct the business 
from processing market orientation (Shapiro 1988). Transferring this understanding 
to the inter-organizational level, for market understanding to be developed in 
collaboration, each organization must participate in developing their collective 
knowledge level. Shared experience and organizational learning enables senior 
management to develop a shared dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis 1986). This 
dominant logic is defined as “the way in which managers conceptualize the business 
and make critical resource allocation decisions - be it in technologies, product 
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development, distribution, advertising, or in human resource management… stored as 
a cognitive map (or set of schemas) among the dominant coalition… expressed as a 
learned problem-solving behavior” (Prahalad and Bettis 1986, p. 490 – 491). This 
dominant logic can then be used when developing co-market orientation among 
businesses in co-producing networks. Therefore, actors ability to develop a shared 
interpretation of the market (Huber 1991; Huber and Daft 1992) is determined by 
actors redundant knowledge, which affects partner’s capability to interpret 
information collectively. This is because actors intelligence is develop from the 
actors level of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Based on this I 
anticipate knowledge redundancy to affect the ability to interpret information in inter-
organizational relations, which again affects the actors ability to perform co-market 
orientation.  
To summarize, the previous discussion identified knowledge redundancy as 
facilitating co-market orientation based on improved level of shared interpretation. 
On the basis of this, I propose that knowledge redundancy affects an actor’s ability to 
perform co-market orientation.  
 
H4: Redundant knowledge has a positive effect on co-market orientation in co-
producing networks.  
 
3.1.5 Structural position   
Olson (1965) predicts that actors with a leading position in a social network are more 
motivated to participate in collective action than less prominent actors. This is 
because the more endowed network member might derive sufficient benefit to, in 
collection, participate in the burden of the collective provision (i.e. an intermediate 
group). This, on the other hand, creates a situation where the less prominent actors 
lack the motivation to participate. In other words, the less endowed network members 
tend to exploit the greater endowed (Olson 1965). Therefore, if the most prominent 
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members of a group satisfies the demand for collective good by themselves, the 
smaller members are less likely to participate, and there will be a tendency to free 
ride.  
Coordinated behavior can come into being even without any formal agreement. 
For instance, if the less prominent actors free ride, but follow the strategy of the 
leading actors because they anticipate that their behavior is well-considered and 
under the assumption that the main actors have much to lose if they act irrationally, 
coordinated behavior will be the result. Such behavior is, however, not reflected in 
collective investments with the purpose of adapting toward the customers, but rather 
through individual coordination. It is important to notice that structural position is not 
identical with company size. Therefore, later in the project, company size has been 
included as a control variable in the model. Based on this I predict the following: 
 
H5: Structural position has a positive effect on co-market orientation in co-
producing networks.  
 
3.2 Effects of co-market orientation and specific 
investments 
Failure of collective action can result in two adaptation problems: unsolved tasks and 
sub-optimalization (Olson 1965), in addition to the coordination problem of free 
riding, as discussed in the previous section. Therefore the problems of unsolved tasks 
and sub-optimalization are of interest in this section. 
  Co-producing networks offer fragments of complementary products. The 
literature has identified bounded rationality (Simon 1991) and information 
asymmetry as bungling coordination (Williamson 1975), and therefore, in order to 
perform a collective adaptation between actors, information must be exchanged. 
69 
 
Greater sharing of information leads to a better understanding of the outcomes of 
mutual behaviour (Kelley and Thibaut 1978). As demonstrated in the previous 
section, perceived risk of opportunistic behaviour and lack of motivation to 
collaborate will result in different degrees of information exchange, and thereby 
different degrees of co-market orientation in the various types of networks (networks 
with different types of structural ties, Ahuja 2000). Voluntary adaptation between the 
network actors can be compared to a co-marketing alliance, which is initiated with 
the goal of performing a synchronized adaptation toward the market (Adler 1966; 
Varadarajan and Rajaratnam 1986), as in symbiotic marketing. Such adaptation is 
twofold: adaptation between businesses and adaptation toward customers (Gulati and 
Singh 1998). Adaptation between businesses is identified through specific 
investments with the purpose of reducing the existence of unsolved tasks and sub-
optimalization. The effect of adaptation is identified through changes in perceived 
customer value. The discussion starts with the specific investments necessary for 
adaptation among co-producing businesses, and then proceeds to elaborate on 
customer value. 
3.2.1 Specific investments  
Through the theory of collective action (Olson 1965), unsolved tasks and sub 
optimization are identified as a problem when organizations operate under 
specialization and co-production. The reason for the emergence of these problems is 
that such networks have to produce goods that are non-excludable and non-rival or 
indivisible between network actors.  
Specific investments are identified as endogenous adaptation costs (Ghosh and 
John 1999). In the value-maximization perspective, which this research supports, 
investments are made with the requirements of the end users in mind, and governance 
mechanism to secure the investments is not in focus. Several theoretical directions 
support this view. For instance, Ghosh and John (1999) treat specific investments as 
endogenous by focusing on value maximization. The IMP group (Håkansson and 
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Snehota 1995) views adaptation as possibly exogenous or endogenous to (that is, a 
characteristic of) the relationship (Hallén, Johanson, and Seyed-Mohamed 1991). 
Because I treat the investments as a source to value creation (Ghosh and John 1999), 
these investments are endogenous to governance. This is in accordance with the 
empirical work of Cannon and Perrault (1999).  
Innovative or adaptive behavior requires resources, and investments in 
adapting toward customers must be a priority. Further, the investments in resources 
and time necessary to develop a synchronized offering must be grounded in the 
knowledge and understanding of where and what to adapt to. A key problem in 
achieving effective coordination and adaptation is that the information needed to 
determine the best use of resources and appropriate adaptation is not freely available 
to everyone (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Information must be exchanged between 
the parties, who must be prepared to both give and receive information. Following the 
theory of collective action (Olson 1965), actors may refrain from participating in 
public good on the grounds of prioritizing individual short-term profit at the cost of 
long- term collective interest. I propose that when parties in a co-production perform 
co-market orientation, their increased knowledge directs action and reduces 
disinvestments (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Daft and Weick 1984; Lant, Milliken, 
and Batra 1992). For instance coordinating conditions in dyads, such as goal 
congruence, have been demonstrated to positively affect idiosyncratic investments 
(Jap 1999). Moreover, research has demonstrated the effects of shared knowledge 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Huber 1991), value maximization (Ghosh and John 
1999), transaction specific investments (Jap 1999), and incentive and motivation 
(Olson 1965) to solve the problem of adaptation in inter organizational relations.  
The implications of co-market orientation in co-producing networks are the 
purposed effect on investments for product adaptation. As discussed previously, 
market orientation affects a party’s knowledge of the market (Day 1994b). In such 
networks this knowledge is shared among the parties. In networks with weak demand 
71 
 
growth the businesses must exert more effort to have a clear understanding of how 
they can provide superior value by more effectively satisfying buyers need (Jaworski 
and Kohli 1993). Therefore, if one of the parties in the co-production refuses to 
perform a co-market orientation, their lack of participation will reduce the level of 
collective market knowledge in the co-producing network. I propose that when 
parties have collective market knowledge, developed through their co-market 
orientation, their investments for adapting toward their customers converge in that the 
parties develop a collective understanding of what to invest in and why to invest. For 
instance, a tourist resort will take joint responsibility by investing in activities that 
increase customer welfare, such as cleaning up the shore, participating in meetings to 
discuss adjustments to customer service, and, for instance, adjusting their opening 
times toward the other parties for the common best, even though this may conflict 
with individual short-term profit. Therefore, through investing in the common best, 
co-market orientation in co-producing networks affects a member’s motivation and 
ability to perform long-term tasks that are not economically viable for any single 
party in the co-producing network in a short- term focus. I propose that co-market 
orientation increases a party’s investments in collective solutions, such as public 
goods. I propose the following: 
 
H6: Co-market orientation has a positive effect on specific investments in co-
producing networks 
 
3.2.2 Customer value 
Customer value is defined as the benefits minus costs a customer associates a product 
or a service (Slater and Narver 2000). In this project I draw on the product 
classification scheme developed by Murphy and Enis (1986) and their dimensions of 
price to identify a customer’s costs when performing an exchange with a firm or an 
alliance. As discussed in Chapter 2.4.3 at page 52, the benefit/costs associated with 
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customer value are divided into effort and risk, further divided into monetary and 
non-monetary aspects. Studies have demonstrated that customers increase their 
purchase with suppliers who lower their customer transaction costs (Cannon and 
Homburg 2001). Among the studies that have investigated transaction costs in the 
market mechanism from the customer’s point of view, are Grønhaug and Gilly (1991) 
who identify customer dissatisfaction as sunken ex-post transaction costs.  
 I predict that a customer’s evaluation of a total product will be affected by the 
degree of adaptation among the [business] parties in a co-producing network. 
Information levels affect the ability to make choices. In the neoclassical model, 
everyone is assumed to know what prices are and where and when goods can be 
bought and sold. Finding a willing buyer or seller at the going price is assumed to be 
unproblematic. In reality, however, potential buyers and sellers may not even know 
of each other’s existence (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 76). Customers search for 
alternatives and compare offerings. Sellers spend a large amount of resources on 
marketing and other information activities in order to inform potential buyers about 
their offerings. When parties in a co-producing network synchronize their 
information and offerings toward their collective customers, the customer’s 
uncertainty decreases. The degree of coordination will, for instance, affect the 
customer effort spent on screening and selecting sellers ex-ante, as effort associated 
with measurement is ex-post. Further, coordination of parties affects the information 
stream to customers. When synchronized information is provided to the market, the 
interpretation and categorization of information is less biased. Base on this I expect 
effort spent on adapting and synchronizing products to simplify a customer’s 
information processing.  
73 
 
Empirical research has investigated the synchronizing effect of product 
combinations9. For instance Bucklin and Sengputa (1995) found that when projects 
and partners were matched, alliance effectiveness increased. Rao, Qu and Ruekert 
(1999) found that the signaling of unobservable product quality was strengthened in 
brand alleys, supporting the positive effect of product combinations. It has also been 
demonstrated that different types of product combinations affect customer 
preferences (Dhar and Sherman 1996), and that product complementarities positively 
affect customer evaluation (Samu, Krishnan, and Smith 1999). Organizational 
implications of new product success in internal and alliance-based processes have 
also been examined. A construct derived from related concepts of mutual adjustment, 
absorptive capacity and relational capability, was found to be a key factor affecting 
new product development success, independent of cooperative form (Sivadas and 
Dwyer 2000). In the tourist industry it has been found that for firms with a market 
penetration strategy seeking to increase their market share, the recommended solution 
would be to cement relationships with other firms with a high usage complementary 
(Dev, Klein, and Fisher 1996).   
Let us take the example of a shopping mall. When a shopping mall invests in 
free parking spots, they decrease customer transaction costs in that they increase their 
availability for customers. When the shopping mall synchronizes and regulates its 
opening hours in the customer’s interest, the customer evaluates this positively 
according to their needs, since this action reduces their performance time. An 
example from the tourist industry would be the collaboration between several parties 
to offer one single entrance pass. I have seen this among ski-lift operators investing in 
offering a ski-lift pass that can be used at several destinations, including a shuttle bus 
transporting the skiers to and from the different destinations. This reduces customer 
                                                     
9 Much empirical research has been undertaken in the micro-economic literature, describing effects of 
product bundling on market price and monopoly power. An antitrust view is, however, not the focus of this 
project. 
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shopping time, but increases their financial risk in that the customer might end up not 
using the other alternatives after all (Gourville and Soman 2001). Customer search 
time decreases when a collaborating partner undertakes a physical investment in 
developing shared brochures and homepages on the Internet. Search time is also 
reduced through investment in collective action, such as a tourist office. A decrease 
in customer waiting time can be implemented by undertaking shared investments in 
storage systems and transportation. Time spent on instructing each business about the 
other businesses’ offerings increases customer value through their access to 
information. Customers decrease their traveling time when retailers synchronize their 
location. In contrast, however, if the retailers’ synchronization of location does not 
converge toward the customer, investments in such synchronization do not represent 
any value for the customer. I deduce the following propositions:  
 
H7: Specific investment has a positive effect on customer value in co-
producing networks 
3.3 Research model 
The previous discussion divided between the coordination effort necessary to perform 
co-market orientation, identified as the independent variables in the model, and the 
consequences of adaptation of actors in co-producing networks, identified as the 
dependent variables in the model. The independent variables are of the types: 
contractual control, consisting of centralization and formalization; and social control, 
consisting of relational embeddedness and knowledge redundancy, and finally 
structural position. Of the dependent variables, specific investments are identified as 
the resources used on firm adaptation, and, finally, customer value is identified as the 
effect adaptation has on customer evaluation.  The research model identified in this 
research is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Research model  
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Chapter 4: Methodology  
 
 
The purpose of the method chapter is to evaluate and make choices to test the theories 
put forward in the research model. It starts by addressing the choice of method and 
design, and follows with a discussion of setting and sample. Next the research 
constructs are operationalized and measured. Finally, there follows a discussion on 
questionnaire design and control variables.  
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4.1 Methods 
The primary goal of this research is to test the hypothesis regarding the main effects 
of and antecedents to co-market orientation in co-producing networks. The subset of 
theories to be evaluated is the theory of collective action, contractual control, social 
network analysis and social capital, the concept of customer value, and the 
framework of market orientation. The theories/concepts in this research are well 
documented. This implies that one goal of the research is effect application: 
generalizing the sphere of influence of the theories (Calder, Phillips, and Tybout 
1981), while placing less emphasis on testing theoretical applications which tests the 
explanations in theories. To ensure that the rendered abstract scientific explanations 
are tested, the procedure to ensure falsification is followed (Calder, Phillips, and 
Tybout 1981). This entails that the process of selecting research designs, selecting 
respondents, operationalizing variables, and choosing research setting is followed.  
A preliminary qualitative research design was implemented in the form of eight 
in-depth interviews with managers within the tourist industry with the purpose of 
discussing the research problem and the research model. These interviews were then 
used when reviewing the theory to discuss the research model, in addition to adapting 
the items to the setting and developing the research questionnaires. 
4.1.1 Choice of design 
The focus in this research is on theoretical propositions involving causal relationships 
between constructs. There are five independent variables in this research: first and 
second – centralization and formalization, explained by the theory of contractual 
arrangements in the contractual theory (Williamson 1979); third and fourth – 
relational embeddedness and knowledge redundancy, explained by the theory of 
social capital (Coleman 1988); and fifth - structural position from the theory of 
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collective action (Olson 1965). Manipulation of centralization and formalization is 
difficult to perform due to the fact that these factors reflect organizational systems. 
Relational embeddedness and knowledge redundancy are time dependent variables. 
To take an example, previous operationalization of relational embeddedness has built 
on experience, repeated interaction and learning (see Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001 
as example). This makes them less suitable to be manipulated in a true experiment. 
Finally, structural position can be bought through investments, or developed over 
time in the community. Thus, manipulation of this construct is not easy.  
To test the research model, the design implemented for this project is 
descriptive. This design is suitable because it is not possible to randomly assign 
subjects of groups for practical reasons. The choice of descriptive design has an 
effect on the fulfillment of the three criteria for inferring causality in social science 
research (Popper 1959). In order to fulfill the criterion that X (independent variable) 
must precede Y (dependent variable) in time, well-established theories are used to 
build the hypothesis. Since theories describe how constructs are interconnected, and 
constructs acquire meaning only within the context of theory (Frankfort-Nachmias 
and Nachmias 1996), the theoretical framework is used to predict the direction of 
influence of the hypothesis. Further, Bollen (1989) evaluates the direction of the 
hypothesis to be less important than the other two standards for evaluating research 
designs: isolation and covariation. This is because the direction of the hypothesis 
builds upon the premise that the parameters have been identified and satisfy the 
requirements for isolation. Moreover, the metaphorical image behind the calculations 
of multiple-regression is that each independent variable has a unique (isolated) causal 
effect on the dependent variable. The inclusion of control variables (Mitchell 1985), 
favors isolation of the variance in the independent variable covariation. The latter is 
because correlated design enables testing for random and systematic measurement 
error (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1982) through multiple samples. Its weakness on internal 
validity is solved through data analysis techniques as a method of control (Frankfort-
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Nachmias and Nachmias 1996). In this descriptive design the samples included were 
pairs of companies in a network, and their customers. Unfortunately, due to practical 
and economic reasons, the research could not be performed over an extended period 
of time to strengthen the test of causality. 
The use of dyadic data in a descriptive design in this research is different from 
previous studies on networks, which have mainly used case studies (Gulati 1998; 
Uzzi 1997), or cross-sectional design (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). Since the 
research uses quantitative data, it facilitates the use of structural equation modeling 
when running the statistical test. Further, the inclusion of more than one respondent 
in each network opens for the opportunity to control for method error. This meets the 
critique from marketing literature, where criticism of previous studies is made for not 
taking method error into consideration when drawing conclusions (Bagozzi and Yi 
1991; Campbell and Fiske 1959).  
The use of monadic static research (data from one time period) reduces the 
confidence of the findings (Bagozzi 1996). Consequently, tracking relationships 
between constructs over successive periods would have augmented the design. To 
reduce the error of static research, the research has included companies of different 
ages, and networks with varying lengths of cooperation in the sample. By doing this, 
the research has striven to ensure that the theoretical test is performed on all 
evolution stages in co-producing networks.  
4.1.2 Setting 
Since the purpose of this research is to test the sphere of theories, a heterogeneous 
sample was included for the test (Calder, Phillips, and Tybout 1982). By selecting 
one industry it was possible to rule out effect from the industry, and this favours 
isolation (Cook and Campbell 1979). A sample that encompasses individual 
differences has the benefit of providing a variation in the focal theoretical variables. 
This increases the ability to generalize the research findings between different 
contexts (Lynch 1999). The drawback of using such a sample is that the variation 
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from extraneous variables reduces the internal validity (Calder, Phillips, and Tybout 
1981). Control variables were therefore included to reduce this risk (Cook and 
Campbell 1979). A goal is therefore to choose research subjects, setting, and 
variables examined that is representative for their real-world counterparts (Calder, 
Phillips, and Tybout 1981, p. 206). 
The empirical setting for this research is the Norwegian tourism industry. 
Specifically, the research setting comprises the relationship between companies and 
their customers in SIC code 55, the hotel and restaurant industry, SIC 92, 
entertainment and attractions, SIC 63, information and booking, SIC 62, air-travel, 
and SIC 61, transport by land. See Figure 4.2 on page 84 for a summary of categories 
and number of respondents.  
Three main criteria were used in selecting this empirical context. First, in the 
setting all of the main independent variables are manifested to a varying degree. The 
Norwegian tourism industry is a very good illustration of an industry operating in co-
producing networks. The companies in the industry vary in age, size, length of 
cooperation, and geographical location, favouring variation in the five areas of 
centralization, formalization, relational embeddedness, knowledge redundancy, and 
structural position. Second, the requirement of a context in which the customer 
experiences a ‘total product’, through interacting with several companies, is met. As 
an example, a tourist on vacation interacts with a travel agency, a transportation 
company, and providers of accommodation, restaurants, as well as many other 
service providers. Finally, the companies in the setting are self- governed (that is, not 
integrated, no equity cross-holdings etc). The industry is characterized by a low 
degree of marketing chain activities (Nygaard, Haugland, and Rokkan 2000). For 
example, in the sample of 288 companies, only 3.4% of the companies reported a 
share of interest in the other company. The empirical setting therefore supports the 
test of the theoretical model.  
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4.1.3 Sampling frame 
To secure statistical representativeness of the sample, several methods were used to 
collect elements in the sampling frame. First, a list of 248 tourist and destination 
companies was received from Statens Nærings og Distriktsutviklingsfond (SND), 
(the public body responsible for stimulating local and regional development in 
Norway). A letter was sent to each of these companies, asking for the name and 
address of 10 of the major travel companies in their area. This was done to ensure the 
inclusion of companies that are defined as belonging in other groups than the travel 
industry in the sample. Typical examples of such businesses are grocery shops and 
transport companies at tourist destinations.  
Second, a list of 3208 travel companies was received from Norges Turistråd 
(the Norwegian Tourist Board). Added to the responses from the previous letters to 
the destination/travel companies, the research ended up with a list of 3570 
companies. In addition the research supplemented the names on the list with a list of 
5206 companies received from a travel project at BI Norwegian School of 
Management. This list was based on the SIC codes previously identified. In this way, 
considerable effort has been made to ensure that the sampling frame in this project is 
complete.  
The consequence of ensuring statistical representativeness in the sample is the 
reduced risk of making incorrect assumptions, thus favouring nomological validity 
(Cook and Campbell 1979). Statistical representativeness is important in descriptive 
design because this design builds on statistical analysis as a method of control. In 
other words, by securing statistical representativeness, the findings from this research 
can be attributed to testing the theory.  
4.1.4 Designing and selecting samples 
The choice of sample elements to be included was twofold. First, stratified sampling 
was used to ensure that both rural districts and cities were adequately represented in 
the sample. Then, elements in each of these clusters were randomly drawn for 
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participation in the research. By this, every element had a known, non-zero 
probability of selection. Second, a professional marketing analysis bureau used the 
CATI-system (computer assisted telephone interviewing) to phone 
managers/marketing directors in the randomly selected companies. If the manager 
agreed to participate, the marketing bureau asked about the names of three other 
companies that operate toward the same customers in the tourist market as they do. 
Next, two of the companies identified in the process above were also called to ask for 
their participation. If one of these companies declined, the third company was 
contacted to ask for its participation, see Figure 4.1. Throughout this process, the 
marketing analysis company continuously crosschecked the lists of names that agreed 
to participate against those names on the original list in order to avoid double 
recruiting.  
The latter method can be defined as network sampling (Bagozzi 1996). 
Bagozzi (1996) points out two prerequisites for the use of network sampling. The 
first is that network informants are able to provide reasonably accurate information 
on the screening characteristics of all persons in the network. The research considers 
this assumption to be satisfied, which means that it expects managers in travel 
industries to know what needs the other firms in the co-production fulfill. The second 
prerequisite is the necessity of having an accurate estimate of the network size. This 
means that implicit in the selection process is the anticipation that the first company 
knows the names of the other companies that operate toward the same customer as 
they do. This builds on the anticipation that the industry consists of intermediate 
networks (Olson 1965). By asking for the names of three other companies, the 
research anticipates it to be reasonable that the company has this kind of information. 
The in-depth interviews with representatives in the industry confirm that it is 
reasonable to anticipate that these firms know which other firms operate in the travel 
industry in their local market, and what needs they fulfill. Additionally, previous 
studies within key informants have demonstrated that there is reason to believe that 
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managers do have the knowledge to evaluate its environment (John and Reve 1982). 
Each of the 
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Figure 4.1 Identification of networks and triads 
 
companies recruited in the sample was thereafter asked to pass on a questionnaire to 
their customers, with a sample of 10 customers in each company. As a reward, each 
of the companies that agreed to participate was offered a summary of the research 
when completed, in addition to participate in the draw of two x two ski-lift weekend 
tickets to Trysilfjellet.  
The risk of sampling error (Bagozzi 1996) was reduced through efforts to 
ensure that respondents were included in the sampling frame. The sample selection 
combined several lists, in addition to combining two parallel methods for selecting 
participants. Prior research in the travel industry has to some degree primarily 
focused on the hotel industry (Gulbrandsen 1998; Nygaard, Haugland, and Rokkan 
2000). A goal of this project has been to include other companies that operate in the 
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travel industry, as reflected through the process of developing a sample frame. The 
response categories are illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
Those companies that questioned whether or not to participate in the research 
were to a large degree dominated by destination companies and museums. 
Destination companies are important actors in the travel industry, but often operate as 
indirect actors in the network of serving customers. The omission of some of these 
companies in the sample should therefore not cause problems when testing the 
theoretical model. Some museums, on the other hand, did not identify themselves as 
partners in a travel product and refused to participate. Finally, some small one-man 
companies refused to 
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Figure 4.2 Response categories 
 
answer the questionnaire because they did not see any connection between the type of 
questions asked and the day-to-day problems they experience. The distribution in age 
of the organizations, and length of cooperation in the sample is illustrated graphically 
in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4. 
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As summarized in Figure 4.5, it is shown that 30 of the companies in the 
research had one or no employees, 128 of the companies had between two  
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Figure 4.3 Age of the companies 
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Figure 4.4 Years of cooperation 
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Figure 4.5 Number of employees 
 
and ten employees, while 100 of the companies had between 20 and 100 employees. 
Finally, 12 companies had over 100 employees. The mean value in the sample is 55 
employees, with a median of 8. The company with 4500 employees is NSB 
(Norwegian State Railways). The strategic unit measured at NSB was, however, 
local.  
Non-response bias was tested using Armstrong and Overton’s (1977) 
procedure of comparing responses. The non-respondents were asked to participate in 
a simplified questionnaire. In total, 27 questionnaires were received from this 
process. The independent-samples t-test procedure, which compares means for two 
groups of cases, was used. The mean values for the two groups are displayed in Table 
4.1. Because the significance value for the Levene test was .00, the results that do not 
assume equal variances for both groups were used. From the table I can see that the 
significance value for the t-test for Equality of Means is high, (> .05). Because of this 
I cannot conclude that there is a significant difference between the two groups.  
No significant differences were found in variables such as number of guests, 
sales volume, establishment year, and number of employees, suggesting that non-
response bias may not be a problem when testing the theories. To take one example, 
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the significance level of number of guests is .327. This means that there is no 
significant difference between the number of guests for companies participating in 
the research, and those who does not participate. 
 
Table 4.1 
 Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for 
Equality of Means 
Group 
Statistics table
    F Sig. T Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Group 
Mean 
Number of  a 37.515 .000 -2.957 .003 -6336510 64950c
guests  b -.999 .327 -6336510 6401461d
Sale a 22.448 .000 -3.045 .003 -84 19c
  b -1.123 .272 -84 104d
Establishment a 67.220 .000 4.477 .000 263 15c
year  b 2.034 .052 263 45d
Number of  a 15.716 .000 -2.258 .025 -156 1950c
employees  b -1.259 .219 -156 1687d
 a = Equal variances assumed 
b = Equal variances not assumed 
c = Non-Response sample 
d = Response sample 
 
Table 4.1 Independent samples t test for differences in non-response 
 
4.1.5 Data collection process 
A professional marketing analysis bureau performed the data collection. To ensure 
correct recruiting procedure, personal instruction was performed to inform the 
manager and the assistants regarding the purpose and content of the project. In 
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addition, a written instruction guided the workers when performing the CATI-system 
call.  
The process of collecting data progressed as follows. First, after recruiting 
managers or marketing managers by phone, the respondent received a seven-page 
questionnaire by mail, in addition to 10 one-page questionnaires directed to their 
customers. Two cover letters and two prepaid reply-envelopes followed the 
questionnaires. The questionnaires were sent in June- August. The managers were 
asked to reply within three weeks, while the customer questionnaires were given five 
weeks for completion. After approximately four weeks, the bureau performed a 
reminder phone call. The effort undertaken to locate respondents and minimize the 
refusal to respond to the questionnaire or questionnaire indicators, reduces the 
amount of non-sampling error in the research (Bagozzi 1996).  
4.1.6 Sample size 
In total, 248 triadic networks agreed to participate in this project, representing 744 
companies. The final number of respondents, after phone reminders, was 288 
companies, giving us a response rate of 39%. Out of these, five networks were 
complete, with responses from all the three companies, while 91 networks were 
partially complete, with responses from two of the companies in the network. The 
response rate is summarized in Table 4.2 and illustrated in Figure 4.6.  
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Table 4.2 
Recruited companies 744 
Number of one-respondent networks (Company I) 288 
Number of one-respondent relations (2 relations in each responses) 576 
Number of two-respondent networks (Company I and II) 91 
Number of complete networks  (Company I, II and III) 5 
Response rate (744/288)  39% 
Customer responses (from 67 companies) 449 
Table 4.2 Response rate 
 
Figure 4.6 
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Figure 4.6 Single-firm response versus dyadic response 
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Sample size is important due to the design of the research being descriptive.  
This entails that statistical tests are used to determine what probability there is of a 
test concluding with falsification of the null hypothesis, which in turn depends on 
how far wrong the null hypothesis is and how large the sample is. The statistical 
analytical tool to be used is based on structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis. 
The reason for using SEM is that it makes it possible to simultaneously estimate a 
measurement model, specifying relations between measured variables and underlying 
latent variables, and to specify structural relations among the latent variables. The 
impressive flexibility of SEM further allows the research to model data structures that 
violate traditional model assumptions, such as heterogeneous error variances and 
correlated errors (Bagozzi 1996).  
The total number of responses is 288 * 2 (relations in each response) = 576 
responses. For the customer responses, the response rate was affected by a company’s 
willingness to pass out the questionnaire to their customers, in addition to seasonable 
conditions. In total, 449 customer questionnaires were received from 67 companies. 
The low response rate could be due to season variation. 
The aim of the sampling process is to gather enough elements to measure 
networks consisting of three companies in each, see Figure 4.1. The response rate 
was, however, not satisfactory to achieve this aim. As a result, further analysis had to 
be based on a dyadic approach.  
The number of path coefficients in the research model in this research is seven 
(seven hypotheses), in addition to ten error terms among the independent variables. 
The total number of path coefficients is then 10 + 7 = 17. SEM analysis is sensitive to 
sample size, and a rule of thumb given by Bentler (1990) is to have at least five cases 
per parameter estimate (including error terms as well as path coefficients). When 
multiplying the seventeen path coefficients by five cases, the sample size for running 
a SEM analysis, according to Bentler (1990) should be at least 85 cases. This implies 
that the sample size passes the level for both the single-firms and for the dyadic 
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approach, reducing the confounding effect of sampling error (Bagozzi 1996). A 
reduction in sampling error is desirable because the error invalidates the testing of the 
theories (Jöreskog 1973), and the effort undertaken to reduce error leads to a 
reduction in the failure to estimate biased and inconsistent estimates of the structural 
coefficients in the linear equations.   
4.2 Measures 
For the theoretical model, the research followed Churchill’s (1979) eight steps in the 
measurement process for each of the constructs. (1) In chapter 4.2 the research 
specifies the domains and gives the meaning of the constructs, and then (2) generates 
a sample of indicators that captures the domains defined. The research then follows 
the process of (3) collecting data, (4) purifying measures, (5) collecting data, (6) 
assessing reliability, (7) assessing validity, and (8) developing norms (p. 66). The 
steps are paired with those of Bollen (1989) which includes (1) give the meaning of 
the concept, (2) identify the dimensions and latent variables to represent it, (3) form 
measures, and (4) specify the relation between the measures and the latent variables 
(p. 180).   
To reduce the error from omitted variable bias, that is, when important 
determinants of a key dependent variable are not measured, a combination of in-depth 
interviews with managers from the industry, the use of previous operationalization of 
the constructs, and extensive comments by a professional marketing research faculty, 
has been undertaken. The following subchapters will review the definition and 
operationalization of each of the constructs in the theoretical model. The items 
marked with (R) are reversed.  
4.2.1 Co-market orientation  
The treatment of market orientation in this research builds upon the behavioral 
perspective, implying that market orientation is defined as an organizational strategic 
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choice (Dreher 1994; Graves and Matsuno 1995). Co-market orientation is defined 
through the following three behavior dimensions: collective intelligence gathering, 
collective intelligence dissemination, and collective reaction to the intelligence. The 
measurement and operationalization of market orientation has been a subject in a 
number of studies (Jaworski and Kohli 1993; Kohli, Jaworski, and Kumar 1993; 
Matsuno, Mentzer, and Rentz 2000). Matsuno, Mentzer and Rentz (2000) exceed 
Kohli and Jaworski’s original MARKOR scale by not only including customers and 
competitors but also other market factors that dominate the market environment.  
Collective intelligence gathering refers to the collection and assessment of both 
customer needs and preferences (existing and future), and the forces (that is, tasks 
and macro environment) that influence the development and refinement of those 
needs (Kohli and Jaworski 1990, p. 4). Importantly, at the intra-organization level, 
multiple departments should engage in this activity because each has a unique market 
lens (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). When several organizations seek to perform co-
market orientation, each of them has to gather or take the responsibility to gather 
market information in their particular market. Market intelligence gathering occurs 
both formally and informally. An example of formal market intelligence gathering is 
when organizations collaborate in the form of formal market analysis. An example of 
informal market intelligence gathering is when organizations capture information, for 
instance, in situations where employees have direct contact with customers.  
Intelligence generation refers to the collection and assessment of both customer 
needs/preferences and the forces (that is, task and macro environment) that influence 
the development and refinement of those needs. At inter-organizational level, 
intelligence generation is tapped by asking each of the parties about the degree to 
which they, in coordination with the other parties, perform a number of market 
orientation activities. The items were measured according to the extent the 
organization, in coordination with the other party, performed the following activities: 
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Collective intelligence gathering: In coordination with the other company: 
1. Meetings with customers at least once a year to find out what products or 
services they will need in the future. 
2. Individuals from the manufacturing department interacting directly with 
customers to learn how to serve them better. 
3. Extensive in-house market research. 
4. Early detection of customers' product preferences 
5. The polling of end- users at least once a year to assess the quality of products 
and services. 
6. Frequent contact with or surveying of those that can influence end users' 
purchases (such as travel companies and destination companies). 
7. Collection of industry information through informal means (such as lunches 
with industry friends and conversations with trade partners). 
8. Several departments independently generating intelligence on their competitors 
9. Early detection of fundamental shifts in the industry (such as competition, 
technology, regulation). 
10. Periodical review of the likely effect on customers of changes in the business 
environment (such as regulation)  
 
Collective intelligence dissemination refers to the process and extent of market 
intelligence exchange among organizations (Kohli and Jaworski 1990). The 
dissemination of intelligence occurs both formally and informally. When several 
organizations seek to collectively perform market orientation, their willingness and 
ability to exchange market intelligence is essential. Channels for intelligence 
exchange must exist. These channels can be both formal, for example meetings and 
formal transfer of information, and informal, for example telephone calls and e-mail.  
Intelligence dissemination refers to the process and extent of market 
intelligence exchange within a given organization. At an inter-organizational level, 
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intelligence dissemination is tapped by asking to what extent the organization, in 
coordination with the other party, performs the following activities: 
 
Collective intelligence dissemination: With the other company: 
1. Plenty of informal "hall talk" concerning competitors' tactics or strategies. 
2. Interdepartmental meetings at least once a quarter to discuss market trends and 
developments. 
3. Marketing personnel spending time discussing customers' future needs with 
other functional departments. 
4. Periodical circulation of documents (such as reports, newsletters) that provide 
information on customers. 
5. Rapid update of other parties when something important happens to a major 
customer or market. 
6. Dissemination of data on customer satisfaction on a regular basis. 
7. Optimal communication between marketing and manufacturing departments 
concerning market developments.  
8. Rapid interdepartmental updates when one department finds out important 
information about its competitors. 
9. Cross-functional meetings to discuss market trends and developments (such as 
customers, competition, suppliers) (Matsuno, Mentzer, and Rentz 2000). 
10. Regular interdepartmental meetings to update knowledge of regulatory 
requirements (Matsuno, Mentzer, and Rentz 2000). 
11. Technical staff in one business unit spending sufficient time on sharing 
information about technology for new products with the other parties 
(Matsuno, Mentzer, and Rentz 2000). 
12. Rapid dissemination of market information to other parties (Matsuno, Mentzer, 
and Rentz 2000). 
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Collective intelligence response is action taken on the intelligence gathered and 
disseminated. On the planning side, the focus is on the extent to which the 
marketplace need play a prominent role in the assessment of market segments and 
development of market programs (Kohli and Jaworski 1990). Action taken on the 
basis of market intelligence concerns the speed and coordination with which the 
marketing programs are implemented. For self-governing organizations to take 
synchronized action, they must have access to the same intelligence and must operate 
based on the same knowledge level. Among others, agreement on segments, direction 
for market development, time for implementing strategies are all examples of 
coordinated responses (Jap 2001).   
Intelligence responsiveness is action taken on the intelligence gathered and 
disseminated. On the planning side, the focus is on the degree to which the 
marketplace need play a prominent role in the assessment of market segments and 
development of market programs. Action taken on the basis of market intelligence 
concerns the speed and coordination with which marketing programs are planned 
(Kohli and Jaworski 1990). At an inter-organizational level, intelligence response is 
tapped by asking to what extent the organization, in coordination with the other party, 
performs the following activities: 
 
Collective intelligence response: planning: With the other company: 
1. Far too much time is spent on deciding how to respond to our competitors' 
price changes (R) 
2. Principles of market segmentation drive new product development efforts  
3. For one reason or another changes in customers' product or service needs are 
ignored (R) 
4. The making of periodical reviews of product development efforts to ensure that 
they are in line with what customers want 
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5. Business plans are driven more by market research than by technological 
advances 
6. Several departments meet periodically to plan a response to changes taking 
place in the business environment. 
7. The product lines sold depend more on internal politics than real market needs 
(R). 
 
Collective intelligence response: implementation: With the other company: 
8. If a major competitor were to launch an intensive campaign targeted at our 
customers, a response would be implemented immediately. 
9. If a major competitor were to launch an intensive campaign targeted at their 
own customers, a response would be implemented immediately. 
10. Activities are well coordinated 
11. Formal procedures for handling customer complaints are in place 
12. Rapid implementation of a major marketing plan is possible 
13. Significant changes in the competitors' offerings can be responded to quickly. 
14. Immediate corrective action can be taken if customers are unhappy with the 
quality of service 
15. Concerted efforts to modify a product or service in case of changes in customer 
demand are made.  
16. New products and services arrive on the market before those of our 
competitors 
17. Solutions and ideas are copied from other companies (R)  
18. Service compares favorably with our competitors 
4.2.2 Centralization  
Centralization refers to the locus of decision-making in a collectivity (Van de Ven 
1976). Centralization is measured as the perceived degree of influence an 
organization has in making decisions that are binding upon its members (Van de Ven 
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1976). One research has tested centralization and market orientation. When 
measuring centralization at the intra-organizational level, Jaworski and Kohli (1993) 
used the scale of Aiken and Hage (1966) and measured the degree of hierarchical 
authority within the organization. The measure was replicated in Matsuno, Mentzer 
and Özsomer (2002). Other studies that have measured centralization are Heide and 
Weiss (1995), Reve and Stern (1986), and the measure of power by Bucklin and 
Sengupta (1993), Emerson (1962), Gaski (1984) and Etgar (1976). The measure of 
centralization captures the degree of contractual control, and the use of power to 
restrain the other party in the co-operating network is implemented. This is in 
accordance with Buckling and Sengupta’s (1993) use of constraints in co-marketing 
alliances, and is adapted in this research. The following items measure centralization:  
 
The other company has control over our decisions regarding: 
1. Changes in our customer service  
2. Changes in our opening times 
3. Changes on our products/service 
4. Changes in our marketing/communication 
5. Changes in our employees (numbers, training etc) 
6. Other forms of changes we make 
 
4.2.3 Formalization 
Formalization refers to the extent to which rules and procedures govern the 
relationship between inter-organizational partners (Van de Ven 1976). Formalization 
increases as the agreement is specified, written down, contractual, and mandatory. 
Formalization as a measure is well established in the literature, examples of empirical 
work being John (1984), Heide and John (1995), Cannon, Achrol and Gundlach 
(2000), Bucklin and Sengupta (1992), Spekman and Stern (1979), and Dahlstrøm and 
Nygaard (1999).  
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Formalization has been used in a market orientation research. Jaworski and 
Kohli (1993) used the scale of formalization identified by Aiken and Hage (1966) 
when measuring it in an intra-organizational setting. The measure was replicated in 
Matsuno, Mentzer and Özsomer (2002). However, this scale builds on a definition of 
formalization at the intra-organizational level as being the degree to which jobs in the 
organization are coded, and rules observed. To measure formalization at the inter-
organizational level, I follow Cannon and Homburg (2001) and Cannon, Achrol and 
Gundlach’s (2000) measure on legal bonds, which refers to the extent to which 
detailed and binding contractual agreements are used to specify the roles and 
obligations of the parties. The following taps the construct of formalization: 
 
1. The degree of specific, well-detailed agreements 
2. The degree of formal agreements that detail the obligations of both parties 
3. The degree of detailed contractual agreements  
 
4.2.4 Relational embeddedness 
At individual level strong ties (embeddedness) are defined to include affective 
responses, such as those made toward close friends and family. Within organizational 
and inter-organizational levels, embeddedness is distinguished among the dimensions 
of frequency and distance. Relational embeddedness arises through a history of 
interactions, trust, norms, and shared values (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). The 
construct of relational embeddedness is measured through Rindfleisch and 
Moorman’s (2001) four items of relational embeddedness, in addition to the measures 
of cooperative norms by Cannon, Achrol and Gundlach’s (2000). Their measure 
follows those of social contracts by Macneil (1980) and covers the core set of five 
dimensions: flexibility, solidarity, mutuality, harmonization of conflict, and restraint 
in use of power.  
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1. We feel indebted to our collaboration for what it has done for us 
2. Our managers share close social relations with the managers from the other 
company 
3. Our relationship with our collaborators can be defined as “mutually gratifying” 
4. We expect that I will be working with our collaborators far into the future  
5. We must work together to be successful 
6. Each side is concerned about the other’s profitability 
7. Both sides are willing to make cooperative changes 
8. One party will not take advantage of a strong bargaining position 
9. We do not mind owing each other favors 
10. No matter who is at fault, problems are joint responsibilities 
 
4.2.5 Knowledge redundancy 
Knowledge redundancy is the structural aspect of ties (Rindfleisch and Moorman 
2001). Access to information affects knowledge redundancy, and actors that operate 
at the same level in the network have redundant knowledge. Therefore, the construct 
of knowledge redundancy measures the degree to which actors have access to the 
same information. Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001) use items that center on 
information, experience and competency when measuring knowledge redundancy. 
The items developed here to measure knowledge redundancy are extended from their 
research.  
 
1. We offer very similar products/services 
2. We have experience from identical customer segments 
3. Our products/services are developed from very similar resources 
4. We derive knowledge from identical customer segments 
5. We offer products/services to identical customer segments 
6. We derive knowledge from identical types of products/services 
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7. The market knowledge of their employees is identical to the market knowledge 
of our employees 
8. We have the same competence within the products/services  
9. We have experience from identical types of products/services 
 
4.2.6 Structural position 
By structural position I mean an actor’s degree of privilege (Olson 1965). According 
to Olson (1965) the more endowed an actor is, the higher the degree of motivation is 
for solving problems through collective action. To measure structural position four 
indicators taps the concept of endowment. These indicators are developed from 
Freeman’s (1979) notion of centrality in social structures. An actor with high degree 
centrality maintains contacts with numerous other network actors (Freeman 1979). 
Therefore, actors have higher centrality to the extent they can gain access to and/or 
influence over others (Scott 1991). These items are different from company size, 
which is included as a control variable later in the research.  
 
1. We have the most central position in our market 
2. We guide the development in our market 
3. Our company is important for customers compared to the other companies in 
the same market.  
4. Other companies in the same market must take this company into 
consideration.  
 
4.2.7 Specific investments in customer adaptation 
A transaction-specific investment is any investment that is significantly more 
valuable in a particular exchange than in any alternative exchange (Williamson 
1985). In relation to the two types of specific investments, adaptation and sunk costs, 
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my focus is on adaptation within a relationship. This adaptation is specific in that it 
tends to concern long-term accommodation that involves investments or permanent 
changes in rules and procedures designed to meet a particular customer’s needs 
(Hallén, Johanson, and Seyed-Mohamed 1991). Those adaptations thus contrast with 
flexibility.  
Cannon and Homburg (2001) and Cannon, Achrol and Gundlach (2000) 
measure relation-specific adaptation through the effort in changes in inventory and 
distribution, marketing, product features, personnel, and capital equipment and tools. 
Supplier’s adaptation thus varies across these areas.  
In this research I tap adaptation in physical and human asset specificity. The 
following adaptations from one party toward the other are measured: 
 
Activity investments in adapting:  
1. opening times 
2. season start and end 
3. personnel 
4. types of activities 
5. marketing 
6. training of employees 
7. purchasing 
Physical investments in adapting: 
8. products  
9. service  
10. accountancy  
11. computer systems  
12. equipment and tools  
13. infrastructure 
14. other types of adaptation  
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4.2.8 Customer value 
The types of products investigated in this research are shopping goods (Murphy and 
Enis 1986), and experience goods (Darby and Karni 1973; Nelson 1978). Shopping 
goods are goods that are characterized by the fact that buyers are willing to spend a 
significant amount of time and money in searching for and evaluating these products. 
When making a product choice, consumers for these high-involvement products 
perceive increased levels of risk and effort compared to preference and convenience 
products, but decreased levels compared to specialty products (Murphy and Enis 
1986). Experience goods are goods whose attributes can only be discerned after 
purchase and consumption. An experience good is characterized by lower perceived 
risk, lower information search and fewer behavioral intentions than credence service 
(where product attributes cannot be judged confidently by the consumer even after 
purchase and consumption), but higher than search-based services (where product 
attributes can be evaluated prior to purchase) (Mitra, Reiss, and Capella 1999). Mitra, 
Reiss and Capella’s (1999) identification of experience services as consisting of 
table-service at a restaurant, watching a play or opera, for example, corresponds to 
the type of consumer choices identified in this research.  
This research uses the customer’s level of effort and risk to identify their costs 
of making a product choice (Murphy and Enis 1986). Effort is defined as the amount 
of money and time it takes to purchase a product, and is divided into non-monetary 
effort, such as time, and financial effort, such as money. Financial price is measured 
by asking managers to compare the price a consumer has to pay to make an exchange 
in their co-producing networks with the one that has to be paid to their competitors. 
When taking the co-producing network as a unit of analysis, the research measures 
effort by asking managers to evaluate the time it takes for a consumer to search for 
information, evaluate alternatives, and choose a product which is offered in 
conjunction with another company, compared to those products offered by 
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competitors. Performance time is measured by asking the manager to evaluate the 
length a consumer stays compared to competing companies.  
Risk is the buyer’s subjective feeling about the monetary and non-monetary 
price of the product. More precisely, risk is the buyer’s subjective assessment of the 
consequences of making a purchasing mistake. A consumer’s subjective feeling about 
the non-monetary price of the product is measured by asking them to evaluate the 
consequences of making a wrong choice. Financial risk is measured through a 
consumer’s evaluation of whether the product will be worth the financial price. To 
measure effort and risk, the following items have been included when asking the 
company:  
 
Non-monetary effort: 
1. Time spent searching for, evaluating, and making a choice as to our 
products/service, compared with those of a competitor (that is, through access 
to brochures, the Internet, etc).  
2. Time spent at the destination compared with competing destinations 
Non-monetary risk: 
3. Perceived psychological risk in the event of making a wrong product/service 
choice.  
Monetary effort: 
4. Perception of price paid for the product/service, compared to that of the 
competitors 
Monetary risk: 
5. Perceived risk associated with the financial price the customer pays for the 
product/service 
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Items to measure the customers are as follows: 
Monetary effort: 
1. How much money they have spent on the trip 
Monetary risk: 
2. Whether the products/service concerned was worth its price 
Non-monetary effort: 
3. The amount of time spent choosing the trip. 
4. The amount of actual time spent on the trip  
Non-monetary risk: 
5. Whether they evaluate their choice about the trip to be the right one.  
 
4.3 Questionnaire design 
The design of the questionnaire in this research followed recommendations by 
Henjesand (1996), and the procedure of attribute-based multientity scaling (Olsen and 
Olsson 2002), see Figure 4.7. This means that for each attribute the questions in the 
questionnaire measure each of the entities simultaneously. For instance, specific 
investments undertaken in collective marketing were measured for each of the 
network companies, after which specific investments in the collective training of 
people were measured. The opposite of this is entity-based multientity scaling, which 
measures the entities separately for each set of attributes. This means that collective 
investments in marketing and personnel are measured for each company separately. 
The choice of attribute-based multientity scaling is based on Olson and Olsson (2002) 
who found that such scaling increases validity when testing attitudes in a country-of-
origin setting. The scale in this research strives to follow previous empirical research 
within the constructs. However, to equalize the scales in the questionnaire, a seven-
point Likert scale with an ordinal measurement scale was used for all of the multi-
item constructs. The scale varies between 1 – strongly disagree to 7 – strongly agree.   
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Figure 4.7 
Attribute-based multientity scaling Company I Company II 
RE1 We feel indebted to our 
collaboration for what it has done 
for us 
 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 
 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 
RE2 Our managers share close social 
relations with the managers from 
the other company 
 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 
 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 
Entity-based multientity scaling Company I 
RE1 We feel indebted to our collaboration for what it has 
done for us 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 
RE2 Our managers share close social relations with the 
managers from the other company 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 
  Company II 
RE1 We feel indebted to our collaboration for what it has 
done for us 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 
RE2 Our managers share close social relations with the 
managers from the other company 
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 
Figure 4.7 Attribute based versus entity based multientity scaling 
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4.4 Control variables 
The size of the companies has been included as a control variable in the research. The 
rationale behind this can be found in the theory of collective action. Collective action 
theory identifies asymmetry in endowment as a problem since such network members 
will bear a disproportionate burden of collective provision. To make sure that 
endowment is not mixed up with company size, the latter has been included in the 
test. Company size is measured through the number of employees in the company. 
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Chapter 5: Data examination and measure 
validation 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the data and validate measures. I start with 
a pre-examination of the data, including an evaluation of non-responses and missing 
value analysis, followed by the measurement model. Finally, an evaluation of 
estimation methods, assessment of overall model fit, test of the social capital 
framework and second-order factor model of co-market orientation is included. The 
sub-chapter ends with an analysis of construct validity, an MTMM analysis, and a 
test of discriminate validity.  
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5.1 Pre-examination of data  
Three tests to pre-examine the data have been performed. These are the test of non-
response, missing value analysis, and univariate statistics.  
5.1.1 Non-response 
To test for systematic respondent errors the research followed the recommendations 
by John and Reve (1982). The research questioned the informant regarding their 
interest in and knowledge of the questions asked. Figure 5.1 displays a histogram of 
the answers, showing a mean of 3.6 for interest, with a standard deviation of 1.57. 
Based on this, it can be established that the informants were motivated to answer the 
questions. The knowledge level of the informants has a mean of 4,7 with a standard 
deviation of 1.33, as shown in Figure 5.2. Eight cases reported very little knowledge 
about the subject asked. These cases have been deleted from further analysis. On the 
basis of this, it can be established that the informants had both the motivation and 
knowledge necessary to answer the questions asked. Further, outliers do not seem to 
be any problem in the data set. 
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Figure 5.1 Respondents’ level of interest 
Figure 5.2 
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Figure 5.2 Respondents knowledge level 
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5.1.2  Missing value analysis 
Two imputation techniques have been implemented to replace missing values in the 
data set. First, for those cases that reported systematic missing values for all of the 
items in one construct, the research imputed the value 1 [strongly disagree]. In other 
words, if the company did not report any value concerning their interaction with the 
other company, the research anticipated that there was no interaction at all. This 
method has been undertaken for the following constructs: co-market orientation, 
specific investments, centralization, formalization, and relational embeddedness. The 
reason why this situation has come into being is that in some instances Company I 
has identified two other companies II and III in the co-producing network, where 
these two companies (II and III) did not report to interact with each other. See Figure 
4.1 at page 83 for illustration.   
Second, for cases with completely random missing values, the research 
implemented the method of regression imputation. For instance, companies in a 
network might divide tasks between each other. One company might invest in 
adapting their opening times toward the other company, while the latter company 
focuses its investment on adapting their types of activities toward the first company. 
Even though one company does not invest in all the types of investments identified in 
the questionnaire; this does not mean that it does not invest at all. It follows that cases 
like this should not be deleted from further analysis, which is why this method of 
regression imputation has been implemented for the completely random missing 
constructs with multiple indicators.  
The method of regression imputation is used because it is recommended in 
situations where data is missed completely at random for 6% or more of cases (Roth 
1994). It is also recommended in situations where one has a sample size that is large 
enough to yield stable regression weights for imputation strategies (Donner 1982), 
which can be anticipated to be the case in this data set with 576 responses. For 
regression imputation, the factor structure of the data matrix is estimated factors from 
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the functions of other variables (Roth 1994). To reduce the risk of creating non-
existing correlation in the factor structure, the method of regression weight(s) 
reported by the sample of indicators was estimated for each of the constructs, after 
which it was imputed to the raw data matrix. Such an approach would artificially 
underestimate variance and covariance statistics slightly, and thus strengthen test of 
power (Bollen 1989).  
The reason why I stress the need to replace missing observations is that it can 
be problematic in analysis (Bollen 1989; Myrtveit, Stensrud, and Olsson 2001), and 
some series measures cannot be computed if there are missing values in the series 
(Kamakura and Wedel 1997), as is the situation with dyadic data. A review of studies 
within social science demonstrates that as many as 73% of the studies do not discuss 
non-response (Roth 1994). Of those that did, 39% argued that no missing data 
technique was needed, 13% implemented listwise deletion, and 15% used parwise 
deletion, while only 1% implemented mean substitution. No research reported other 
techniques. These figures are alarming when one takes into account the fact that 
different techniques have different levels of appropriateness dependent on condition 
codes. For other techniques, listwise deletion may result in discarding a large 
proportion of the data. For instance, it biases the distribution in the sample, and non-
missing values of variables for the dropped cases will not be utilized. Parwise 
deletion forms a sample covariance matrix by using all cases with non-missing values 
to compute each covariance or variance. However, the choice of sample in a 
covariance structure analysis through parwise deletion is ambiguous since the 
elements of the covariance matrix are determined by different numbers of cases 
(Bollen 1989). Parwise deletion may lead to mathematically inconsistent correlations, 
or a covariance matrix that is not positively definite. Replacing missing values with 
estimates from the sample mean or median of the observed variables increases the 
risk of heteroscedasticity for the error term in the equation, because the error variance 
in such cases is greater for those cases with estimated value. Further, the distribution 
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of the missing values is unlikely to be normal even if the distribution of the sample 
cases is normal (Bollen 1989). The method of imputation by similar cases, as used by 
Stump and Heide (1996), is not relevant in this research because there is no reason to 
anticipate company characteristics to predict network cooperation. 
5.1.3 Univariate statistics 
Analysis of structural equation modeling builds on the assumption of multivariate 
normally distributed data. First, univariate statistics at item level are investigated. 
According to Muthen and Kaplan (1985), variables with skewness and kurtosis of 
between –1 and 1 appear to provide acceptable model estimates. Skewness and 
kurtosis above absolute value 1 decrease the reliability of the data analysis. In the 
univariate statistics, the statistical properties are within the limits, with a somewhat 
excessive kurtosis for three of the items: item numbers one and two in customer 
value, with a kurtosis of 3.272 and 2.188, and item one in relational embeddedness, 
with a kurtosis of 2.384. The univariate statistics at item level are given in Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1 
Items: Mean Standard 
Deviation
Skewness Kurtosis
Customer Value  
X1 2.867 1.416 0.369 -0.092 
X2 5.967 1.120 -1.697 3.272 
X3 5.751 1.342 -1.486 2.188 
X4 3.355 1.521 -0.048 -0.477 
X5 2.950 1.318 0.052 -0.161 
Specific Investments   
X6 2.501 1.947 0.912 -0.604 
X7 2.575 2.019 0.904 -0.613 
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X8 2.369 1.834 1.018 -0.238 
X9 2.858 2.129 0.609 -1.159 
X10 3.088 2.170 0.404 -1.358 
X11 2.492 1.890 0.927 -0.429 
X12 2.176 1.702 1.221 0.258 
X13 2.711 2.034 0.713 -0.928 
X14 2.664 1.992 0.747 -0.826 
X15 1.852 1.425 1.558 1.441 
X16 2.016 1.627 1.503 1.225 
X17 1.909 1.492 1.564 1.555 
X18 2.130 1.688 1.278 0.518 
X19 2.366 1.684 0.792 -0.668 
Co-market orientation   
X20 2.148 1.356 1.023 -0.101 
X21 1.994 1.318 1.233 0.389 
X22 2.301 1.548 0.851 -0.596 
Items: Mean  Standard 
Deviation
Skewness Kurtosis 
Centralization   
X23 2.441 1.981 0.979 -0.497 
X24 2.426 2.034 1.054 -0.397 
X25 2.601 2.060 0.809 -0.901 
X26 2.631 2.008 0.746 -0.960 
X27 2.050 1.720 1.440 0.782 
X28 2.250 1.805 1.152 0.018 
Formalization     
X29 2.448 2.146 1.059 -0.490 
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X30 2.269 2.048 1.294 0.113 
X31 1.978 1.823 1.653 1.322 
Relational 
Embeddedness 
    
X32 1.732 1.353 1.820 2.384 
X33 2.954 2.041 0.444 -1.261 
X34 3.790 2.258 -0.093 -1.508 
X35 3.822 2.159 -0.185 -1.428 
X36 4.065 2.355 -0.228 -1.526 
X37 3.506 2.158 0.067 -1.455 
X38 3.406 2.063 0.100 -1.381 
X39 3.686 2.193 0.010 -1.428 
X40 4.383 2.172 -0.548 -1.143 
X41 3.373 2.062 0.168 -1.332 
Knowledge 
Redundancy 
    
X42 3.079 1.934 0.461 -1.051 
X43 4.271 1.911 -0.425 -0.852 
X44 4.440 1.865 -0.479 -0.679 
X45 3.600 1.894 0.096 -1.078 
X46 3.556 1.587 -0.002 -0.611 
X47 3.114 1.679 0.401 -0.699 
X48 4.122 1.721 -0.297 -0.657 
X49 3.699 1.663 -0.170 -0.784 
X50 3.552 1.632 -0.073 -0.776 
Structural Position 
X51 4.299 1.709 -0.175 -0.748 
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X52 3.891 1.594 -0.271 -0.607 
X53 5.077 1.264 -0.675 0.795 
X54 1.694 2.994 0.456 -0.718 
Table 5.1 Univariate statistics at item level 
 
 
Table 5.2 
 
Variable: 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation
Skewness Kurtosis
Consumer Value 4.176 .751 -.256 2.164 
Specific 
Investments 
2.416 1.538 .765 -.567 
Co-market 
orientation 
2.145 1.310 1.059 .007 
Centralization  2.399 1.764 .976 -.314 
Formalization  2.238 1.864 1.265 .253 
Relational 
Embeddedness 
3.469 1.726 -.186 -1.247 
Knowledge 
Redundancy 
3.720 1.392 -.070 -.517 
Structural 
Position 
 4.065 1.222 -.151 -.267 
Table 5.2 Multivariate normality 
 
Large deviation from the assumption that observed variables are multivariate 
normally distributed may cause problems with regard to statistical conclusion validity 
(Bollen 1989, p.418). When testing at the overall construct level, as reported in Table 
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5.2, the customer value construct showed the highest kurtosis of 2.164. To sum up, 
the research evaluates the univariate statistics as not including any extreme, 
devastating, values, and no further action has been undertaken to transform the data. 
5.2 The measurement model 
The structure in the measurement model chapter starts with a discussion of the choice 
of estimation method, followed by a discussion of overall model fit. Next, a second-
order factor model of co-market orientation is developed for the purpose of 
implementation in the confirmatory factor analysis when identifying convergent 
validity and reliability. Finally, MTMM analysis and discriminate validity are 
investigated.  
5.2.1 Estimation method 
The method of Maximum Likelihood (ML) has been implemented as the estimation 
method of analysis in this project. The reason for this is that ML is based on the 
assumption of multivariate normality of the observed variables and leads to estimates 
that are consistent, asymptotically unbiased, asymptotically efficient, and 
asymptotically normally distributed (Bagozzi 1996). However, multivariate normality 
assumes that each variable has zero skewness (third-order moment) and zero kurtosis 
(fourth-order moment). This assumption of multivariate normality is not fulfilled 
when using ordinal scales, whereas the alternative, Weighted Least Squares (WLS) 
(Browne and Cudeck 1993), requires an unattainably large sample, >2000, and 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS), which is superior in empirical fit, lacks theoretical 
fit (Olsson, Troye, and Howell 1999). Based on the previous discussion, a full-
information estimation approach, hereof ML, is implemented to test the research 
model (Anderson and Gerbing 1988).   
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5.2.2 Test of the social capital framework 
In Chapter 2.3.2 the research proposed that the two dimensions of social capital were 
characterized by the two constructs embeddedness and knowledge redundancy, 
whereas the degree of competitors vs. collaborators, and different vs. same market 
level affected the presence of the constructs. In contrast to Rindfleisch and Moorman 
(2001), the research proposed that social capital existed in the cell [same level * 
collaborators] (upper right corner in Figure 2.1 at page 44) through the existence of 
co-marketing alliances. This anticipation is tested in Table 5.3, and demonstrates that 
even actors that operate at a horizontal level can perceive each other as collaborators 
(correlation on .336). 
 
Table 5.3 
    Collaborators Competitors 
 Vertical .370 a -.184   
   (.000) b (.000) 
 Horizontal .336 .362  
   (.000) (.000) 
a = Correlation coefficient 
b = Significance level (2-tailed) 
  
Table 5.3 Correlation between elements in the social structure 
 
The dimensions of competitors vs. collaborators, and different vs. same market level 
were tested separately and not in a continuum such as Rindfleisch and Moorman 
(2001) do. This is because I anticipate that the companies can have different roles 
simultaneously. A Fisher Z-test for testing the different types of social capital was 
performed, using the following equations: embeddedness = f(collaborators > 
competitors), knowledge redundancy = f(same level > different level). The results 
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from the test support the proposition that the degree of relational embeddedness is 
more strongly correlated to collaborators than competitors, and that knowledge 
redundancy is more strongly correlated to the horizontal level than the vertical level. 
The results are summarized in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4 
Relational embeddedness Knowledge redundancy 
Collaborators .675 a Vertical level .164 
  (.000) b (.001) 
Competitors -.097  Horizontal level .573 
  (.037) (.000) 
Fisher Z-test  13.834 c 7.248 
a = Correlation coefficient 
b = Significance (2-tailed) 
c = One tailed Fisher Z-test >= 2,33, Sig. = .001 
 
Table 5.4 Fisher Z -test of social capital  
  
5.2.3 Test of the second-order factor model of market orientation 
To test co-market orientation it is first necessary to establish whether there is a 
difference between this construct and individual market orientation. To test this 
proposal I tested the correlation between the dimensions in each of the two 
definitions. As can be seen from Table 5.5 the lack of correlation between individual 
market orientation and co-market orientation clearly indicates that the two constructs 
should be treated separately. 
Further, I tested whether the three dimensions in co-market orientation inter-
correlated. As shown Table 5.6 the correlation between the constructs is satisfactory 
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with values on .7 and .8. This supports the convergent validity for the co-market 
orientation construct.  
 
Table 5.5 
  Co-market orientation: 
 
Individual Market Orientation:  
Intelligence
gathering
Intelligence 
dissemination 
Intelligence 
response
Intelligence gathering -.033 a -.070 -.050 
 (.636) b (.332) (.486) 
Intelligence dissemination -.092 -.080 -.073 
 (.217) (.265) (.320) 
Intelligence response -.057 -.062 -.052 
 (.445) (.394) (.477) 
a = Correlation coefficient 
b = Significance level (2-tailed)
   
Table 5.5 Correlation matrix for individual and co-market orientation  
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Table 5.6 
 Collective 
intelligence 
gathering 
Collective 
intelligence 
dissemination 
Collective intelligence  .814a  
Dissemination (.000)b  
Collective intelligence  .768  .779
Response (.000)  (.000)
a = Correlation coefficient 
b =  Significance level 
   
Table 5.6 Correlation matrix for inter- dimensional co-market orientation 
 
To further test the construct, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using 
EQS/Windows 5.7b (Bentler and Wu 1993) was performed to identify the three 
dimensions of co-market orientation. Questions have been raised as to whether the 
items measuring market orientation are formative or reflective. In line with the work 
of Matsuno and Mentzer (2000), Matsuno, Mentzer and Rentz (2000), and Kohli, 
Jaworski and Kumar (1993), this research treated the items for each of the 
dimensions as reflective, and followed this by treating each of the three dimensions 
as a second-order factor model, reflecting the construct market orientation, see Figure 
5.3. Bollen and Lennox (1991) discuss the consequences of indicators that reflect 
(reflective effect measurement model) versus those that influence (causal 
measurement model) a construct. The most widely-accepted premise in classical 
measurement theory is that reflective measures are characterized by internal 
consistency among indicators, recognized through positive correlation between the 
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indicators (Bollen and Lennox 1991), which is the situation in my research (the 
correlation matrix is not reported). 
Matsuno, Mentzer and Rentz (2000) evaluated the MARKOR scale developed 
by Kohli, Jaworski and Kumar (1993). As discussed in chapter 4.2.1, the 32 
indicators developed by Kohli and Jaworski were supplemented by five indicators 
developed by Matsuno, Mentzer and Rentz.  
Collective intelligence generation. The 10 indicators representing collective 
intelligence generation reported satisfactory factor loadings and overall model fit for 
the single-firm analysis of the network. The factor loading was stable at .7 and .8 
level. Composite reliability for intelligence generation is satisfactory at .944. The fit 
indices were satisfactory with CFI at .934, see Table 5.7. 
Collective intelligence dissemination. All the 12 indicators measuring 
collective intelligence dissemination reported satisfactory factor loadings at levels of 
.7 and .8 Composite reliability for intelligence dissemination is .965. CFI for the 
dissemination dimension is .911. 
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Figure 5.3 
MARKOR
IG ID IR
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6
IG = Intelligence generation, ID = Intelligence dissemination, IR = Intelligence response
 
Figure 5.3 Second-order factor structure  
 From Matsuno, Mentzer and Rentz (2000) 
 
Collective intelligence response. For collective intelligence response, four out 
of 17 indicators reported problems with low factor loadings. Not surprisingly this was 
for the recoded indicators. Three of the indicators were from the MARKOR scale of 
Kohli and Jaworski, while one was from the revised scale of Matsuno, Mentzer and 
Rentz. The actual items are number 1, 3, 7 and 16. After carefully evaluating the risk 
of disrupting the validity of the construct in this research, it was decided not to 
include the indicators in the further analysis. This decision is based on the evaluation 
that including the indicators would create a bias in the analysis, in addition to the fact 
that the remaining indicators for collective intelligence responsiveness number 13 
items. The remaining indicators reported satisfactory factor loadings, at the .8 levels, 
and a composite reliability of .974. The CFI for collective intelligence responsiveness 
is .920, and is thus satisfactory.  
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Table 5.7 
Items: Parameter 
(error) 
T-
value 
Composite 
Reliability 
Shared 
Variance
Intelligence Generation .944 .632 
X1 .729b  ----   -- a   
X2 .792 (.057)c   18.182  
X3 .671 (.054) 15.250  
X4 .862 (.063) 19.920  
X5 .784 (.054) 17.980  
X6 .760 (.071) 17.398  
X7 .662 (.071) 15.029  
X8 .884 (.054) 19.471  
X9 .896 (.061) 20.751  
X10 .867 (.069) 20.043  
Intelligence Dissemination .965 .695 
X11 .812 ---- --   
X12 .759 (.046) 19.893   
X13 .867 (.041) 24.208   
X14 .792 (.039) 21.142   
X15 .816 (.054) 22.075   
X16 .860 (.049) 23.916   
X17 .894 (.046) 25.393   
X18 .884 (.044) 24.969   
X19 .874 (.041) 24.500   
X20 .805 (.038) 21.666   
X21 .770 (.036) 20.317   
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X22 .862 (.049) 23.990   
Intelligence Responsiveness .974 .742 
X23 Excluded   
X24 .816 ---- --   
X25 Excluded    
X26 .888 (.043) 25.472   
X27 .862 (.036) 24.292   
X28 .826 (.043) 22.714   
X29 Excluded    
X30 .870 (.045) 24.616   
X31 .897 (.041) 25.879   
X32 .831 (.042) 22.933   
X33 .880 (.047) 25.079   
X34 .859 (.040) 24.152   
X35 .865 (.051) 24.412   
X36 .885 (.046) 25.336   
X37 .855 (.039) 23.945   
X38 Excluded   
X39 .858 (.040) 24.096   
125 
 
 
Items: Parameter (error) T-value Composite 
Reliability 
Shared 
Variance 
Second-order factor model .923 .801 
CMO-IG .894 ---- --   
CMO-ID .926 (.033) 30.360   
CMO-IR .864 (.040) 27.362   
a = These items are fixed to 1.00 for the purpose of scaling.   
b = Standardized factor loadings. 
c = Standard error. 
CMO-IG = Collective intelligence generation, CMO-ID = Collective 
intelligence dissemination, CMO-IR = Collective intelligence 
responsiveness  
Table 5.7 Dimensions of a co-market orientation  
 
The second-order model of co-market orientation. When testing the three 
dimensions in the second-order factor model of co-market orientation, the following 
was found. The dimension of collective intelligence gathering reported a standardized 
factor loading of .894, collective intelligence dissemination had a standardized factor 
loading of .926, and collective intelligence response reported a standardized factor 
loading of .864. The reliability for the second order co-market orientation construct is 
.923 with a shared variance on .801. To sum up, co-market orientation is measured by 
10 + 12 + 13 indicators. The fit indices in this research are a bit lower than Matsuno, 
Mentzer and Rentz (2000), who reported values of CFI = 1.00, CFI = .94, and CFI = 
.99, successively. I created the dimensions of co-market orientation by computing 
constructs that consisted of adding together the items in each of the dimensions. I 
evaluate the second-order model of co-market orientation in this research to be 
satisfactory, and the three dimensions of co-market orientation: collective intelligence 
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generation, collective intelligence dissemination, and collective intelligence 
responsiveness, are implemented in the confirmatory factor analysis in the 
measurement model.  
 
5.2.4 Test of customer value 
A test of the correlation between customer values as measured by customer response 
and the response given by the companies was not satisfactory, see Table 5.8. One 
explanation for this could be that, when measuring customer value, the construct used 
different items when asking the company than when asking the customers 
themselves. When asking the company, the operationalization was based on 
psychographics, while when asking the customers themselves it was based on 
objective measures, such as the amount of time spent at a destination; the time spent 
on searching for, evaluating, and choosing a destination; and the amount of money 
spent on the trip. As discussed earlier, the number of customer responses was from 
only 67 companies. The data from the companies is therefore used in the further 
analysis.  
Table 5.8  
Customer value: Correlation (Significance level) 
Search time .058 (.105)
Time at place .011 (.765)
Price 016 (.651)
Financial risk .005 (.887)
Social risk -.050 (.158)
Table 5.8  Test of customer value between customer and company responses 
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5.2.5 Construct validity  
The research implements the approach of classical test theory where multiple 
indicators covary due to a common underlying cause (the latent variable) and the 
procedure of validity and reliability assessment (Bollen and Lennox 1991; Churchill 
1979). Additionally, the two-step approach developed by Anderson and Gerbing 
(1988) is used to assess the factor structure for the measures and theoretical 
relationship. There are several reasons why this approach was chosen. It allows both 
for the separate testing of the specifications of relations between latent constructs and 
observed variables as well as for the testing of the specifications of relations between 
latent constructs. Moreover, it encourages having multiple indicators for a latent 
construct, and the separate focus on the measurement model reduces the risk of 
overidentification. The measurement model enables the manifestation of the latent 
variables prior to testing the structural model. If, in contrast, only one test is 
performed, the identification of lack of fit cannot be attributed due to misspecification 
of the measurement model or the structural relations among the latent variables 
(Bagozzi 1996). 
The research implemented confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using 
EQS/Windows 5.7b (Bentler and Wu 1993) for each of the samples in the network. 
This assesses convergent validity in the measurement model by determining the 
significance of each indicator’s estimated pattern coefficient on its posited underlying 
construct factor (greater than twice its standard error) (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). 
The purification of multiple iterations of reliability evaluation, confirmatory analysis, 
and item-by-item substantive evaluation was performed in order to estimate the 
items’ loading significance for the single- form sample. After deleting 
unknowledgeable informants, as well as cases with a large amount of missing values, 
the analysis was run for the measurement model for the single-firm data matrix, 
resulting in the number of cases being N = 515.  
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The Chi-square test for the initial measurement models was χ2 (df) = 5935.078 
(1348), p = .001. Because the Chi-square tests the null hypothesis that the estimated 
variance-covariance matrix deviates from the sample variance-covariance matrix only 
because of sampling error (Bagozzi 1996), a significant Chi-square means that the 
given model’s covariance structure is significantly different from the observed 
covariance matrix. What this means is that the Chi-square value should not be 
significant if there is a good model fit, while a significant Chi-square indicates the 
lack of a satisfactory model fit. Therefore, the Chi-square test does not support the 
model.  
However, there are three ways in which the Chi-square test may be misleading. 
First, the more complex the model, the more likely there is to be a good fit. Second, 
the power (that is the probability of rejecting a false H0) of the Chi-square test to 
detect discrepancies between Σ and Σ(θ) partially depends on sample size. The 
estimate of Chi-square increases in direct proportion to (N - 1), and the power of the 
test increases as N increases. In other words, Chi-square tends to be large in large 
samples if the model does not hold. Third, the Chi-square fit index is very sensitive to 
deviations from the assumption of multivariate normality (Bollen 1989). Because of 
this, additional fit statistics are included.  
The goodness of fit index (GFI) and adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) was 
as follows: GFI = .685 and AGFI = .653. The GFI (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1989) is 
analogous to R-square, and reports the percentage of observed covariance explained 
by the covariance implied by the model. That is, R2 in multiple regression deals with 
error variance, whereas GFI deals with error in reproducing the variance-covariance 
matrix. GFI often runs higher than other fit models, and therefore .95 has been 
suggested as the cutoff. AGFI is a variant of GFI which uses mean squares instead of 
the total sum of squares in the numerator and denominator. For AGFI .90 has been 
suggested as the cut off (Hu and Bentler 1999). When following GFI and AGFI the 
model is not satisfactory.  
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Two other fit indices are included: comparative fit index (CFI) and root mean square 
error of approximation (RMSEA). The test reported CFI = .828 and RMSEA = .081. 
The CFI compares the existing model fit with a null model that assumes the latent 
variables in the model are uncorrelated (the ‘independent model’). Bagozzi (1996) 
evaluates CFI as proposed by Bentler (1990) to hold the greatest promise for accurate 
assessment of overall model fit. CFI is normed to fall between 0 and 1 and should be 
independent of sample size. The logic of CFI is that no more complicated model can 
be hypothesized for the data if the data supports the mutual uncorrelatedness model 
(Tanaka 1993). A value of .90 indicates that 90% of the covariance in the data can be 
reproduced by the given model. Regarding RMSEA, it is also called discrepancy per 
degree of freedom. RMSEA does not require a comparison with a null model and 
thus does not require the posit of a plausible model. RMSEA corrects for model 
complexity because the degrees of freedom is in its determinant. RMSEA is one of 
the fit indexes that are less markedly affected by sample size. Hu and Bentler (1999) 
suggest RMESA <= .06 as the cutoff for a good model fit. However, it has been 
suggested that there is good model fit if RMSEA is less than or equal to .05, and 
adequate fit if RMSEA is less than or equal to .08 (Bagozzi 1996).  
 
Table 5.9 
Items: Parameter 
(error) 
T-value Composite 
Reliability 
Shared 
Variance 
Customer Value  .764 .430 
X1 .701b ---- -- a   
X2 -.317 (.057) c -6.703   
X3 -.310 (.064) -6.559   
X4 .861 (.077) 17.164   
X5 .848 (.066) 17.027   
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Specific Investments  .967 .676 
X9 .807 -- --   
X10 .832 (.048) 22.481   
X11 .848 (.043) 23.113   
X12 .867 (.049) 23.914   
X13 .799 (.052) 21.205   
X14 .881 (.043) 24.491   
X15 .798 (.041) 21.188   
X16 .857 (.047) 23.480   
X17 .890 (.045) 24.882   
X18 .768 (.035) 20.061   
X19 .760 (.040) 19.789   
X20 .775 (.036) 20.342   
X21 .760 (.041) 19.779   
X22 .852 (.039) 23.304   
Co-market orientation  .924 .801 
X6 .886 -- --   
X7 .910 (.033) 29.900   
X8 .889 (.040) 28.642   
Centralization   
X23 .917 -- -- .960 .802 
X24 .897 (.030) 33.579   
X25 .938 (.028) 38.445   
X26 .875 (.031) 31.386   
X27 .831 (.028) 27.716   
X28 .911 (.026) 35.087   
Formalization   .920 .793 
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X29 .878 -- --   
X30 .958 (.033) 31.553   
X31 .831 (.032) 25.167   
Items: Parameter 
(error) 
T-value Composite 
Reliability 
Shared 
Variance 
Relational Embeddedness  .947 .646 
X32 .486 -- --   
X33 .739 (.209) 11.002   
X34 .902 (.260) 11.910   
X35 .919 (.252) 11.991   
X36 .839 (.259) 11.599   
X37 .841 (.238) 11.608   
X38 .864 (.231) 11.729   
X39 .760 (.228) 11.137   
X40 .841 (.240) 11.609   
X41 .760 (.214) 11.139   
Knowledge Redundancy  .925 .580 
X42 .730 -- --   
X43 .690 (.060) 15.447   
X44 .725 (.059) 16.269   
X45 .812 (.059) 18.347   
X46 .730 (.050) 16.385   
X47 .711 (.053) 15.933   
X48 .808 (.054) 18.245   
X49 .843 (.052) 19.079   
X50 .790 (.051) 17.804   
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Structural Position .784 .483 
X51 .785 -- --   
X52 .814 (.063) 15.235   
X53 .567 (.045) 11.752   
X54 .575 (.061) 11.923   
χ2 
Degrees of freedom 
p value 
GFI 
AGFI 
CFI 
RMSEA 
5935.078 
1348 
.001 
.685 
.653 
.828 
.081 
 
Number of cases = 515 
a = These items are fixed to 1.00 for the purpose of scaling.   
b = Standardized factor loadings. 
c = Standard error. 
Table 5.9 Single-firm measurement model 
 
Based on the previous findings, and the large number of items in this research, 
I do not consider the fit statistics to provide adequate evidence to adjust the items in 
the model. The reason is that I priority construct validity, and deleting items in 
constructs is a serious threat to this. Even though two of the items in customer value, 
financial and psychological risk, are at the .3 levels, the items are too important to be 
excluded. I will therefore move on to investigate the reliability of and variance in the 
constructs to further validate the model. To summarize, the measurement model 
reported satisfactory fit: Chi-square (df) = 5935.078 (1348), p = .001, GFI = .685, 
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AGFI = .653, CFI = .828, RMSEA = .081. The 90% confidence interval of RMSEA 
is (.079 - .083), see Table 5.9.  
 
a) Reliability analysis 
Composite reliability was calculated using the procedures outlined by Fornell and 
Larcker (1981). The formula for construct reliability is CNη = 
( ) ( ) ( )⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ + ∑∑∑ iii yy ελλ 22  for construct η, where λy = standardized loading for scale 
item yi, and εi = measurement error for scale item yi. As can be seen from the 
formula, reliability is the squared correlation between a construct and its measures. 
The composite reliability in the analysis varies between .764 and .967, which is 
within the accepted level of .70 (Fornell and Larcker 1981; Nunnally 1978).  
Average variance extracted is a more conservative measure than composite 
reliability (Fornell and Larcker 1981), and was calculated using the following 
formula: Vη = ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +∑∑∑ iii yy ελλ 22 . Bagozzi and Yi (1988) recommend variance 
extracted to be above .50. Two constructs reported average variance extracted below 
the recommended level: customer value at .430 and structural position at .483. In 
other words, the ratio of the true scores‘ variance to the observed variables’ variance 
is questionable, resulting in unsatisfactory internal consistency.  The rest of the 
constructs reported satisfactory reliability and shared variance. 
5.2.6 MTMM analysis 
To address the problem of systematic method error, which comes into being because 
the correlation between methods in the dyadic sample is always 1, the use of 
multitrait- multimethod was implemented (MTMM). This enables the distinguishing 
of substantive (that is, trait) variance from unwanted method variance, which is 
variance attributable to the measurement procedure(s) rather than to the construct of 
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interest. By this it is possible to control for the fact that each attempt to measure a 
concept is contaminated by irrelevant aspects of the method employed. 
The following steps were undertaken when running a CFA in MTMM 
(Bagozzi 1996 p. 360-363), based on the assumption that measurement models 
contain stochastic error terms that are usually interpreted to be the sum of specific 
factors and random measurement errors in the observable indicators (Bagozzi and Yi 
1991). (a) The multiple indicators for each of the theoretical constructs were 
computed into a single- item construct (labeled trait factor). As a result, the trait 
factors in the theoretical model consist of single indicators in the MTMM analysis, 
see Figure 5.4. (b) The one-item traits from each of the two company samples 
(Company I and Company II) were then added to a measurement model using CFA. 
Thus, each of the theoretical constructs in the measurement model was represented by 
trait factors from each of the two parties in the network. (c) The variance of the 
constructs was fixed at 1.00, and covariation between the trait factors and covariation 
between the two method factors was fixed in order no longer to covary. This was 
done to prevent random error from confounding specific error in the disturbances. 
That is, correlations among method factors represent the convergence of the general 
trait factor, and correlations among method factors may also represent the 
convergence of the general trait factor across methods, rather than the true 
relationships among methods (Bagozzi 1996 p.350). Finally, the random error for the 
constructs is fixed at >.0. This is done to avoid linear dependency among constructs 
in the analysis, a situation that comes into being because the theoretical constructs are 
measured by psychometric data, which in turn necessitates the inclusion of random 
error.  
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Figure 5.4 
 
 
Figure 5.4 The MTMM matrix in CFA 
 
CFA enables the calculation of the proportions of trait, method and error 
(Bagozzi and Yi 1991). Table 5.10 reports convergent validity, measured by the 
parameter estimates and factor loading for each dyadic construct; construct composite 
reliability; and shared variance when controlling for method variance for the two 
companies. All the t-values of the estimated factor loading of the constructs are 
within the accepted level. For the theoretical scales, no construct reported composite 
reliability above  
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Table 5.10 
Scale   
Parameter (error) 
 
T values 
Comp. 
Reliab. 
Shared 
Variance 
CV Company I .625a (.069) 6.328 .292 .212 
 Company II .181 (.070) 1.297   
INV Company I .451 (.137) 5.706 .575 .415 
 Company II -.167 (.130) -1.830   
CMO Company I .607 (.107) 7.874 .326 .219 
 Company II -.262 (.093) -3.252   
CENT Company I .471 (.137) 6.379 .214 .134 
 Company II .216 (.126) 2.747   
FORM Company I .191 (.128) 2.655 .331 .245 
 Company II .673 (.126) 8.703   
EMBED Company I .604 (.116) 9.445 .272 .197 
 Company II .171 (.096) 3.002   
KNOW Company I .686 (.128) 8.541 .535 .369 
 Company II .518 (.108) 5.481   
POSIT Company I .765 (.109) 9.047 .575 .415 
 Company II -.494 (.089) -4.674  
Company I       -- .332 (.071) 3.116  
 -- .769 (.157) 8.479  
 -- .645 (.130) 6.875  
 -- .777 (.165) 8.723  
 -- .881 (.147) 10.728  
 -- .738 (.164) 8.170  
 -- .536 (.145) 5.891  
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 -- .381 (.125) 3.947   
Company II       -- .363 (.052) 3.489   
 -- .821 (.123) 9.515   
 -- .790 (.100) 9.166   
 -- .849 (.135) 10.122   
 -- .567 (.157) 5.897   
 -- .930 (.132) 11.876   
 -- .514 (.103) 5.693   
 -- .347 (.080) 3.636   
a = Standardized factor loadings     
Table 5.10 Dyadic measurement mode with MTMM 
 
the recommended level. Compared to the reliability reported in Table 5.9 (page 132) 
this is a demonstration of how shared method variance affects validity. 
Convergent validity correlation among all the dyadic constructs (n = 91) is 
reported in Table 5.11. The correlation between the dyadic pairs of constructs is very 
low, well below the required values, and contradicts previous studies with multiple 
informants across dyads (John and Reve 1982). This implies that the constructs do 
not have convergent validity at the overall construct level, a situation indicating the 
necessity to implement the control for method variance to purify constructs. This 
situation also highlights the necessity to run the structural model for the single-firm 
sample in addition to the dyadic approach, a process that has also been recommended 
by Bagozzi (1996).  
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Table 5.11 
Constructs Correlation 
Customer Value Company I vs. Company II .216 (.037)a
Specific Investments Company I vs. Company II .177 (.087)
Co-market orientation Company I vs. Company II .063 (.554)
Centralization Company I vs. Company II .216 (.036)
Formalization Company I vs. Company II .134 (.198)
Relational Embeddedness Company I vs. Company II .069 (.506)
Knowledge Redundancy Company I vs. Company II .021 (.562)
Structural Position Company I vs. Company II -.002 (.955)
a = Significance level 
Table 5.11 Correlation between the dyadic constructs 
 
Table 5.12 reports the apportioning of variance (Phillips 1981) due to trait, 
method, and error for the scale measurement of the model tested. To a very high 
degree, the portion of method variance dominates the constructs. This signals the 
importance of controlling for method to purify measures for further analysis (Bagozzi 
and Yi 1991; Campbell and Fiske 1959; Phillips 1981). To take two examples, 
formalization in the Company I sample reports a method variance of .606 and 
relational embeddedness in the Company II sample reports a trait variance of .089. 
Shared method variance is a major validity threat that may influence test results 
(Bagozzi and Yi 1991; Campbell and Fiske 1959; Phillips 1981). Despite previous 
emphasis on shared method problems (Churchill 1979), few studies in marketing and 
management have actually taken the problem into serious consideration (Bagozzi and 
Yi 1991). The control for method variance in this research therefore increases its 
validity.  
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Table 5.12 
 Variance Component 
 Trait Method Error 
Company I:    
Customer Value .360 .191 .448
Specific Investments .215 .366 .419
Co-market orientation .305 .324 .371
Centralization .264 .436 .300
Formalization .131 .606 .262
Relational Embeddedness .286 .350 .364
Knowledge Redundancy .367 .287 .345
Structural Position .518 .258 .225
Company II: 
Customer Value .130 .261 .609
Specific Investments .107 .528 .365
Co-market orientation .132 .399 .469
Centralization .137 .538 .326
Formalization .424 .357 .219
Relational Embeddedness .089 .484 .427
Knowledge Redundancy .284 .282 .434
Structural Position .410 .288 .301
Table 5.12 Partitioning of variance due to trait, method and error 
 
Given multiple measures obtained by multiple methods, construct validation is 
assessed through an inspection of the multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) matrix, where 
the correlation matrix for different concepts (that is, traits) is measured by different 
methods (Campbell and Fiske 1959). Campbell and Fiske (1959) recommend the 
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MTMM approach to control for measurement errors. Measurement error components 
can have serious influences on empirical results, yielding potentially misleading 
conclusions (Bagozzi and Yi 1991; Campbell and Fiske 1959). When the same 
method is used to measure different constructs, shared method variance always 
inflates the observed between-measure correlation. Working with dyadic data in this 
research enables us to control for measurement effects to facilitate convergent and 
discriminate validity.  
Bagozzi and Yi (1991) argue that CFA is shown to overcome most limitations 
inherent in the Campbell and Fiske procedures. When applied to MTMM matrix data, 
the CFA model hypothesizes that the total variation in measures can be expressed as 
a linear combination of trait, method, and error effects (Jöreskog 1974). Nevertheless, 
it is well documented in marketing literature that CFA models have had difficulty 
analyzing MTMM data, whether for lack of fit, inadmissible estimates, or lack of 
convergence (Bagozzi 1996). In addition, one must consider the additive versus the 
multiplicative effect of method factors on trait factors (Kumar and Dillon 1992). 
Thus, the choice of a particular covariance structure model cannot be predicated on 
fit considerations alone, but rather must be made in the context of the measurement 
model presumed to underlie the observations. As a matter of fact, a good fitting CFA 
model in the case of MTMM should treated with caution since the apparent method 
effects are really confounded by trait effects from a general trait factor (Bagozzi 
1996).  
5.2.7 Discriminate validity 
Three different tests of discriminate validity were performed. First, discriminate 
validity was tested for the single-firm sample. Models where all traits were allowed 
to correlate were compared against a series of models where intertrait correlation was 
set to unity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). The results are presented in Table 5.13. Each 
case reported significant Chi-square differences between the models. To take one 
example, the test of discrimination between formalization and centralization is 
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statistically significant: (χ2 (df) = 694 (1), p<. 05). The correlation matrixes for the 
single-firm matrix are reported in Table 5.14. 
Second, following Bagozzi, Yi and Phillips (1991) the procedure of a one-
factor versus a two-factor confirmatory model was adopted to assess discriminate 
validity using EQS. A Chi-square difference test for one versus two factor model was 
conducted. As an example, the one-factor solution between relational embeddedness 
and customer value, χ2 (1355) = 6681.032, reported a worse fit than did a model 
treating relational embeddedness and customer value as two separate factors, χ2 
(1348) = 5935.078, see Table 5.15 for the Chi-square differences. The Chi-square 
difference test was satisfactory.  
Third, to test the discriminate validity of the overall constructs, the research 
computed constructs from pairs of scales in the dyad. For example, knowledge 
redundancy for Company I and Company II in a network were added to the construct 
‘knowledge redundancy’. For the test to compare models where all traits were 
allowed to correlate with a series of models where intertrait correlation was set to 
unity, each case reported significant Chi-square differences between the models. For 
example, the test of discrimination between knowledge redundancy and co-market 
orientation is statistically significant: χ2 (1) = 137.795, p<. 05, see Table 5.16 for the 
findings. 
In sum, the tests of discriminate validity provide evidence to assume that the 
constructs are different from each other, and thus, non-redundant. 
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Table 5.13 
Covariances Chi-square(df) 
CV INV 782 (1) 
CV CMO 433 (1) 
CV CENT 840 (1) 
CV FORM 818 (1) 
CV EMBED 740 (1) 
CV POSIT 630 (1) 
CV KNOW 903 (1) 
INV CMO 934 (1) 
INV CENT 2206 (1) 
INV FORM 687 (1) 
INV EMBED 2710 (1) 
INV POSIT 672 (1) 
INV KNOW 2488 (1) 
CMO CENT 1006 (1) 
CMO FORM 642 (1) 
CMO EMBED 862 (1) 
CMO POSIT 624 (1) 
CMO KNOW 1224 (1) 
CENT FORM 694 (1) 
CENT EMBED 2522 (1) 
CENT KNOW 3078 (1) 
CENT POSIT 756 (1) 
FORM EMBED 684 (1) 
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FORM KNOW 975 (1) 
FORM POSIT 655 (1) 
EMBED KNOW 2470 (1) 
EMBED POSIT 626 (1) 
KNOW POSIT 715 (1) 
 
Table 5.13 Divergent validity through united intertrait correlation 
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Table 5.14 
 CV INV CMO CENT FORM EMBED KNOW 
INV .285a       
 (.000)b       
CMO .431 .534      
 (.000) (.000)      
CENT .232 .567 .509     
 (.000) (.000) (.000)     
FORM .248 .541 .535 .525    
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)    
EMBED .265 .585 .542 .470 .529   
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)   
KNOW .099 .298 .214 .184 .165 .294  
 (.024) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)  
POSIT .075 .158 .180 .078 .177 .166 .003 
 (.087) (.000) (.000) (.077) (.000) (.000) (.952) 
a = Correlation coefficient 
b = Level of significance, two tailed 
  
 
Table 5.14 Correlation matrix for single-firm data 
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Table 5.15 
 One-factor vs two-factor 
Constructs: Chi-square (df) 
CV INV 735.410 (7) 
CV CMO 398.313 (7) 
CV CENT 772.921 (7) 
CV FORM 755.685 (7) 
CV EMBED 745.954 (7) 
CV KNOW 902.350 (7) 
CV POSIT 575.985 (7) 
INV CMO 1068.876 (7) 
INV CENT 2474.164 (7) 
INV FORM 961.100 (7) 
INV EMBED 2738.579 (7) 
INV KNOW 2466.229 (7) 
INV POSIT 564.775 (7) 
CMO CENT 1127.139 (7) 
CMO FORM 882.670 (7) 
CMO EMBED 1031.033 (7) 
CMO KNOW 1481.112 (7) 
CMO POSIT 550.988 (7) 
CENT FORM 970.777 (7) 
CENT EMBED 2841.367 (7) 
CENT KNOW 3554.106 (7) 
CENT POSIT 585.774 (7) 
FORM EMBED 970.638 (7) 
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FORM KNOW 1402.566 (7) 
FORM POSIT 555.747 (7) 
EMBED KNOW 2461.287 (7) 
EMBED POSIT 556.680 (7) 
KNOW POSIT 604.050 (7) 
 
Table 5.15 Divergent validity for one- versus two-factor solutions 
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Table 5.16 
Covariances Chi-square (df)
CV INV 84.270 (1)
CV CMO 21.221 (1)
CV CENT 179.408 (1)
CV FORM 151.868 (1)
CV EMBED 125.849 (1)
CV POSIT 26.100 (1)
CV KNOW 96.669 (1)
INV CMO 62.807 (1)
INV CENT 42.962 (1)
INV FORM 121.054 (1)
INV EMBED 68.752 (1)
INV POSIT 109.254 (1)
INV KNOW 191.844 (1)
CMO CENT 93.581 (1)
CMO FORM 148.895 (1)
CMO EMBED 53.601 (1)
CMO POSIT 71.081 (1)
CMO KNOW 137.795 (1)
CENT FORM 92.569 (1)
CENT EMBED 128.368 (1)
CENT KNOW 282.058 (1)
CENT POSIT 243.974 (1)
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FORM EMBED 116.520 (1)
FORM KNOWL 264.482 (1)
FORM POSIT 197.544 (1)
EMBED KNOW 209.111 (1)
EMBED POSIT 164.720 (1)
KNOW POSIT 192.166 (1)
 
Table 5.16 Divergent validity at construct level 
 
5.2.8 Summing up the measurement model 
The CFA for the sample reported satisfactory fit for the factor loadings, the 
convergent validity, and the reliability measures. Further, the tests of the second-
order factor model of co-market orientation confirmed the dimensions to be imputed 
into the measurement model. The fit indices for the single-firm measurement model 
were somewhat satisfactory, taking into consideration the choice of prioritizing 
construct validity at the cost of overall model fit. The only items that were excluded 
were four items in co-market orientation responsiveness. The research concluded 
with 5 indicators for customer value, 14 indicators for specific investments, 6 
indicators for centralization, 3 indicators for formalization, 10 indicators for 
relational embeddedness, 9 indicators for knowledge redundancy, and finally 4 
indicators for structural position. The items are summarized in Table 5.17. 
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Table 5.17 
Constructs Initial version Final version 
Customer Value 5 5 
Specific Investments 14 14 
Collective MO Intelligence generation 10 10 
Collective MO Intelligence dissemination 12 12 
Collective MO Intelligence response 17 13 
Centralization  6 6 
Formalization 3 3 
Relational Embeddedness 10 10 
Knowledge Redundancy 9 9 
Structural Position 4 4 
Table 5.17 Number of items in final model 
 
By implementing the measurement model into an MTMM analysis using CFA, the 
opportunity to apportion variance into trait, method, and error came into being. The 
test revealed, however, that scale variance at the overall construct level was not 
satisfactory. Discriminate validity was tested using three different methods, one for 
the single-firm samples, one for the construct level, and, finally, one for the overall 
construct level.  
By using a dyadic approach, the test uncovered several weaknesses in the data 
which would not have been possible to detect with a single-firm focus. Taking this 
into consideration, the results verify the necessity to validate data before drawing 
conclusions at later stages. Based on the results, it was decided to run the structural 
model separately for the single-firm data, in addition to the dyadic approach, a 
method that has been recommended by Bagozzi (1996).  
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Chapter 6: Tests of the research model 
 
 
 
The following chapter tests the proposed hypotheses in the theoretical model. The test 
is threefold. First the structural model is tested for the single-firm sample. After that, 
it is tested to include control variables. Finally the dyadic structural model using a 
MTMM approach is performed.  
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6.1 The structural model 
The second step in Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) two-step approach to SEM is to 
conjoin the measurement model with the structural model. This method is chosen 
because it enables a comprehensive and confirmatory assessment of construct 
validity, as discussed previously. The structural model in the research therefore 
constitutes a confirmatory assessment of nomological validity (Anderson and 
Gerbing 1988).  
Analysis of the structural relationships was performed by EQS/Windows 5.7b 
(Bentler 1985). The results of the structural relationships for the single-firm sample 
are presented in Table 6.1. The results from the single-firm analysis including the 
control variable are not discussed successively, but are summarized in Table 6.2. The 
results of the structural relationships for the dyadic MTMM approach are presented in 
Table 6.3. The results of the hypothesis are displayed as follows: the findings are 
presented for the single-firm sample (marked with S); after that the results of the 
hypothesis are presented using the dyadic MTMM approach, (marked with D). 
Effects of contractual arrangements. The first set of hypotheses to be tested 
was the effect of independent variables on co-market orientation. The independent 
variables are categorized into three groups: contractual arrangements, social capital, 
and structural position. The research started the test by investigating the effects of 
contractual arrangements on co-market orientation. First, the degree of centralization 
was hypothesized to positively affect the level of co-market orientation in the co-
producing network, H1. The statistical test of the single-firm sample supported the 
alternative hypothesis, (γ31S = .239, p< .01), as did the statistical test from the dyadic 
approach, (γ31D = .597, p< .05). Based on this, H1 is statistically supported. 
Hypothesis H2 contends that formalization positively affects co-market orientation. 
The statistical test for the single-firm sample supported the falsification of the null 
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hypothesis, (γ32S = .261, p< .01). By using a dyadic approach, the statistical test did 
support the strength of the relationship between formalization and co-market 
orientation, but this statistical test was not significant. It therefore provided no 
support for falsifying the null hypothesis, (γ32D = .063). Based on this, H2 is not 
supported statistically.  
Effects of social capital. For the hypotheses regarding social capital, hypothesis 
H3 predicts relational embeddedness to have a positive effect on co-market 
orientation. The statistical test in the single-firm sample supported the rejection of the 
null hypothesis, (γ33S = .298, p< .01), as did the test of the dyadic data (γ33D = .548, 
p< .01). Thus, H3 is statistically supported. For knowledge redundancy, the research 
predicted that it would positively affect co-market orientation, H4. The statistical test 
of the single-firm sample supported this hypothesis, (γ34S = .068, p< .01). For the 
dyadic approach, the statistical test supported the hypothesis, with the results being 
significant (γ34D = .230, p< .10). To sum up, the statistical tests statistically support 
hypothesis H4.  
Effects of network structure. Hypothesis H5 predicts a central structural 
position to have a positive effect on co-market orientation. The statistical test for the 
single-firm sample supported the hypothesis (γ35S = .085, p< .05). The dyadic test of 
the hypothesis also supported the rejection of the null hypothesis (γ35D = .179, p< 
.10). From this, the research can conclude that the statistical test of H5 is statistically 
supported.  
Effects of co-market orientation. Hypothesis H6 pertains to the two constructs 
co-market orientation and specific investments. For hypothesis H6, the research 
proposes that co-market orientation in a co-producing network positively affects the 
mount of specific investments in the network. The statistical test for the single-firm 
sample supported the falsification of the null hypothesis, (β23S = .604, p< .01). By 
using the dyadic approach, the test also supported the falsification of the null 
hypothesis (β23D = .637, p< .01), and H6 is thus statistically supported.  
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Effects on customer value. The final hypothesis contends that specific 
investments affect the level of perceived customer value (H7). The hypothetical test 
contended that the more specific investments in a co-producing network, the higher 
the level of customer value. For the single-firm sample, the statistical test supported a 
falsification of the null hypothesis, (β12S = .421, p< .01). For the dyadic approach, 
when controlling for measure error, the statistical test also supported the falsification 
of the null hypothesis (β12D = .580, p< .05). Based on these results, the research 
concludes that H7 is statistically supported.  
Control variable. When the control variable of company size was included in 
the single-firm analysis, the test results did not show a marked change. The results, 
including the control variable, are presented in Table 6.2.  
6.1.1 Summing up the structural model 
Seven out of seven hypotheses were supported in the analysis of the single-firm data, 
whereas in the test of the dyadic data six out of the seven hypotheses were supported. 
The hypothesis not supported in the dyadic approach was the link between 
formalization and co-market orientation. The findings are summarized in Table 6.4.  
 
Table 6.1 
 Dependent variables: 
Independent variables: Co-market orientation Specific 
investments 
Customer 
value 
Centralization .239a(5.365)b   
Formalization .261 (5.402)   
Relational embeddedness .298 (5.725)   
Knowledge redundancy .068 (2.171)   
Structural position .085 (1.828)   
Co-market orientation  .604 (13.541)  
Specific investments   .421 (8.408)
                                  R2 .500 .365 .177 
χ2 = 6227.506, degrees of freedom = 1359, p value = .001, GFI  .675, AGFI = .645, 
CFI = .817, RMSEA = .084 
a = Standardized value 
b = t values in parenthesis  
     
Table 6.1 Structural model for single-firm analysis 
 
 
  
Table 6.2 
 Dependent variables: 
Independent variables: Co-market orientation Specific 
investments 
Customer 
value 
Centralization .246a (5.527)b   
Formalization .272  (5.666)   
Relational embeddedness .293  (5.581)   
Knowledge redundancy .053  (1.409)   
Structural position .111  (2.678)   
Co-market orientation  .604  (13.307)  
Specific investments   .415 (8.178)
Company Size -.105 (-2.879)   
                                  R2 . 520 . 364 . 173 
χ2 = 6296.172, degrees of freedom = 1407, p value = .001, GFI  .673, AGFI = .642, 
CFI = .812, RMSEA = .083 
a = Standardized value 
b = t values in parenthesis  
     
Table 6.2 Structural model for single-firm analysis, including control variable 
 Table 6.3 
 Dependent variables: 
Independent variables: Co-market orientation Specific 
investments 
Customer 
value 
Centralization .597a(2.119)b   
Formalization .063   (.502)   
Relational embeddedness .548 (2.364)   
Knowledge redundancy .230 (1.292)   
Structural position .179 (1.544)   
Co-market orientation  .637 (2.342)  
Specific investments   .580 (2.183)
                                  R2 .745 .336 . 405 
χ2 = 269.541, degrees of freedom = 97, p value = .001 
a = Standardized value 
b = t values in parenthesis  
     
Table 6.3 Structural model of the dyadic data 
 
Table 6.4 
Hypothesis Independent Dependent Predicted Single-firm Dyad 
H1 CENT CMO + + + 
H2 FORM CMO + + NS 
H3 EMBEDD CMO + + + 
H4 KNOWL CMO + + + 
H5 POSIT CMO + + + 
H6 CMO INV + + + 
H7 INV CV + + + 
Table 6.4 Summary of findings in the structural model 
  
 
  
 
Chapter 7: Results and implications of the 
findings 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the results from the research and its 
implications. First I evaluate the test of the construct, co-market orientation. Then the 
discussion of the effects of contractual control on co-market orientation follows. Next 
the effect of co-market orientation on specific investments is discussed, which is 
followed by a discussion of the effects of specific investments on customer value. 
The chapter is closed with a discussion of implications, limitations and future 
research.  
 
 
7.1 Results 
The question of interest in this research is “What is the impact of a co-market 
orientation in co-producing networks?” To accomplish this two sub questions were 
developed. First, how do specialized actors in co-producing networks coordinate their 
businesses toward each other when they participate in a co-market orientation? 
Second, in a situation where specialized actors operate in a co producing network, 
what affect does adaptation from businesses with regard to the total product have on 
the customer’s evaluation of the total product? The first sub-question reflects the 
independent variables, factors that affect a co-market orientation, where the second 
sub-question reflects the dependent variables: co-market orientation, specific 
investments and customer value. Each of these factors is discussed in turn. However, 
the concept of ‘collective’ market orientation is also introduced in this research. 
Consequently, the first section is a summary about the empirical analysis of this 
concept.  
7.1.1 Test of co-market orientation 
The concept of co-market orientation is developed from the market orientation 
literature in conjunction with the theory of collective action (Kohli and Jaworski 
1990; Olson 1965). The theory of collective action discusses the coordination effort 
between two or more actors with the purpose of the common. Thus, a co-market 
orientation is identified as a type of collective action, and is recognized through the 
collective performance of the three market orientation dimensions as defined by 
Kohli and Jaworski (1990). As a consequence of this, my treatment of market 
orientation builds upon a behavioral perspective, which implies that market 
orientation is defined as an organizational strategic choice (Dreher 1994; Graves and 
Matsuno 1995). By co-market orientation I mean the market orientation activities 
actors in co-producing networks perform together (Kohli and Jaworski 1990). 
Therefore, co-market orientation is defined through the three behavior dimensions, 
collective intelligence gathering, collective intelligence dissemination and collective 
reaction to the intelligence.  
 To test the concept of co-market orientation the content of the construct was 
discussed during in-depth interviews with managers from the tourist industry. The 
managers stressed especially the importance of disseminating intelligence between 
the actors. Further, three empirical tests were performed to test the construct. First, 
the three dimensions of individual market orientation were tested against its 
correlation with the three dimensions of a co-market orientation (see Table 5.5 at 
page 119). The analysis reported that there was no correlation between the two forms 
of market orientation, lending support to the idea that the two concepts of market 
orientation should be treated as separate constructs. Second, the inter-dimensional 
correlation between the three dimensions of co-market orientation reported a strong 
correlation (see Table 5.6 at page 120). Third, the second order factor model 
confirmed that the three dimensions of co-market orientation could be treated as 
reflective dimensions of a higher order model, see Table 5.7 at page 125. Based on 
the above analysis, the concept of co-market orientation was used for the further 
analysis in the research.  
7.1.2 Effect of contractual control 
This research is among the first to develop and test antecedents and effects of co-
market orientation in co-producing networks. Co-market orientation is defined as a 
type of collective action, and factors affecting the coordination effort of self-
governing actors are investigated. To fully understand this problem, I draw on 
collective action which builds on the fundamental sociological question: when will a 
collectivity act to maximize its collective interest even though such behavior conflicts 
with a course of action that would maximize the short-term interest of each individual 
separately (Marwell and Ames 1979)? This research tests the effect that contractual 
control and social structures have on the companies that operate within the network 
and how they affect actors’ behavior. Contractual control was predicted to affect 
collective behavior through its ability to simulate the elements of hierarchical control 
(Stinchcombe 1985), and social control affects actors’ behavior through the resources 
the actors can draw on from the relationships. The results from contractual control are 
discussed first, before discussing the effect of the actor’s social network.  
Contractual control was separated into centralization and formalization. It is 
proposed that the effect of centralization enables the firms to perform a co-market 
orientation. This is because it clarifies boundaries on decisions and activities and 
thereby simplifies the decision-making (Galbraith 1977). In the empirical test the 
hypothesis was supported for single-firm sample and for the dyadic analysis, see 
Table 7.1. The empirical findings therefore support that centralized decision-making 
reduces the potential for uncoordinated behavior among network members.  It does so 
by reducing the actors’ free riding and facilitates the performance of a co-market 
orientation.   
The second contractual control mechanism investigated is the presence of 
formalization. Formalization refers to the extent to which rules and procedures 
govern the relationship between interorganizational partners (Van de Ven 1976), and 
facilitates the performance of a co-market orientation. This is because it identifies 
duties and responsibilities for parties in a bilateral collaboration (Heide 1994).  In 
contract theory, and as used in the transaction cost economy, formalization fosters 
convergent expectations (Reve 1986). In my empirical analysis I found that 
formalization positively affects co-market orientation in the single-firm analysis, but 
the effect was not significant in the dyadic analysis. The analysis of the dyadic 
sample controls for method variance, and its results have a higher degree of validity 
than single-firm analysis. Therefore, in the dyadic analysis, I can, to a greater extent, 
anticipate that the effects can be traced to the effects from the construct, and not 
because of method variance. This exemplifies the necessity to include a more 
stringent method when analyzing survey data. Based on the dyadic test, I conclude 
that the empirical test does not demonstrate that formalization affects a co-market 
orientation.  
A summary of the empirical test of contractual control demonstrates that when 
the parties implement a centralized decision mechanism this facilitates the 
performance of a co-market orientation. Formalization, on the other hand, does not 
seem to have any affect on a co-market orientation, see Table 7.1. 
 
 Table 7.1 
 Dependent variable: 
Co-market orientation 
  Findings: 
Independent variables: Predicted Single-firm Dyad 
Contractual control    
Centralization + + + 
Formalization + + NS 
Table 7.1 Findings from contractual control 
 
7.1.3 Effects of social capital 
The second control mechanism is social capital. The central proposition of social 
capital theory is that a network of relationships constitutes a valuable resource for the 
conduct of social affairs. Such a resource provides members with the collectivity-
owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the 
word. Social capital is separated into relational embeddedness and redundant 
knowledge, which is derived from a level in the market and closeness. First, a test of 
the two types of social capital was performed. As derived from existing theory 
(Ahuja 2000; Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973; Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001; Uzzi 
1997), relational embeddedness exists under conditions of closeness and high 
frequency, which is measured through the actors’ perceptions of each other as 
collaborators versus competitors (Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). Knowledge 
redundancy is identified through the different levels in the market, where a horizontal 
level facilitates redundant knowledge and a vertical level facilitates structural holes 
(Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). First I tested whether relational embeddedness was 
more strongly correlated to collaborators than competitors, and whether knowledge 
redundancy was more strongly correlated to actors at a horizontal level than a vertical 
level. The empirical test, illustrated in Table 7.2, supports my assumptions. In other 
words, when actors in a social network perceive themselves as collaborators in the 
network, they have a significantly higher frequency of interactions and lower distance 
than actors who view themselves as competitors. When actors in a social network 
operate at a horizontal level, they have significantly more redundant knowledge than 
actors who operate at a vertical level in the market. Based on this, the constructs of 
relational embeddedness and knowledge redundancy, which are derived from the 
structural network in which the actors operate, are implemented in the model as two 
forms of social capital.  
 
Table 7.2 
  Findings: 
 Predicted Single-firm 
Relational embeddedness:   
Collaborators > Competitors + + 
Knowledge redundancy:   
Horizontally > Vertically level + + 
Table 7.2 Fisher Z-test of dimensions in social capital 
 
Two features regarding relational embeddedness were predicted to facilitate the 
performance of co-market orientation: reciprocity of direct ties and the risk of social 
lockout in closed networks. The empirical analysis supports the prediction that 
relational embeddedness hampers opportunistic behavior and thereby facilitates 
collective behavior. Based on this, I can predict that the existence of reciprocity in 
social networks affects actors’ behavior in a way that encourages them to work for 
the common. This is because the partners expect that unselfish effort will be returned, 
which is demonstrated in this test. Also, in closed networks, the information about 
one party’s opportunistic act diffuses rapidly to other related partners and sanctions 
for deviant behavior are more easily imposed. Therefore, such networks reduce 
actors’ tendency to free ride and the level of coordinated behavior is enforced.  
The second type of social capital is redundant knowledge. Redundant 
knowledge is the opposite of structural holes, i.e. structures where the partners share 
ego networks (Scott 1991). The empirical analysis gives support for knowledge 
 redundancy to positively affect co-market orientation, i.e. the test is significant for the 
single-firm analysis and dyadic analysis, see Table 7.3. Therefore, when partners 
share ego networks, i.e. operate at a horizontal level in a co-producing network, they 
have similar information which enables them to convert information into similar 
knowledge. This is important because it affects the interpretation of information that 
transfer between the parties and their level of co-market orientation increases. Based 
on the regression analysis I can anticipate that actors at a horizontal level have a more 
favorable opportunity to perform a co-market orientation, such as in co-producing 
networks.  
A summary of the empirical test of social control demonstrates that parties who 
are close and have a high frequency of interactions are associated with relational 
embeddedness, whereas parties operating at the same level in the market are 
associated with redundant knowledge. Relational embeddedness facilitates the 
performance of a co-market orientation through its redundancy and social norms, and 
knowledge redundancy gives support to its affect on co-market orientation through 
actors’ shared interpretation.  
 
Table 7.3 
 Dependent variable: 
Co-market orientation 
  Findings: 
Independent variables: Predicted Single-firm Dyad 
Social capital    
Relational embeddedness + + + 
Knowledge redundancy + + + 
Table 7.3 Findings from social capital 
 
7.1.4 Effect of structural position 
The final factor, which is tested for its affect on a co-market orientation, is the 
structural position of the actors in the network. The empirical test provides support to 
Olson’s (1965) proposition that actors with a central position in the network are 
willing to bear larger costs of the collective provision. The rationale is that these 
actors are more motivated to perform the collective action because they are more 
prominent. Indirectly this proposition says that less prominent actors have a greater 
tendency to free ride. As can be seen from Table 7.4, the hypothesis is supported by 
the  
 
Table 7.4 
 Dependent variable: 
Co-market orientation 
  Findings: 
Independent variable: Predicted Single-firm Dyad 
Structural position + + + 
Table 7.4 Findings from structural position 
 
single-firm and the dyadic analysis. Therefore, the effect of structural position is 
supported in this research. 
A summary of the empirical test of structural position supports the idea that 
centrally positioned actors tend to bear a larger degree of the burden of the collective 
actions.  
7.1.5 Effect of co-market orientation  
Regarding the effect of a co-market orientation in co-producing networks, this 
research has identified specific investments as a mediating variable on customer 
value. I start the discussion with the results from the effect of co-market orientation 
on specific investments.  
The specific investments in this research are defined as adaptation costs, costs 
that are endogenous to governance. These investments are physical, such as 
investments in equipment, machinery and infrastructure, and investments in 
activities, such as human assets. Because the adaptation toward the customer 
increases the co-producing network’s attractiveness, even for those who do not 
 participate in the investments, the investments are defined as a public good. This is 
because the adaptation produces goods that are non-excludable and non-rival or 
indivisible between all of the actors in the network. 
As illustrated in Table 7.5, the empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that 
the degree of resources used in adaptation increases with the level of co-market 
orientation. Co-producing networks are identified as fragmented markets, which are 
characterized by the specialized businesses that are occupied with divided or 
narrowed tasks (Dollinger 1990). This situation leads to the problems of unsolved 
tasks and sub optimization (Olson 1965). To help solve these problems, this research 
demonstrates that the more co-market orientation is performed by the actors in the co-
producing network, the more willing they are to use resources to adjust their products 
toward each other. Therefore, when the parties perform a co-market orientation they 
develop an understanding of what and why to invest. This understanding enables the 
actors to resolve unsolved tasks in coordination and it prevents the actors from 
operating in a sub optimizing way, even when this conflicts with  
 
Table 7.5 
 Dependent variable: 
Specific investments 
  Findings: 
Independent variable: Predicted Single-firm Dyad 
    Co-market orientation + + + 
Table 7.5 Findings from co-market orientation 
 
individual short term profit. Co-market orientation is, therefore, one answer to the 
coordination problems in co-producing networks. 
To summarize, the empirical test of the effects from co-market orientation on 
specific investments is that it increases actors’ knowledge of what and why to invest.  
As a result, the actors’ are more likely to use resources to adapt to each other. 
Consequently, co-market orientation reduces the occurrence of problems caused by 
unsolved tasks and sub-optimization in co-producing networks.  
7.1.6 Effect of specific investments 
As Deshpandé, Farley and Webster (1993) point out, the effects from customer 
orientation should be measured by asking customers themselves, rather than the 
organization’s key informants. Therefore, participants were asked to pass out 10 
questionnaires to each of their customers. Sixty-seven out of a possible 288 complied, 
which resulted in a total of 449 customer responses. Because of the low customer 
response rate, the companies’ response of customer value was used for further 
analysis.  
We predicted that the more resources companies used to adapt their products to 
each other to handle problems with unsolved tasks and sub-optimization, the more 
positive the evaluation from customers. This understanding of customer value is not 
simply 'added' but is mutually 'created' and 're-created' among actors with different 
values for complementary products (Ramírez 1999). The empirical analysis 
supported my prediction that specific investments positively affected customer value. 
For instance, my analysis demonstrates that when actors in co-producing networks 
use resources to synchronize their market information, the customer uses less time on 
search and evaluation. The empirical analysis also demonstrates that resources used 
for adapting products toward each other positively affects the customers’ perception 
of the price they pay for the product. Also, the perception of physical and 
psychological risk is lowered through the coordination. Further, customers report that 
they stay longer at destinations where the actors have invested resources for 
adaptation.  
A summary of the empirical test of the effects from specific investments on 
customer value is that it increases the customer’s perception of value gained from the 
transaction. As a consequence, product adjustments made by the co-producing 
businesses, specifically for the customer, have a strong affect on the customer’s 
evaluation of the total product, see Table 7.6. 
 
  
 
Table 7.6 
 Dependent variable: 
Customer value 
  Findings: 
Independent variable: Predicted Single-firm Dyad 
Specific investments + + + 
Table 7.6 Findings from specific investments 
7.2 Conclusions, implications and future research 
The following section discusses the conclusions, implications, and future research 
from the research. I start with a discussion of the research’s conclusions. 
7.2.1 Conclusions 
The answer to sub-question one is that specialized actors in co-producing networks 
coordinate toward each other to develop a co-market orientation, through 
centralization in contractual control and through social capital, which is derived from 
the structures in the co-producing network, hereof relational embeddedness from 
closeness and high frequency of interactions, redundant knowledge through similar 
ego networks, and through actors’ positions in the structural network. These factors 
therefore reduce the problem of free riding among the actors in the co-producing 
network since it motivates them to participate in a type of collective action. For 
centralization, the test proved that it enables the firms to perform a co-market 
orientation. This is because it clarifies boundaries on decisions and activities and 
thereby simplifies the decision-making (Galbraith 1977) through reducing the 
potential for uncoordinated behavior among the network members. For formalization, 
the test supported the single-firm analysis but not the dyadic analysis. Therefore I 
cannot predict that the extent of rules and procedures affects a co-market orientation. 
For social capital the research demonstrated that the social structures affect the 
resources the actors could derive from their network. Especially, the research 
demonstrated that for networks where the actors share ego networks, i.e. operate at a 
horizontal level in a co-producing network, their extent of similar information 
enables them to convert information, which positively affects their behavior of co-
market orientation. For relational embeddedness, the research discussed two effects: 
reciprocity and social lockout. First, the research demonstrates that the actors are 
more motivated to work for the common best when the network consisted of actors 
that had a high degree of reciprocity. Such reciprocity comes into being when the 
network is characterized by strong ties. Second, closed networks motivated for 
collective action because such networks included the threat to socially lock out actors 
that performed for individual best, at the cost of the common. Finally, the research 
demonstrated that those actors that had a central position in the network had to carry 
a larger degree of the collectively provision. This was because such actors were 
endowed, which means that they derived larger benefits from the collective provision 
than the others did. 
The answer to sub-question two is that the effect of business adaptation 
regarding the total product is that a co-market orientation positively affects the 
production of public goods in the network. The actors therefore have shifted their 
goal from short-term individual profit to long term collective best. This enables the 
creation of activities that reduce the problem of unsolved tasks and sub-optimization, 
which exist in co-producing networks. Such adaptation positively affects customers’ 
perception of value derived from such networks, as compared to networks with low 
adaptation. The research demonstrated that the more co-market orientation a co-
producing network performed, the higher degree of specific investments the network 
members spent on adapting toward each other and toward their collective customers. 
Therefore, the network, in fact, performed action for creating public good by 
themselves. The research demonstrates that such performance has a positive effect on 
the value the customers evaluate, when transacting with the co-producing network, 
e.g. the total product. These findings are summarized in Table 7.7. 
 
 Table 7.7 
   Findings: 
Independent: Dependent: Predicted Single-firm Dyad 
Centralization Collective MO + + + 
Formalization Collective MO + + NS 
Relational 
embeddedness 
Collective MO + + + 
Knowledge 
redundancy 
Collective MO + + + 
Structural position Collective MO + + + 
Specific investments Customer value + + + 
Collective MO Specific investments      + + + 
Table 7.7 Summary of findings in the structural model 
 
7.2.2 Implications 
The next part considers the implications of the research. The chapter is divided into 
theoretical implications and managerial implications. The discussion starts with 
theoretical implications. 
a) Theoretical implications 
Research on market orientation has been in focus for decades. The focus has been on 
the philosophical foundation of market orientation (Drucker 1954), its definition and 
operationalization (see Deng and Dart 1994; Gray, Matear, Boshoff et al. 1998; Kohli 
and Jaworski 1990; Narver and Slater 1990; Wrenn 1997), the link between market 
orientation and performance and potential moderating effects (see Deshpandé, Farley, 
and Webster 1993; Greenley 1995; Han, Kim, and Srivastava 1998; Slater and Narver 
1994), and market orientation in combination with organizational learning (Baker and 
Sinkula 1999; Day 1991; Hurley and Hult 1998; Siguaw, Brown, and Widing 1994; 
Slater and Narver 1995). Building on the existing market orientation literature, the 
intended contribution from this project is to test the implications of a co-market 
orientation in co-producing networks. Few studies have investigated market 
orientation at the inter-organizational level. Among the few is research on how 
individual market orientation affects the supplier-distributor relationship (Siguaw, 
Simpson, and Baker 1998). No research, to my knowledge, has investigated the 
implications of co-market orientation in strategic alliances or in situations within co-
producing networks. Because firms often create superior value for customers by 
collaborating with other organizations (Varadarajan and Rajaratnam 1986), see for 
example symbiotic marketing (Adler 1966), market-oriented firms that collaborate 
with other firms to compete must develop strategies for market orientation that is 
inter-firm rather than intra-firm in nature.  
The identification and inclusion of a co-market orientation, derived from the 
theory of collective action, is developed in this research. This research is therefore 
among the first that connects collective action and market strategies. By doing so, this 
research develops and discusses new solutions to old problems by combining well-
established theories.  
The research also contributes by demonstrating the controlling effect of social 
norms on co-market orientation between actors in co-producing networks. Several 
studies have discussed the controlling effect of social norms on a partner’s behavior 
(Coleman 1988; Greve and Salaff 2001; Gulati 1998; Maxwell 1999; Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal 1998; Putnam 1993); they also occur within marketing (Achrol 1997; Achrol 
and Gundlach 1999; Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach 2000; Gundlach and Achrol 
1993; Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990; Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). Further, 
contributions to network theory are increasing (Ahuja 2000; Uzzi 1997) and progress 
is also seen in the marketing literature (Achrol, Reve, and Stern 1982; Håkansson and 
Snehota 1995; Webster 1992). Despite this, the project will be one of the first to 
investigate the effect of social capital on an actor’s behavior in situations where self-
governing actors coordinate for co-market orientation. Among the few that have 
tested social capital in marketing using survey data are Rindfleisch and Moorman 
(2001) who tested the effect from social capital on development of new products. 
 Therefore, my research builds on their research and tests how social capital affects 
actors’ performance in a co-market orientation.  
The methodological contribution of this research is the empirical investigation 
of co-marketing alliances using dyadic data (John and Reve 1982). By investigating 
the situation of co-production in a network I have broadened the focus of empirical 
research within both market orientation and coordinating arrangements, such as 
contractual arrangements and social control. Analysis of the dyad, using MTMM, 
enables the control of standard error - conditions that have been asked for in 
marketing research (Bagozzi and Yi 1991).  
b) Managerial implications 
This research may have implications for collaboration in co-producing networks. The 
positive effect of co-market orientation and specific investments should increase 
managers’ focus in that area, especially in co-producing networks which are 
characterized by public goods. The analysis also sheds light on the fact that the social 
network itself controls actor behavior. Actors in co-producing networks may reduce 
the level of costly control systems whenever the network structure provides the actors 
with information that affects actor behavior. The more prominent actors should also 
be aware of the high risk of non-participation from non-prominent actors in the 
network. My research may recommend more formal control through centralized 
decision-making and informal control from the social network, because of the 
motivation problem actors have for participating in collective action, such as the 
situation are in co-producing networks.  
7.2.3 Limitations and future research 
Limitations and future research are considered together because the limitations of any 
research should form the focus of future research. The section is divided into the 
theoretical perspective, research design, data collection and the measurements.  
a) Theoretical perspectives 
This research builds on the assumption that the actor performs rational choices. The 
rational choice theory, however, has been criticized for categorizing individuals into 
one group, the “individualism” (Udéhn 1993), where a mixed motivation for 
participation should be used. This critique affects the logic of Olson’s (1965) 
collective action because this theory builds on the rational choice theory. The theory 
of collective action therefore has a view on “either/or” rather than “how much?” An 
example of an extension of motivation for collective action is Knoke (1988, p. 315), 
who identifies three dimensions of motivation: rational choice, affective bounding 
and normative conformity, all of which affect involvement in collective action. 
Therefore, motives, other than self-interest have been argued to be part of the 
explanation of collective action. As a result, future research that conceptualises 
rationality would strengthen the understanding of rationality and, thereby, any 
theories that build on rational choice theory (for example, the theory of collective 
action), and clarify how different motivation for behavior affects the outcome.  
A second limitation of the research is the fact that co-market orientation is 
viewed from the behavior orientation perspective. Even though this choice enables 
the determination of factors that affect co-market orientation in social networks, it 
does not allow for the investigation of corporate culture in co-market orientation 
(Webster 1988). Co-market orientation from the philosophy phenomenon point of 
view would emphasize factors such as shared cultural values. For instance, Achrol, 
Scheer and Stern (1990) identify organizational compatibility, goal compatibility, 
partner commitment and trust to be important characteristics of partner firms. By 
choosing the behavior perspective, this research could not identify how 
organizational cognition - schemata, scripts, cognitive maps, standard operating 
procedures, groupthink, theories in use, or frames of references - affects a co-market 
orientation. Therefore, future research that combines and/or contrasts these two 
orientations would be valuable.  
b) Research design 
Pair of companies in a series of co-producing networks have been investigated in this 
research. Some network researchers have, however, pointed out that it is necessary to 
map the entire network to capture the value from direct and indirect ties (Greve and 
Salaff 2001; Scott 1991). Future research should, therefore, take the research question 
 from this research and apply it to a structural network research. By doing so, a more 
in depth investigation of the effects that social network nodes and ties have on 
collective action could be undertaken (Scott 1991). For example, analysis could be 
done using the analytical tools KrackPlot and USInet.  
Further, the data in this research is based on a descriptive design with only one 
time interval. Future research that implements longitudinal data would strengthen the 
test of direction of the hypothesis.  
c) Data collection 
This research assumes that managers are capable of and willing to share information 
through questionnaires. By following the recommendations of measuring dyadic 
relationships in marketing by John and Reve (1982), the questionnaire tested 
respondents’ interest and knowledge to certify that they were reliable. Future research 
should test whether this reliability also holds for structural networks.  
 The time constraints of this project necessitated the data collection to be done 
during June - August. This is disadvantageous because the tourist setting in this 
research is seasonal. The customer data is therefore limited to summer-activities. 
Data from a full year would capture customer data from all types of companies within 
the industry. Such data would reinforce the validity of the research.   
d) Measurement 
One construct was new in this research, the notion of co-market orientation. The 
measurements for this construct are built on existing operationalization for individual 
market orientation. Even though the indicators reported satisfactory convergent and 
divergent validity, they should be exposed to future tests to strengthen their validity. 
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Appendix A Definitions of Social Capital  
  
Bourdieu (1986, p. 
243) 
Made up of social obligations (‘connections’), which is 
convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and 
may be institutionalized in the form of a title of nobility 
 
Bourdieu (1986, p. 
248) 
The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or 
recognition 
 
Baker (1990, p. 619) A resource that actors derive from specific social structures 
and then use to pursue their interests; it is created by changes 
in the relationship among actors 
 
Coleman (1990, p. 
302) 
Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, 
but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in 
common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, 
and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within 
the structure 
 
Boxman, De Graaf, 
& Flap (1991, p. 52) 
The number of people who can be expected to provide support 
and the resources those people have at their disposal 
Bourdieu and 
Wacquant (1992, p. 
119) 
The sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network 
of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition 
 
Burt (1992, p. 9) Friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom 
you receive opportunities to use your financial and human 
 capital 
 
Loury (1992, p. 
100) 
Naturally occurring social relationships among persons which 
promote or assist the acquisition of skills and traits valued in 
the marketplace… an asset which may be as significant as 
financial bequest in accounting for the maintenance of 
inequality in our society 
 
Schiff (1992, p. 
160) 
The set of elements of the social structure that affects relations 
among people and are inputs or arguments of the production 
and/or utility function 
 
Portes and 
Sensenbrenner 
(1993, p. 1323) 
Those expectations for action within a collectivity that affect 
the economic goals and goal-seeking behavior of its members, 
even if these expectations are not oriented toward the 
economic sphere  
 
Putnam (1993, p. 
67) 
Features of social organization such as networks, norms, and 
social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for 
mutual benefits 
 
Belliveau, O`Reilly, 
and Wade (1996, p. 
1572) 
An individual’s personal network and elite institutional 
affiliations 
 
Thomas (1996, p. 
11) 
Those voluntary means and processes developed within civil 
society which promote development for the collective whole 
 
Brehm and Rahn 
(1997, p. 999) 
The web of cooperative relationships between citizens that 
facilitates resolution of collective action problems 
 
Fukuyama (1997, p. 
10) 
The ability of people to work together for common purposes in 
groups and organizations 
 
Inglehart (1997, p. 
188) 
A culture of trust and tolerance, in which extensive networks 
of voluntary associations emerge 
 
Pennar (1997, p. 
154) 
The web of social relationships that influences individual 
behavior and thereby affects economic growth 
 
Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal (1998, 243) 
The sum of the actual and potential resources embedded 
within, available through, and derived from the network of 
relationships possessed by an individual or social unit. Social 
capital thus comprises both the network and the assets that 
may be mobilized through that network 
 
Portes (1998, p. 6) The ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of 
memberships in social networks or other social structures 
 
Woolcock (1998, p. 
153) 
The information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inhering in 
one’s social networks 
 
Knoke (1999, p. 18) The process by which social actors create and mobilize their 
network connections within and between organizations to gain 
access to other social actors’ resources  
 
 
